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Abstract 
 
This project draws attention to the ‘graphic elements’ – both written and visual – of a 
creative writing practice by exploring those graphic elements in both the critical 
component of this mixed-mode dissertation and in a series of creative artefacts.  Its 
principle aim is to record how as a practising creative writer-researcher I have made a 
series of artefacts as a way of providing an opportunity for readers and researchers to 
explore this specific instance of theoretically-informed aesthetic experimentation.  The 
psychophysiological researcher, Tony Bastick, having investigated expert ‘experimenters’ 
in Intuition: How We Think and Act (1982), identified an “intuitive method” that provides 
“insights” into a “creative process” that is, importantly, “preverbal”, yet not in fact visual 
(298–299).   In this project I raise a different set of questions from those raised by 
‘alphabetically’-guided ways of creating writing, as a means of continuing to learn and 
reinvent my own creative writing practice as mixed-mode (combining written and visual 
invention).  My proposal is to demonstrate how a creative writer-researcher with a keen 
interest in the visual arts might make an original contribution to the fields of creative 
writing and visual arts by providing readers with an opportunity to view and examine that 
set of artefacts alongside a critical document that explores how the choices were made 
during the double creative process.  My central hypothesis is that a practising creative 
writer-researcher is uniquely situated to identify how her or his own expanded and 
complexified creative writing process might work and to share that specific cross-
disciplinary knowledge as the epistemic aspects of a creative writing practice draws on 
resonances and exchanges with other disciplines, including the visual arts.  On these 
bases this mixed-mode submission includes a portfolio of writing within a visual arts 
framework together with a written critical commentary focused on issues raised by those 
complex practices themselves.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
                                                       Page Number 
 
 
  
Introduction:  …………………………………………………….                              6                  
Sensing the Logic of Writing: Creative Writing Reimagined        
 
  
Chapter 1:  ……………………………………………………….                             19 
Sensing a Creative Writing/Visual Art Practice-led Literature Review  
 
 
Chapter 2: ………………………………………………………..                             55 
Sensing the Logic of the Art of Writing and Publication 
 
  
Chapter 3:  ……………………………………………………….                             85 
A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process 
 
 
Conclusion  ……………………………………………………....                           112 
 
 
Endnotes  …………………………………………………………                          116 
 
 
Bibliography  ………………………………………………………                        122 
	   6	  
 
Figure 1  
Introduction   
 
The purpose of this research project, that comprises both creative and critical 
components, is to explore a range of written materials and complex visual registers.  I 
propose to argue that a broad research investigation into the disciplines of science, 
philosophy and the arts allows a creative writer-researcher to enquire into a creative 
writing practice where certain visual elements and words are rendered visible by engaging 
in it from the perspectives established in the critical writing.  The aim of this project is to 
investigate how a new way of writing is invented. This project offers an opportunity to 
peruse the contents of a creative writer’s portfolio while reading the written critical 
component.  As will be clear from the chapters that follow, the different writing and 
visual art practices that provide a key focus to this research undertaking grew in tandem 
with each other.  While the first edition of The Clara Ann Burns Story was published early 
during this doctoral research (2011) and is out of print, the second edition of The Clara 
Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011), and “pity for meat” (a recently completed series of visual 
and written artefacts) along with the critical writing that follows here need to be viewed 
as tightly connected, and the two need to be read in a va-et-vient (to and fro) movement 
that itself replicates the writing, reading and creative processes pursued throughout the 
research period.  
 The timing of the creative and critical processes involved in the production of 
this submission is vital to an understanding of my critical relationship with the so-called  
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'practice and theory' debates that remain central to the 'arts-practices as research' 
activities pursued in British and European university contexts. A widespread assumption 
seems to be that 'theory' and 'practice' are two distinct entities likely to produce quite 
different research outcomes, but this problem of naming (nominalisation) to which 
Melrose has drawn attention (sfmelrose.org.uk), and of sentence-production is as 
unhelpful in the practice-as-research context as it is hegemonic.  Implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly, something called 'theory' is located before something called 
'practice', which means that 'theory' conventionally has primacy while 'practice' is 
necessarily secondary, whereas in fact both nouns name modes of practice.  Theoretical 
activities are practised, whether those theoretical activities are conventionally 'creative' 
and/or conventionally writing-based.  In the instance I have recorded in this document, 
one major starting-point for the research undertaking was my own published creative 
writing; the traditional literature-based research activity I undertook for doctoral 
purposes followed that early publication, and it was triggered in part by the way in which 
the creative manuscript was first published – i.e. without the visual materials that seemed 
to me to be key to it. Hence the creative issues not only preceded but equally they 
triggered the ways in which I investigated the theoretical and philosophical writing that I 
cite and report on in what follows.  
 
Some of what I judge to be the most strikingly original products made by creative 
writers/visual artists – Anne Carson’s Nox (2010), Stephen Goddard’s “Anecdotes and 
Antidotes-Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing” (2003), Annette Iggulden’s “‘Silent’ 
Speech”i (2007/2010), Tom Phillips’ii A Humument (1980/2012), and Selah Saterstrom’s 
The Pink Institution (2004) – allow a viewer/reader to draw upon what the British 
typography and graphic communications researcher Michael Twyman suggested is 
“graphic language” and/or “verbal graphic language” (1982: 11).  Twyman developed a 
series of binary models in an attempt to clarify the difference between “Aural” (i.e. 
sound) and “Visual” (i.e. graphic) language (1982: 7).   But why would we want or need 
to do this?   
For example, Iggulden in “‘Silent’ Speech” invented an art practice that she 
describes in these terms: “I actively manipulate the pain of my silence to sustain my 
speech through visual language” (2010: 73).   Might it be possible to ‘move pain’ as it is 
felt in the body in such a way that a silent space might allow the preservation of speech 
through visual language?  Iggulden claims  
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I realised that it was colour alone that was significant and which resonated   
with meaning. […] When starting a work, I neither know what images may  
arise nor the final image that the painting itself will take. […] These images  
retain their tenuous link with both verbal and visual language, for although  
illegible as written language, they stem from alphabetic writing, and its 
associations with spoken word (ibid).   
  
 
Her reference to not knowing “what images might arise” and to “colour alone that [is] 
significant” seems to me particularly useful to my concern with “sensing the logic of 
writing” and “creative writing reimagined”.  But rather than not knowing, I would identify 
an expert creative writing practice as knowing of how “images might arise” and involving a 
process in which “colour is significant”.  I am in comparison much less certain how 
images stem from the alphabetic or a relationship with spoken words (although they may 
emerge with speaking out loud).  My sense of what Iggulden means here, is that it is 
colour (i.e. visual, image) that she valorises; nevertheless while engaging in her creative 
practice she sustains a connection with spoken language, moving to and fro between 
verbal and visual language.  I am suggesting this because Iggulden describes her creative 
writing/painting practice as both “discursive and figural” yet “particularly associated with 
the voice” (2010: 69).   This is a crucial point: the attempt to make a connection between 
visual and spoken language when colour (image) itself does not speak.  What do we 
know about the relationship between something that is discursive and something else 
that is figural?  To whom can we turn?  I am going to argue in what follows that my 
creative judgements are not guided by conventional spoken language or written language, 
instead from an understanding of how a particular organisation of a graphic language 
(e.g. shape, image, colour) arises during a “visual experience”,iii thus, perhaps, confirming 
what the French literary theorist and philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard wrote in 1971 in 
Discourse, Figure where he noted the “futile attempt to bring everything back to articulated 
language […] when it is patently clear that language, at least in its poetic usage, is 
possessed, haunted by the figure” (2011: 246).   
Lyotard’s doctoral thesis, Discours, figureiv was published in France in 1971.  It was 
not translated into English until 2011 (Univ. of Minnesota Press).  It prefigures many of 
Lyotard’s early concerns that he continued to work on in his later writing, for example: 
Libidinal Economy in 1974 (English Translation, 1993, The Athlone Press); The Post-Modern 
Condition: A Report On Knowledge in 1979 (English Translation, 1984, Univ. of Minnesota) 
and The Inhuman: Reflections on Time in 1988 (English Translation, 1991, Polity Press).  
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While all of Lyotard’s works are useful, Discourse, Figure (2011) in particular, provides 
concepts related to his sense of the differences – for an artist or a reader – between an 
aesthetic (creative) writing process that he might have described as figural and critical 
writing that he might have described as discursive.  This distinction, as I proceed to discuss 
and demonstrate in what follows, is key to my project.  Before I proceed to explore the 
usefulness of Discourse, Figure further, there are two points I would like to make: first, 
Lyotard seems to me to have been interested in a creative writing/inscription decision-
making process at “the moment the artist’s hand frees plastic vision”, rather than how 
one might interpret or “read” an artefact (211-212).  In particular he was interested in 
that artist’s “eye, and judgment, forcing the mind to take the position in front of the 
sensory” (212).  In the case here the focus of this particular project is on how a particular 
series of artefacts are invented from the point of view of the artist rather than to 
interpret meaning of or critique of already made artefacts.  Second, while Lyotard’s 
approach to writing in Discourse, Figure is to identify its essential material as graphic,v my 
approach is to argue that a creative writing/inscription process is guided by what 
importantly is an internal (embodied) visual process and a set of highly specialised 
actions.  As such, I am indeed arguing that the central person having a clear view of this 
visual process and of these specific actions is the artist and in this particular case, the 
artist-researcher.  In other words, it is the practising artist-researcher who is in a position 
to identify how the seeing, doing and making of an artefact is experienced in the mind-
body and to document the decision-making processes ‘discursively’.  By ‘discursively’, I 
mean critically because such an artist-researcher has demonstrated not only an interest in 
engaging in aesthetic practice and testing and authenticating that practice but also in 
presenting an archive of the research findings, in the form of a mixed-mode portfolio, to 
the broader research community. 	  
As the title Discourse, Figure suggests, Lyotard’s aesthetic opens to a path of 
reflecting on the confusion between discourse (phonetic-related) language and figural 
(colour or graphic related) language, in whatever language this might be.vi  He argues, in my 
view, that because discourse is governed by phonetic (heard) experience it tends to be ruled 
by a certain dominant culturally accepted understanding of reality, whereas a figure relates 
predominantly to visual works of artvii that are seen and therefore silent, thus resisting 
closed linguistic structures.  Lyotard associates works of art with desire, feelings, and 
sensations that always exceed representation.  It follows that the outcome of a creative 
writer’s production process, whose experience as I indicated above may be significantly 
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visual rather than verbal (word focused), must not be mistaken as having a necessary or 
direct relationship with discourse. In Lyotard’s terms no matter how we might want to 
categorise creative inscription – as writing, illustration, poetry, or painting – it always 
remains figural.viii  In other words, it is what is seen and, in critical terms, what matters is 
how it works.   
 (the “I” of the practising artist-researcher) am going to argue that a figure is a 
key concept in opening up thinking about a new and different creative writing practice 
that is visually-led.  Lyotard also called a figure a “figural space” (50).  He describes a 
figural space as “sensory” and “provisionally ‘space of designation’ because its properties 
seem analogous to those of that space and contradict those of linguistic space” (ibid).      
How I understand Lyotard’s “figural space” is that it relates to works of art, and 
in particular to a kind of understanding of writing that can encourage a creative writer to 
‘sense’ix in the mind-body how to make an artefact by selecting and organising visual 
registers in an unexpected way.  An outside observer, such as an art critic or historian, 
might argue that parts of the artefact are easily recognisable (e.g. words, lines, marks).  
However, a “figural space” permits aesthetic inconsistency as it troubles or even fractures 
the phonetic relationship between a particular set of words and stable meanings for the 
purpose of showing how reality can be continually tested, redesigned, and reimagined by 
engaging in a creative writing process.  Lyotard wrote: “I need only note that reality is 
constituted from the imaginary” (281).  That is, it has no independent existence outside 
of perception, and perception shifts and changes.  It is from this Lyotardian use of the 
“imaginary” (itself a Lacanian notion) that the relationship between a “figural space” and 
an artist’s desire to reimagine different ways of making artefacts constitutes the force that 
drives a visual art-making process itself regardless of the name ascribed to it: poetic 
writing, painting, drawing, inscription, script, graphic signal and so forth.   
In Discourse, Figure Lyotard shows his readers photocopies of what he calls 
illustratedx artefacts while pointing out in his critical writing that a creative writing practice 
has never been limited to making “unillustrated” (262) phonetic (i.e. stable, signifying) 
artefacts.  Rather, writing itself has always been an illustrative practice that allows for 
fluctuation between visual registers and meaning.  It is this point of fluctuation between a 
figural-space and discourse where words are understood as imitating a graphic illustration that 
cannot be defined or limited to a particular meaning but rather spurs questioning, 
complexity, non-representation and non-signification by subverting the easily 
identifiable.  In this way creative writing, Lyotard seems to me to suggest, is an activity 
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that takes place in “the process, as it were, of making itself visible, that is […] such as one can see it 
before looking at it […] in other words, the [artist] made us see what seeing is” (197) (writer’s 
emphasis).xi  While a creative writer may risk obscurity and economic poverty by making 
artefacts that are not easily identifiable to a broad audience, at the same time she or he is 
fulfilling a desirexii to bring to life new forms of writing. 
I want to draw attention to the Lyotardian notion of illustration as cited above, 
since its usage relates to an unconventional notion of the illustrator. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2010) an illustrator is a “person who draws or creates pictures 
for magazines or books” (873).  The preposition “for” implies that an illustrator is 
different from the person who creates a book or magazine.  The implications of the 
English definition, of course, might not be what the French philosopher – Lyotard – had 
in mind.  Antony Hudek, one of the translators of the original book, Discours, figurexiii 
(along with Mary Lydon), in a paper entitled “Seeing Through Discourse, Figure” (2011) 
cautioned those who explore Discourse, Figure that 
 
 all Discourse, Figure could do—and it is considerable—is describe its own 
 struggle to dwell in the abstract, floating space between discourse and figure. 
 How to translate the book’s dé-jeu? In the language in which it writes itself— 
that is, each time language tries to arrest its own motion in the act of  
writing (parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia12/parrhesia12_hudek.pdf). 
 
Hudek points out (above) that a Lyotardian understanding of language is not identical to 
generally accepted meaning.  The enquiry that Hudek was struggling with in this 
particular case was how to translate the French writing into English, while at the same 
time, understanding that this particular writing of Lyotard’s is an image of something that 
has to be sensedxiv rather than rationalisedxv (or reduced to everyday English).  This 
sensory way of understanding what writing is seems to me to be useful, because it 
focuses attention on the individual difference of shape and dance of the figural colour; 
how the details of a “figural-space” were rendered is unlikely to be available to a 
spectating eye.  This provides the central argument for this present project.   
To return to the notion of illustration, in the present context a reader might 
initially observe that I have chosen in the portfolio (presented to the reader/examiner) to 
“illustrate” a pre-existing writing, as is suggested in the OED definition above.  In fact, I 
have explored visual registers, which constitute an aspect of my lived memory, in the 
present tense, for the simple reason that during my creative writing decision-making 
process living memories arise in my imagination as primarily visual images that the 
writing seeks to “illustrate”, thereby illuminate living memories and shape and punctuate 
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these via an intuitive method (which is part of expertise).  This overcomes any sense that 
we might expect to find elsewhere that the visuals “illustrate” an already written text to 
which they are secondary – which would make me an illustrator and not a creative writer.  
Instead, in what follows, I am going to argue that words are positioned within the fabric 
of the visual “image-stuff” that pre-exists them.   
 My sense is that Lyotard’s enquiry aimed to explore and test how it seemed to 
him as a literary theorist, philosopher and writer that writing itself was made of the 
“image-stuff”xvi that he argued already exists in an artist.  Freud might have named the 
site of this already existing “image-stuff” as emerging from the “preconscious” or 
“unconscious”.xvii  My own argument is that a creative writing process is led by an artist’s 
seeing, rather than hearing (a voice in the head), and might be informed by a different set 
of questions from those asked of translation or interpretation, precisely because 
translation or interpretation always arrives after the act of writing.  In these visually-led 
cases, I am arguing, each creative writer invents a graphic language that resists discourse 
(i.e. phonetic speech, rational argument, narrative, dialectic) by allowing the mind’s eye 
and hand to lead to a silent figural resting place, because creative thinking – in my view – 
involves visualising an artefact in the mind as it is emerging in reality.  As Lyotard 
explained: “Reading is hearing, not seeing.  […] [The] moment the artist’s hand frees 
plastic vision […] one must keep at arm’s length the assumptions, interpretations, and 
habits of reading that we contract with the predominant use of discourse” (2011: 211-
212).   
 In 1982, the psychophysiological researcher Tony Bastick identified what strikes 
me as a similar kind of process in his Intuition: How We Think and Act (1982).  Here 
Bastick noted that preverbal is the 
 
property […] of intuition […]. Firstly because intuitive perception and  
processing is speedy on many parallel modalities whereas the verbal mode  
is linear and slow in comparison.  This ‘speedy parallel’ versus ‘slow  
linear’ comparison is […] the sensory quality of the knowledge of which  
the subject becomes aware through the intuition [that] precedes verbalization  
and makes its complete verbal communication impossible.  It seems words  
only assist in the ongoing intuitive process by reason of their connotations  
and affective associations.  They are however a means of communicating  
and verifying after the intuition in the later stages of the creative process  
(298).   
 
As Lyotard put it in Discourse, Figure in 1971, we are looking, in creative writing, at a 
“mobile spacing of seeing” and “the ‘lateral’ relations of words and images” along with 
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“language undone” (2011: 53).  I am going to argue that this kind of immediate way of 
knowing or “intuitive process”, that arrives before the verbal (i.e. discourse), is where an 
aesthetic choice is first opened up, while an “intuitive method” (Bastick 1982), that may 
have no need of dependence upon complex discourse, is likely to be developed on the 
basis of artistic experience.       
Two years before Lyotard completed Discourse, Figure, the psychologist Rudolf 
Arnheim, in Visual Thinking (1969/1997) was interested in a visual and sensory way of 
making an artefact. “A person, who paints, writes, composes”, Arnheim explained, 
“thinks with the senses […] productive thinking in whatever area of cognition takes place 
in the realm of the imagery” (1997: v).  What Arnheim’s book suggests, from my point of 
view, is that a creative writer is likely in fact to be a visual artist whose aesthetic decision-
making process is guided by “the stuff of the senses” (1), “visual thinking” (80), 
“memory images” (84), or “imagery of thought” (118), that arise from “perceptual 
thinking, which I will distinguish as intuitive” (233).  In a very general sense this idea of a 
sensory way of thinking may also shed light on what Lyotard was pointing at when he 
wrote that “unlike speech, writing institutes a dimension of visibility, of sensory 
spatiality, that will allow precisely to make visible the universe re-created” (2011: 63).  
This is a key point in the account that follows, it may not be enough to think of a 
creative writer’s choice as informed by sounds of letters or words or sentences alone.  
Rather, it may be necessary to begin to think of a creative writer as a visual as well as 
verbal artist, who can test and experiment with different qualities, including, as I have 
suggested above, the texture, colour, and depth of paper (Carson 2010: 3.3-4.2).  I 
propose in the different artefacts assembled here in this research project to allow a 
sympathetic reader/viewer to understand some of the implications of the complex and 
apparently radical scenario that I have set out in this “Introduction”.   
In 1987, the British anthropologist Jack Goody pointed out that the “oral and 
written […] are often confused” but that historically writing “changes […] the ways in 
which [the human] understands the universe” (1993: ix-3).   Goody argued: “The physical 
basis of writing is clearly the same as drawing, engraving and painting – the so-called 
graphic-arts” (3).  If, above all, writing is in fact a graphic (from the Latin graphicus 
“picturesque”) artistic (from the Latin artem “practical skill”) practice, this recognition 
may lead us to consider the possibility that a creative writing practice could be guided – 
or even orchestrated – by a visual experience rendered through visual language.   
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In 1999 the American political scientist and visual language researcher Robert 
Horn suggested visual language is a way of writing on a computer that involves the 
integration of words, images and shapes.  Horn argued    
 
I define visual language as a tight and thorough integration of words, images  
and shapes.  The emphasis is on integration. […] Visual language is becoming 
widely used. […]  All computers sold these days are graphic […]. Education  
for the most part, has steered people in the direction of learning verbal 
expression and in many cases completely ignoring the use of visual language 
elements. […]  I think that we are seeing a new mode of what I call “multi- 
modal” reading developing. Visual language communication units are both  
more demanding for readers and more immediately comprehensible. Because 
multiple levels of visuals, text, and concepts are combined, they require readers  
to spend a little more time in synthesis in order to come away with the full 
meaning of the communication.  At the same time [...] [we] need to figure out 
how and when to integrate visual language into the curriculum [...] (1999: 1-5).       
 
Should Horn’s observation give us pause to consider “visual language” from the context 
of creative writing practice-led research?  I have suggested, above, that Carson, Goddard, 
Iggulden, Phillips, and Saterstrom’s writing practices both exemplify and demonstrate a 
highly professional aesthetic use of visual language in the sense that Nox, “Anecdotes 
and Antidotes-Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing”, “‘Silent’ Speech”, Humument, 
and The Pink Institution, put on display not only words but also images, shapes, and 
shades of colour.  In this case, however, a key question remains: can we – how might we 
– understand how this kind of visual creative writing process works if most of the tools 
used by a literary scholar and critic traditionally come not from the visual arts themselves 
but from literature and language studies?  Would a highly detailed first hand account – if 
some such thing is available – of how Carson, Goddard, Iggulden, Phillips, and 
Saterstrom chose to use a variety of visual registers be of interest to other creative writers 
and/or visual artists?  
In 2013, the practising creative writer, researcher, and educator Stephanie 
Vanderslice proposed that creative “writers in the digital landscape must be aware of the 
ways in which new media changes and of their need to learn it as they see fit and 
accommodate to it in whatever ways that benefit their work” (2013: 139).  The present 
mixed-mode research enquiry seeks to identify how a practising creative writer-researcher 
experiments and tests new and different ways of making artefacts that have only 
relatively recently become available on personal computers, and how this might work.  It 
may also be of use to other creative writers who are working on computers.  
	   15	  
Dianne Donnelly, like Vanderslice, is a practising creative writer-researcher 
editor, and educator, who in Key Issues In Creative Writing (2013) identified a number of 
changes that are occurring within the discipline of creative writing that are related to new 
“digital media” and how these changes differ from those that have been normalised 
within the mainstream traditions of educational systems.  Donnelly also argued in favour 
of investigations into how these changes work specifically to complexify and enrich the 
discipline of creative writing:  
 
As students engage in digital media, they are building new literacies that are  
more complex than conventional literacies.  Creative writing also uses 
space theory in interesting ways (i.e. hyper-text, photos, maps, vlogs, wikis, 
music) that interfaces with textual dimensions, digital tangibles and online 
platforms. While digitization invites readers in at a new level, it also invites 
students to bring together constructions from other disciplines, welcomes 
disciplines to partner in unexpected ways, and positions writers to consider  
how the visual arts might enhance the hybridity of stories and essays through 
manipulations and juxtapositions of photo/videos and text. When it comes  
to visual methodologies […] why compartmentalize creative writing when  
the discipline is almost always found in spatial proximity – programmatically –  
to our university relations?  As creative writing crosses boundaries within  
the university system we see more potential for new disciplinary  
partnerships, new relations and new ways of redefining literature (7). 
 
 
Donnelly’s suggestion, above, indicates that creative writers are now “crossing 
boundaries” into other disciplines, particularly into the “visual arts”.  This seems to me 
to be useful to my enquiry concerning how a creative writer in a digital age might go 
about exploring and discussing new and different ways of writing that lead to the making 
of more new kinds of artefacts than were possible before.  For the purposes of the 
present enquiry I have cited the work of Donnelly as she reminds us that while the 
development of traditional ways of writing creatively may continue to be essential 
foundational tools used by creative writers (e.g. words, syntax, enjambment), as we move 
through the second decade of the 21st C. the discipline of creative writing is also opening 
up to research findings that are challenging traditions and allowing practising creative 
writer-researchers to make contributions by accounting for the ways artefacts might be 
made through the use of digital technologies.  My central argument here is that this 
technological access allows a creative writer who may very well be a visual artist to bring 
together an array of perceptual registers that offer other researchers a more complex 
interaction in a particular figural space since this new interaction would embrace a 
multimodal approach as opposed to one that uses letters or words alone.       
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I propose, in what follows, to argue that these issues, introduced above, need 
further investigation, since creative writers are likely to continue to record and design 
artefacts that effectively communicate (and communicate affectively) through a close 
integration of words and visual elements (e.g. shapes, photographs, lines) using new 
modes of digital technology (see figure 1: p. 6).  Therefore, I am proposing that it may be 
that the research findings that follow this introductory chapter may be helpful in two 
ways.  First, by breaking down barriers that suggest that the discipline of creative writing 
has ever been or should be limited to a particular set of phonetic-language related 
registers as opposed to remaining open to a diverse array of visual and tactile materials 
and techniques.  Second, by providing an opportunity to trace the evolution of the logic 
of an expert decision-making process of a creative writer-researcher through a virtual 
inscription of a (Deleuzian) rhizome as it moves to and fro between two main 
components: from the critical writing that points directly at a set of artefacts (these are 
designated by a number inside a parenthesis or brackets) to a creative writing practice 
reimagined, that discloses a language that can be perceived and processed but is not fully 
translatable into words.    
In what follows immediately, I provide a synopsis of the three chapters that 
follow, together with the creative components in the portfolio: first and second editions 
of The Clara Ann Burns Story (2011) and “pity for meat” (a recently completed artefact).   
 
Chapter 1, “Sensing A Creative Writing/Visual Art Practice-led Literature Review” 
introduces some of the key writings that act as guides in the explorations that follow this 
chapter.  The focus is on writing that takes issue with the traditions of critique by 
showing how a creative system works through various relationships that challenge – or 
simply sidestep – a predominantly rationalist approach. Donnelly and Harper’s Key Issues 
in Creative Writing (2013) brings to light why creative writing practice-led research matters 
and this writing is linked by a kind of invisible mercurial thread to The Sage Handbook of 
Digital Dissertations and Theses (2012) edited by Andrews, Borg, Boyd Davis, Domingo and 
England; to Melrose’s “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ and the Digital Submission” (2012) and 
to Perry’s work, including “Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis” (1998), 
“History Documents, Arts Reveals: Creative Writing Research” (2010) as well as “The 
non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative 
writing” (2008); and to Goddard’s “A Correspondence Between Practices” (2010), and to 
Iggulden’s “‘Silent’ Speech” (2010). These lead, in turn, to The Artistic Turn: A 
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Manifesto (2009) by Coessens, Crispin and Douglas.  These practice-led writings cultivate 
the joy of discovering different theoretical pathways each of which is potentially 
pertinent to the present enquiry.  From this point, the exploration of creative writing 
practice-led research works along wandering lines. Some lines led to dead ends such as 
Cixous’ Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993), and Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (2011) that 
ask different questions than the ones I set out to investigate suggesting that I reroute 
through other passageways. Other key documents introduced in this Literature Review 
include Lyotard’s Discourse, Figure (2011) and The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (1998) that 
together explore artistic practices as sensory and emotional events rather than working 
within a structured set of laws or genre. This privileging of sensation led to 
Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003) and Sylvester’s Interviews With Francis 
Bacon (2012), which, along with Senagala’s “Rhizogramming And Synesthetic 
Transformation of Designer’s Mind” (2005), together constitute unique art-practice-led 
focused writings, experiments, and diagrams.  These pointed toward Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology (1997), Arnheim’s Visual Thinking (1997), Twyman’s “The graphic 
presentation of language” (1982), Goody’s The Interface Between the Written and the Oral 
(1993) and Horn’s “Visual Language and Converging Technologies in the Next 10 – 15 
Years (and Beyond)” (2001): investigations of the graphic (non-phonetic) nature of 
writing itself.  I also include in this chapter reference to a chance encounter with 
Carson’s Nox (2010).  This led me to Freud’s “Screen Memories” (1899), Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory (1991) as well as his The Creative Mind (1974), and to Passerini’s 
“Connecting Emotions: Contributions from Cultural History” (2008), as well as 
Deleuze’s Bergsonism (1991).  Finally, I cite Ulmer’s Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (1994), 
Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 
(1999), and Morris and Swiss’ New Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories (2006) – 
drawing particular attention to Noland’s chapter entitled “Digital Gestures”.  These three 
documents seem to me to strengthen my argument regarding my shift in focus to 
creative digital practitioner expertise and experience, as this might be the only effective 
way that the complexities of creative decision-making and work processes can be 
identified and documented.      
 
In Chapter 2, “Sensing the Logic of the Art of Writing and Publication” I record how 
some of the originating decisions were made in making the First Edition of the Clara 
Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011) and my self-editing of the Second Edition, also published in 
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2011.  The latter involved my attempt, supported by the editor himself, to return the 
artefact to the visual state that was intended in the original manuscript.  This chapter 
begins with a note to the reader that points out that I have made these published paper 
books available to the reader thus providing a means to move haptically, as well as 
visually, to and fro from creative to critical components. I am arguing that the two 
inform/are informed by each other.  In the critical component of this chapter I use the 
writings of Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard as 
primary guides to support my case.  Most importantly, this chapter points directly at a 
series of visual artefacts that allow a reader to move to and fro from the artefacts to the 
critical writing.  I also point out in this chapter that some of the concepts developed by 
psychologists and philosophers seem to me to overlap notionally with the creative 
writing decision-making process that I used in editing the Second Edition of The Clara 
Ann Burns Story.    
 
In Chapter 3, “A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process”, the aim is to provide 
a partial account of the creative decision-making process that I used in making “pity for 
meat”, a series of artefacts presented in a creative writer’s (visual art) portfolio. The idea 
of presenting the artefacts in a visual/creative writer’s art portfolio evolved meditatively 
and gradually out of the research process itself.  “pity for meat” was completed only a 
few months before the completion of this doctoral research.  In this chapter, I argue that 
the research activity itself allowed me to enquire into my own creative writing decisions 
by engaging in research, and making some of the outcome available to other researchers.  
In this chapter, as in the previous chapter, I begin with a note to the reader that suggests 
she or he peruse the artefacts while reading the critical element, moving haptically as well 
as visually to and fro between creative and critical components.  My central argument in 
this chapter is that as an artist as well as researcher what drives both of these practices is 
the desire to experiment and investigate, as a way of learning how to reimagine a way of 
inventing new and different kinds of artefacts, and how a rhizomatic-creative-writing 
process might work through a diagram.      
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Chapter 1 
Sensing A Creative Writing/Visual Art Practice-led Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this literature/visual art review is to introduce the key published texts 
that I draw upon in the remainder of this mixed-mode thesis, as a means of setting out 
the exploratory path I have traced through them.  Each of the following sections 
considers a particular text in some detail and in an order that moves relative to the 
general logic of the overall project.  The aim is three-fold: first, to provide a backdrop 
that indicates why these documents are of interest to my project.  Second, to specify the 
uses I eventually make of these writers as the research writing progresses.  Third, for 
comparative purposes, to introduce a number of volumes of theoretical, literary, and 
exegetically focused writing that led me astray from my research focus as their limitations 
were not immediately apparent.  Nevertheless, these assisted in clarifying some of my 
difficulties with some published material that seems to be located in what might be called 
the ‘literary camp’ or ‘turn’.  This difficulty foreshadows my developing argument in the 
remainder of the dissertation.  These theoretical, literary, and exegetically focused 
volumes are interspersed throughout this chapter after I explore some of the key aspects 
of the most influential volumes. My hope is that this literature/visual art review will 
encourage further exploration of the interrelationship between a variety of influential 
writers who have taken a particular interest in artistic practises, creative processes and 
computer technology.   
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A key text in the field of practice-led research in creative writing is Key Issues In Creative 
Writing: New Writing Viewpoints (2013).  The editors are Diane Donnelly and Graeme 
Harper who are pedagogues as well as practising creative writer-researchers who teach 
creative writing in the United States.  Donnelly and Harper collaborated in writing the 
introduction and the concluding chapter to this critical volume and each also wrote two 
chapters individually. The other contributors are practising creative writer-researchers 
from different parts of the world: Patrick Bizzaro, Katharine Haake, Steve Healey, Nigel 
McLoughlin, Indigo Perry (also known as Gaylene Perry), Mimi Thebo and Stephanie 
Vanderslice.  The book is of particular interest to this project for three reasons.  First, 
this text focuses on “creative writer-researchers” and “the activities and understandings 
of creative writers” (178-179).  Second, it draws attention to creative writing-practice-led 
research in the doctoral context.  Third, it claims that there is very little if any ‘creative 
writing practice-led research’ available. One of the aims of my own project is to assist in 
filling this gap.  By ‘practice-led research’ I mean research that ascribes to the “Manifesto 
to the artistic-researcher” (Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas 2009: 181).  The published 
manifesto I refer to can be found in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto (Coessens, Crispin and 
Douglas 2009).  Although Coessens and Crispin’s central focus is music, Douglas is a 
visual artist whose doctorate was practice-led and focused on the creative process of the 
artist.  I return to it below for a general approach to artistic practices and as research.    
 The first chapter in Donnelly and Harper’s book is entitled: “Introduction: Key 
Issues and Global Perspective in Creative Writing”.  This introductory chapter begins by 
drawing attention to the work of Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean who edited Practice-led 
Research, Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts (2011) that was originally published in 2009 
by Edinburgh University Press (Donnelly and Harper 2013: xiii).  Smith and Dean 
proposed: “it is pointless for creative practitioners to work within the university unless 
the university environment responds to them and they respond to it” (Smith and Dean 
2011: 9).  What might be some of the implications of this observation?  According to 
Donnelly and Harper the discipline of creative writing is fluid and changing.  They 
suggest that those who are teaching in the academy who are not conducting art-practice 
research might not recognise emerging shifts in creative writing or know how to address 
these shifts through their curricula and pedagogy. Not recognising is causing knowledge 
“gaps” in the discipline of creative writing as we move through the second decade of the 
21st C.  The book suggests exploring and narrowing these “gaps in understanding – with 
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an eye on the discipline’s future role in the academy and in the world at large” (2013: 
xxv).  
 In the introductory chapter, Donnelly and Harper also identify a list of “key 
issues” related to creative writing that are posed as a series of questions (xxii–xxv).  
These questions correspond to chapters.  For example, question 6 is: “What are the key 
issues in creative writing as research and in creative writing research” (xxiii)?  In Chapter 
6, entitled “Creative Writing Research”, Harper focuses on the idea that creative writing 
“incorporates both creative practice and critical understanding” (104).   He noted: “I am 
using the term ‘creative writing’ here to refer to the actions that constitute creative 
writing, not the material artefacts that emerge from the human activity of creative 
writing” (104-105).  Hence, drawing attention to the embodied judgments of a creative 
writer-researcher during a creative process. To my developing perspective this set of 
observations is critical because it implies that creative writing knowledge lies in the mind-
body of a practising creative writer-researcher who is likely to be emotionally invested in 
the creative process and to be most familiar with recent research findings related to 
emerging creative writing in the world.  Question 9 is: “In what ways do the critical 
processes of research, study and theory impact creative writing pedagogies” (xxiv)?  In 
Chapter 9, entitled “Holding On and Letting Go”, Indigo Perry proposed: “In the 
university creative writing courses, what we have been teaching all along is the art of 
balancing a delicately intuitive and entwined process of holding on and letting go” (146). 
Perry recognises that the discipline of creative writing has no set boundaries; and that 
those who teach creative writing are taking a practice-led research approach.  According 
to Perry, a practice-led approach: “is carried out in the process of producing the creative 
work itself.  And this leads to how we might better establish pathways for research that 
develop quite organically” (157).  In other words, creative writing in the university in the 
future is likely to valorise: “intertwining theory and practice”, “the intuitive”, 
“knowledge”, and “the process of creating” (146-147).  This links with the present 
creative writing practice-led approach, the details of which will become clear as the 
reading/viewing and investigation proceeds.  Plainly, one of the most difficult areas for 
artistic research is epistemology, the study of knowledge itself, which, I argue in what 
follows, requires researchers in the field to engage appropriately with pertinent 
philosophical writing.    
 In a chapter entitled “Teaching Toward the Future” Vanderslice draws 
attention to emerging computer technology and how this impacts not only a creative 
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writer’s choice of materials and writing implements and how artefacts are made, but also 
how artefacts are presented and distributed (137-145). “We must teach [creative writers] 
[…] this awareness,” Vanderslice advises, “an awareness of the digital environment they 
grew up in and to which they must continue to adapt as they forge careers as writers” 
(139).  A practising creative writer-researcher’s position as it relates to experimenting 
with and testing new digital technology is another key issue in the present project.    
 Such key issues set out to challenge the way higher education institutions teach 
creative writing by speculating on the outcomes of other creative writers’ thoughts, 
feelings, methods and judgements, rather than advocating that the creative writer 
research the sorts of thoughts, feelings, methods and judgments that might have been 
involved in the creation of an artefact.  Specifically, a creative writing practice-research 
enquiry in the post-graduate or doctoral research context is most likely complex, highly 
individualised, idiosyncratic and sensory-led. The first-person focus on the embodied 
judgement of a particular, a named writer, clearly takes us into a field of qualitative 
research, as it is outlined by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln in their Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Sage Publications 2005).   
 There is also an emphasis in the case made by Donnelly and Harper on taking a 
broad investigatory approach to creative writing-research (xxi).  This kind of approach 
demands that a creative writer explore and develop her or his own creative writing 
process while simultaneously developing a highly detailed critical understanding of the 
specific details related to that process. In this way the creative and the critical research 
investigations enrich each other, placing a creative writer-researcher in a position not 
only to invent a new kind of artefact, but also to contribute to the discipline by sharing 
knowledge that details how this was achieved (179).   
 Harper points out that creative writing practice-research findings are directly 
related to how practising artists/creative writers “think, feel, and do [creative writing] 
that has not been fully articulated and certainly not researched” (107).  Furthermore this 
kind of art-practice-led research is “located in the development of modes, methods and 
ways of recording such research”, but, he also adds, “at present, we have some way to go 
in doing exactly that” (115).   
 This text overall draws attention to the importance of making a contribution to 
creative writing practice-led research by offering a ‘new point of view’.  This new point 
of view might emerge from a double stranded activity: by engaging in both a creative 
writing practice that increases in theoretic complexity and simultaneously conducting a 
	   23	  
broad art-practice-led research investigation in the doctoral context, since these might 
not be completely separate activities. 
 
The Sage Handbook of Digital Dissertations and Theses (2012), its editors claim, has been 
published as a guide to advanced research in a digital age.  I want to draw attention to the 
“Introduction” (1-11) that these researchers wrote collaboratively. Here Andrews et al (I 
am paraphrasing) emphasise that the relationship between the creative and critical in 
practice-led or practice-based research is being questioned in swiftly moving knowledge 
streams.  They are concerned that some universities have failed to adopt their regulations 
and guidance in accordance with current developments.  They point out that these 
“aspects interact with a philosophical debate about the primacy of the word and 
contestation of the assumption that words are essential to the validation of an activity as 
research” (1).  They also remind their readers that “design is central to the activity of 
‘writing’ a dissertation” (3), and that at “the core of the process are students and their 
supervisors, who need to work out, in collaboration, how to address a particular research 
problem” (7).  As a doctoral candidate conducting supervised practice-led research in a 
British university I believe the term practice-led research has become generally accepted as 
related to the work of an artist-researcher.  But can practice-led research be used by artist-
researchers to remember the experience of her or his creative decision-making process as 
it progresses toward development?  Or are all artist-researchers required to use a research 
model made by other researchers from different disciplines, going from a prefabricated 
model to building another, and back again, replicating the central order of an already 
made model?  Might it be the case that practice-led research in the arts can suggest one 
means of challenging all pre-established models, thereby allowing the research project as 
a whole to demonstrate innovation and artistry?        
 
In an attempt to provide a context to think about how this particular practice-led 
research enquiry is situated with regard to knowledge made widely available through 
published writing, I began this chapter by citing the work of Donnelly and Harper who 
have advocated a practice-led research that does not compromise the “individuality of [a] 
creative writing practice” (2013: 179).  Given that the aims of all research that claims to 
be “practice-led” might not be “individuality”, for contrastive purposes I want to 
highlight the work of three practising creative arts researchers: Stephen Goddard, 
Annette Iggulden and Gaylene Perry, who each wrote a chapter in Barrett and Bolt’s 
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Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry (2007/2010) that is a response to her 
or his doctoral project that required using a creative work-plus-exegesis model advocated by 
Barrett and Bolt (34; 159-163; 195).  But rather than utilising this widely used creative 
work-plus-exegesis model, I am interested in engaging in practice-led research that 
coheres, in part, with Harper and Donnelly’s notion of “individuality” (179); and with 
what Melrose, in “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ and the Digital Submission” (2012) calls 
“disciplinary specificity and identity” (298).  This approach, she argues, involves engaging 
with “modes of knowing […] and models of intelligibility (ways of seeing, knowing and 
doing) that differ from those that have been normalised within […] mainstream 
traditions of schooling” (299); the former are “highly individualised” (301) and are 
“constitutive to disciplinary practices” (303) that aim at identifying and documenting 
“decision-making in the creative and performing arts” (303).  I draw equally on Coessens, 
Crispin and Douglas’ proposal (I return to Coessens et al in detail below) that research 
should be “done by the artist, with the artist being in control of the research questions, 
deciding the delineation of the subject, defining the source and target domains, all from 
the artist’s point of view” (2009: 20).  Why am I interested in engaging with practice-led 
research that coheres with these notions?         
 
Perry’s research, she reports, culminated in a novel and exegesis, nevertheless she argued 
against the exegesis requirement:  first, in 1998 in “Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the 
Exegesis” (http://www.textjournal.com.au/oct98/perry.htm).  This essay was published 
while Perry was writing a novel that she explains is “a major component of a doctoral 
thesis” while the “other component is a mandatory exegesis drawing upon literary 
theory”.  In this essay one of the questions Perry asks (I am paraphrasing) is: why a 
doctoral candidate, whose focus is studying literature, is required to produce only 
exegesis, while a doctoral candidate whose focus is creative writing, is required to create 
both an artefact and exegesis?  She also questioned the meaning of ‘exegesis’.  Perry 
concluded that “an assessment of whether or not a compulsory exegesis can be enforced 
justifiably should continue”.  Second, in 2007 in a chapter in Barrett and Bolt’s book 
(cited above) entitled “History Documents, Arts Reveals: Creative Writing As Research” 
(2010: 35-45) Perry points out (I return to this important argument in “Chapter 2”) that 
her discussions as a doctoral candidate focused on the “suggestion that the creative work 
could be recognised as valid research within itself, without necessarily requiring exegesis” 
(35). Third, and finally, in 2008 in an essay entitled “The non-verbal and verbal: 
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expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (1-11) Perry argued that 
some of the outcomes of creative writing are “non-verbal” (the “non-verbal” is a key 
notion that I return to in Chapters 2 and 3) and “cannot be exegetised” (3-4).  Perry’s 
interest in identifying an alternative approach to the creative-work-plus-exegesis model 
seems to me to be useful for the purposes of the present enquiry, which is to explore the 
issue of a practice-led enquiry that engages with “disciplinary specificity” (Melrose 2012: 
303) by which I mean identifying and documenting modes of knowledge that operate 
during a highly individualised creative decision-making process.    
 
Iggulden’s chapter is entitled “‘Silent’ Speech” (2010: 65-79).  Here Iggulden identified 
what she calls “the creative practice of writing, copying the words of others, changing 
words into images” (77).  She indicates that she used “painting and drawing materials to 
[…] explore how material practice might advance and challenge theory” (66) and 
emphasised that her “work is never theory driven” (67).  Igguden is interested in what 
she calls “a visual experience that expresses the emotional […] lived experience” (79).  
She wrote: “The aims and outcomes of my practice can be explained through the words 
of the exegesis” (ibid).  But she argues that words cannot explain what is “non-verbal” 
(ibid).  She proposed (I am paraphrasing) that by providing different examples of what 
she refers to as “visual language” she has not only demonstrated how medieval nuns 
invented ways of seeing voices of women who have been silenced, but has also offered 
“images as a mode of communication” (ibid).  She remarked: “I am hopeful that my 
findings provide a stimulus for further research by others into this little explored area” 
(ibid).  Her reference to a “little explored area” and “research by others” seems to me to 
be useful to my concern for continuing to clarify why I have chosen certain notions 
related to practice-led research offered by other researchers, such as Donnelly and 
Harper, Melrose, Coessens et al, who suggest artist-researchers should focus on 
identifying and documenting specific creative decision-making that aspires to 
individuality, which perhaps implies a little explored area.  
 
Goddard’s chapter in Barrett and Bolt is entitled “A Correspondence Between Practices” 
(2010: 113-121).  He wrote that the primary aim of his “doctoral research was to focus 
on the possibilities of utilising video as a creative research practice, and the ways in 
which an exegesis could also function as a creative and reflexive practice” (114).  
Goddard explained that he “struggled with the practice-exegesis relationship from inside 
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the playing field” (2010: 113).  For Goddard the aim of exegesis is “to present a sense of 
the creative decision-making process(es)” that are “usually invisible to an audience, and 
also somewhat invisible to the practitioner, if they remain unexamined” (119).  Here the 
role of examining “a sense of the creative decision-making processes” seems, to 
Goddard, to lie in the process of exegesis itself.  But my own argument, in this mixed-
mode research enquiry, is that the creative work-plus-exegesis model can indeed generate 
insights into creative decision-making processes. Might it be the case that the exegetic 
model, as propounded by Goddard, perpetuates the marginalisation or erasure of specific 
“knowledge objects” that are operating during creative decision-making processes “in 
expert decision-making” (Melrose 2012: 304-305)?  I am suggesting this because 
Goddard noted:  
 
 Lorne Story both questions and adds annotations to the re-enactments and to 
my uncertain recollection of the original events.  The meta-narrative does not 
provide a coherent, explanatory master narrative.  It merely provides another 
perspective on the events surrounding my adolescent fall from grace. After  
the passage of more than thirty years, an un-tethered surfboard becomes  
a symbolic shield representing a slippery set of floating memories. […] 
I was attempting to trace the ways in which writing and video technologies 
 mediated and recorded my memories, stories, annotations and analysis.  To  
this end, I used the video camera as a form of memory detector, sweeping the 
 shoreline for lost trinkets and fragments of memory […] to present a sense  
of the creative decision-making process(es) within the context of the  
research practice (118-119).  
 
Iggulden indicated that    
 
 I was attempting to re-address my past.  After my mother’s death I was 
 sent photocopies of the notes she had used in her pastoral work as a 
 missionary in Pakistan in the 1960’s.  […] As I copied the already thrice- 
 copied words (the photocopy of her hand-written copy, from the copy of  
‘God’s words’ in the Bible), the ‘positive’ shapes formed by these  
re-writings left an image suggestive of the female body in the ‘negative’ 
spaces of the paintings.  I had unconsciously reasserted the memory of  
my mother into the spaces of the words of Law that had been used to silence  
her. […] When starting a work, I neither know what images might arise nor 
the final image that the painting itself will take.  […] These images retain 
their tenuous link with both verbal and visual language […]. My intuitive 
dialogue with visual and verbal languages has changed or added to the  
meaning of the words.  […] When I began thinking about the alphabet for  
this part of my research, memories of early school years reasserted themselves:  
seeing and trying to remember the shapes of the image of letters (72-74). 
 
 
Meanwhile Perry pointed out that      
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I was attuned to the traces of my fictional characters […] of the places that  
rang with their familial memories […] both in the act of writing it and in  
the finished narrative […] I began to confront my own past […] I started  
to recognise that I had angry feelings towards my own mother, feelings  
that needed reconciling. […]  In Water’s Edge I wrote of a disappeared father  
[…] my own father drowned in inland water […] it reminds me that I carry  
my father with me […].  I started to think a great deal about what this process  
of writing was teaching me […] I felt myself being involved with what  
was happening.  I felt that I lived it. […] There is much material about  
the creativity involved in the construction of memory […] there are few  
boundaries in imagining (38-45).  
 
It is provocative, perhaps, to observe that all three of these artist-researchers, above, 
have identified “memory”; yet, these artist-researchers’ use of the modifiers such as 
“lost”, “past”, and “disappeared”, which are affective (in the Deleuzian sense), also 
suggest to me that memory/remembering exists other than during a present decision-
making experience.  The methods identified by these writers such as using “the video 
camera as a form of a memory detector” or “trying to remember the shapes of the image” 
or “attuned to the traces of my fictional characters […] that rang with their familial 
memories” seem to me to negate these artists’ vital role in memory creation that each 
might have otherwise understood as what she or he sees, feels, and knows while making 
certain choices.  My contention is that “memory” rarely constitutes a major research 
focus in creative writing/visual art-making practices that are distinct from the products 
of the creative doing and making, and that if memory did constitute a major focus, then 
perhaps we would no longer need to propose that a video camera is a “memory 
detector” or that fictional characters have “familial memories” or that we are “trying to 
remember the shapes of the image”.  I favour instead drawing on Henri Bergson’s model 
of “memory-images” (1991: 133), for example, or Sigmund Freud’s model of “screen 
memories” (1899: 202), or Jean-Francois Lyotard’s model of “memory-effects” (1998: 
48) – to whose work I return.     
 My argument here is simple.  Goddard, Iggulden, and Perry identify “memory” 
toward the beginning of each of their published chapters in the Bolt and Barrett 
collection.  As I understand these published chapters, these artist-researchers are likely to 
have traced the general outline of a widely used creative work-plus-exegesis model that 
attempts to regulate knowledge on the basis of discourse (i.e. word, signifiers), rather 
than develop a figural process (in the Lyotardian sense) appropriate to the task they have 
taken on.  I am suggesting this because, despite announcing an interest not only in 
“memory”, but also in “personalised images” (Goddard 2010: 114); “visual processes” 
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(Iggulden 2010: 79); and in “perceptions” (Perry 2010: 43) their texts repeatedly return to 
“a series of interactive dialogues” (Goddard 2010: 118); to “research into words and their 
meaning” (Iggulden 2010: 66); and to “narrative” (Perry 2010: 38) – hence, to discourse 
(my emphasis), rather than remembering to prioritise what they have already identified is 
operating – that is, “memory”.  It seems to me that perhaps the phenomenon of memory 
is “somewhat invisible to a practitioner” as a result of the requirement to use the creative 
work-plus-exegesis model – a model that forgets that the artist is not a spectator; instead he 
or she has direct access to knowledge specific to the decision-making process as it is 
perceived and experienced in the mind-body.  According to Harper: “At best, an exegesis 
or commentary can offer some post-event notes on an event of creative writing” (2013: 
112).  My understanding of practice-led research is that it begins with the seeing, doing 
and making, and testing this experience against knowledge made widely available in 
published writing.  The artist-researcher moves to and fro, as the doctoral project is 
created as a whole from the artist-researcher’s point of view and undertaking, as the 
artistic-research is going on, for the purpose of exploring how this works and identifying 
and documenting artistic development and specific expert creative decision-making as it 
is going on. The point is not to make the creative work first, and after it is completed 
“reflect upon the chronology of the research process” (Goddard 2010: 118) thereby 
placing the artist-researcher in the position of a spectator or art critic or analyst who 
typically draws attention to something that has already taken place instead of what “is 
taking place”.     
  
 As suggested above, I am advocating here that we practicing creative writer-
researchers might find it useful to explore a range of writing, coming from a variety of 
fields.  Some twenty years before the publication of specialist texts on practice-led 
research, Helene Cixous composed Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993) and 
presented it as a series of critical theory-related lectures to an audience at the Wellek 
Library at the University of California, Irvine in the United States.  According to the 
summary on the back cover this is a book wherein “Cixous reflects on the writing 
process”.  A widely known and highly regarded writer and philosopher, Cixous, who is 
French, earned her doctoral degree in English literary studies.  She developed what 
became known as French Feminist Literary Theory.   
 How does a writing process work according to Cixous?  
 
 I began to write in the regions of the unconscious […] I could write 
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 a thesis, but the texts I wrote were never mine […] you cannot write 
 without the power of dreams (102 – 103).  
 
 The book displays long excerpts from a few writers: the Czech Republic-born 
German-language writer Franz Kafka (60), the Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector (62), and 
the Russian writer Alexander Pushkin (92). 
  
 How did these writers go about writing according to Cixous?   
 
 The book writes itself, and if by chance the person opposite should  
 ask what you are writing, you have nothing to say since you don’t know. 
 Yet the book is written […].  A book that writes itself and carries you on  
  […] even if you don’t know how it works (100).   
 
It is the wilfully articulated “knowledge gap” identified by Harper and Donnelly, that 
strikes me so powerfully in Cixous’ writing.  She is a researcher whose reputation is 
worldwide.  In this book we are introduced to a handful of creative writers, with whose 
writing we might well already be familiar, but about the writing process she provides no 
insight whatsoever.  Why, in this book, did Cixous choose not to explore the written 
work of philosophers or scientists, whose disciplines might have offered some insights 
into a creative writing process? She answers: “But what surprises me is the frequent 
distrust on the part of writers.  I don’t know where this is located, whether it precedes 
writing […] we have in view imaginary laws we believe order the world of writing” (102). 
Which returns us to the original enquiry: the writing process.  On the last page the book 
asks: “How can it be written” (156)?    
 What this very brief snapshot suggests is that Cixous’ Three Steps on the Ladder of 
Writing is narrowly focused, and the writer is ill-equipped to write on exactly what the 
book professes to be interested in, namely the writing process.  My own project is driven 
by the need to identify complex writing for and from the perspective of a practising 
creative writer-researcher who takes a broad investigatory approach to a creative writing 
process while also narrowing this focus by exploring a personal experience that points to 
particular outcomes of a creative writing process.  Perhaps we can’t ‘blame’ Cixous for 
these omissions: her focus on the work of a small number of other notorious writers 
means that, because her own creative writing is not included in her book, she cannot 
know, nor indicate, how the writing process of any writer involved worked.  Despite the 
publication of her own creative work (especially dramatic writing for the Théâtre du 
Soleil, Paris), she was not in the position, in this book, to specify how the (creative) 
writing process works.     
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The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto (2009) is a book created collaboratively by Kathleen 
Coessens (a philosopher and musician), Darla Crispin (a pianist and musicologist) and 
Anne Douglas (a visual artist and researcher).  It is primarily concerned with two issues: 
first, artistic research enquiries in the doctoral and post-doctoral academic settings that 
are conducted from the point of view of a practising artist; and second, the inadequacy of 
verbal and written accounts.  It is in The Artistic Turn that these practising-artist-
researchers announce the following “Manifesto for the artist-researcher” (that I am 
paraphrasing here): first, never forget that it is up to the practising artist-researcher to 
remember the origin of the artistic experience and the creative act; second, provide room 
for the artistic experience and creations; third, search for possible discourses appropriate 
to the artist’s experience and creations; fourth, search for hidden dimensions and 
different perspectives; and then, continue ... (181).  
 Like a Deleuzian rhizome, that sprouts simultaneously in different directions as 
it establishes connections, the manifesto (cited above) assisted in setting this research 
project in motion.xviii  While drawing notionally from a wide range of eminent scientists’, 
philosophers’ and artists’ work – including Theodore Adorno, Aristotle, Henri Bergson, 
Leonard Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu, John Cage, Michel de Certeau, Merce Cunningham, 
Gilles Deleuze, Rene Descartes, Albert Einstein, Jan Fabre, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Jurgen Habermas, Wassily Kadinsky, Alan Kaprow, Immanuel Kant, Paul Klee, Thomas 
Kuhn, Plato, Michael Polanyi, Rainer Maria Rilke, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Ludwig 
von Wittgenstein – Coessens, Crispin and Douglas theorise that “Western academia” in 
the decades leading up to the 21st C. has tended to valorise insular linguistically-led 
disciplinary research enquiries that sought to identify systematic procedures, 
“deterministic” protocols, and conformity to widely known theoretical models (15).  The 
book calls for practising art-researchers to explore and document complex “specific” 
individuated techniques and skill-sets gained through an embodied creative experience 
for the purpose of making a contribution to discussions that are different than those of 
an art theorist (178).  Immersed in the changing landscape of practice-led approach to 
artistic disciplines the book’s writers illuminate how artistic disciplines are best served by 
research, even though “more often than not a research project’s essence can only be 
demonstrated rather than told” (179).   
 This book also trumpets in a silent mercurial language a “new” (103) research 
approach aimed at discovering fresh and distinctive correspondences that interlink a 
theory with an artistic product, each of which enrich each other and allow an outside 
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reader/examiner a way to move back and forth in the relationship between the 
theoretical discourse that points to how an artefact was made, and the artefact itself.  It 
warns: “Critics of artistic research have argued that a research culture should be 
measured by the results” (179) but by doing so overlook the fact that an artistic 
“endeavour is (and always has been) concerned with playing the tensions between 
freedom and constraint, determinacy and indeterminacy, power of persuasion and 
political power” (179-180).  Furthermore, “art has become more and more central to 
philosophical discourse” (180) – examples of which we can find in Bergson, Lyotard, and 
Deleuze, among other writers, whose work I return to in some detail in the chapters 
below.  This kind of argument from experienced creative researchers signals why in the 
present project I draw from a number of philosophers’ work as well as that of published 
scientists, language theorists and artists who have taken a particular interest in heuristic 
practices, as opposed to asking whether the artefact is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or how we might 
want to compare an artefact to another artist’s work, or how we might want to categorise 
it.xix  While these are interesting questions, my own sense is that these kinds of questions 
are not relevant to this particular doctoral enquiry.  In my view the fundamental concept 
is expressed in Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas’ book on p. 102:  
 
 Like the ship on the sea, the artist is always on a journey, always somewhere  
 ‘in practice’, in movement, transforming matter so that it ‘matters’. So it is 
 with his or her research trajectory: every search for a definitive reference  
 point is in vain because the reference points themselves are moving, both  
 in the case of the ship, and in that of the artistic practices.  The unique 
  conditions of life at sea—unique in each time-space context and unique to  
 each journey—require a special set of practices and expressions peculiar to  
 seafarers.  Likewise, in making art, the outcome is rarely known;  
 nonetheless, we organise space, time and medium, creating its possibility  
 and using a range of skills and techniques specific to our art.  
 
Thus suggesting that the specific movement, sensory forces, energy shifts, are embodied 
as an open-ended art-practice research journey unfolds.      
 One of the most striking and compelling chapters is: “Deterritorializing the 
research space: the ways of knowing art” (76–97).  The term “deterritorialize” is related 
to a concept identified by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and French 
psychoanalyst Felix Guattari in 1980 in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(2014) that suggests knowledge has no set boundary or structure.  Coessens, Crispin and 
Douglas make use of the term “deterritorialize” by calling for artist-researchers in 
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“Manifesto for the art-researcher” to: “Deterritorialize the research space to provide 
room for the artist’s experience and creations in the world” (2009: 181).    
 The notion that a “research space” might engage with modes of “specific 
artistic knowledges” that according to Coessens et al, also “enables us to see the world as 
continuously in the process of formation and to act accordingly” (85).  This suggests that 
artistic production is evolutionary, activity-orientated, idiosyncratic, event based, and, I 
would argue, body-centred.  In other words, it is unlikely that an artistic strategy follows 
an established pathway.  Rather what is required of an artist is to become a re-searcher 
“re-immersing oneself in the processes of searching” (91) who continually engages in an 
investigation of a creative process that like a “rhizome” is complex and likely to grow in 
a multitude of unanticipated directions.  In order for a new artefact to be created or to 
emerge, these researchers suggest, we need a “deterritorializing space” and a 
“rhizomatic” method of journeying forth, as it is only through opening up to a new 
deterritorialized space that creative emergence can happen. The spatial analogy and 
metaphor of a rhizome provide a flexible epistemological model to an art-researcher, 
thereby inspiring the practising artist-researcher to rethink   
 
 traditional distinctions, forsaking the route-guide for the map, [as] we  
 will engage in a critically reflective attempt to unravel the space of, and  
 for, artistic research, eventually discovering a possible terra incognita (86).   
 
I return to the rhizome in considerable detail in the final chapter of this dissertation.     
 Much of the value in the chapter related to “deterritorializing” can be gleaned 
from the ways it demonstrates the usefulness of artistic research that interacts with 
“science and art, [as these] can both accelerate and connect their divergent lines of flight 
and [can] generate […] [how] what might be achieved more than outweighs the 
difficulties and the risks enumerated here” (97).  
 In my view, to which I return once again in some detail below, this manifesto 
positions artistic research in the mind and body of the artist who experiences the creative 
process.  It is the practising artist-researcher who continually faces the challenge to create 
a new artefact and to endeavour to indicate critically how an artistic research space 
evolves.  This ‘manifesto’ also identifies a “rhizomatic” method as most useful and 
appropriate to interpreting how artistic-practice-led research is given life.   Most of all the 
reader is invited to use the book to spur questions.  For example: How does an artistic 
strategy work?  If a creative production process is unpredictable what concepts might 
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work to assist a practising artist-researcher to explore the unforeseeable?  How might an 
artist articulate a heuristic organisational process that is mixed-mode in terms of how it is 
received or might channel energetic movements?  The book reminds us: “The results of 
artistic research are largely unknown but, through the artistic turn, its horizon is being 
vividly imagined” (180).   The book, the artefacts presented within it and the critical 
research, together offer a range of potential meanings each of which has a clear 
significance for the present research undertaking.   
 
A major work of a ‘non-artist-practitioner’-philosopher is Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory (2011) comprising a series of drafts (1961–1969) that were pieced together and 
published posthumously in 1970.  The book proclaims, “that form in artworks is 
everything on which the hand has left its trace […] the empirical process of making” 
(189).  The origin of the word empirical is from the Greek empeirkos “experienced”.  
Process (n.) is from the Latin processus “going forward”.  This particular orientation 
signals, in part, the aim of this present enquiry – that is, to demonstrate the artist 
experiencing the aesthetic process through her body, wherein the hand – literally – leaves 
its diverse traces.  Adorno was a German sociologist, philosopher, and musicologist 
associated with a number of writers whose work was influenced by the theories of Freud, 
Hegel and Marx – although his primary engagement with art was with works already 
made.  The book is widely regarded as one of the most influential theoretical books 
published in the 20th C. on aesthetic theory.  The book defines an artwork as “spuriously 
individual […]. Even Dada […]” (238).  But at the same time it “destroys […] categories 
[…].  It is evident that […] art is not the subordinating concept of its genres” (239).  The 
idea that an artefact is individual and destroys categories and/or genres is useful to certain 
key aspects of the present research project.  In my argument, conforming to a generic 
category automatically prevents the emergence of a new artistic space.     
 But the book also observes that “the weakness of artists [lies] in the face of the 
formidable concept of their object […] single-mindedly artworks devote themselves […] 
to the precritical, consciousness, desperate naiveté” (239).  The idea that a practising art-
researcher’s conscious thought is pre-critical does not help me build my case.  An artist-
researcher in the doctoral context needs to have access to conscious concepts even if 
these quickly slip through the fingers; meanwhile, any notion of expertise in a published 
writer’s craft seems to me to suppose that the experienced writer’s consciousness is far 
from “pre-critical”, far from “naïve”, however desperate.        
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 In chapter ten, entitled “Toward a theory of the Artwork”, the book 
announces: “authentic works, are those that surrender themselves to the historical 
substance of their age without reservation” (240).  Yet, in the second chapter, 
“Situation”, the book warns, “nothing is more damaging to theoretical knowledge of […] 
art than its reduction to what it has in common with older periods” (25).  These are, 
perhaps, contradictory claims.  This admittedly brief introduction to Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory raises the issue of the validity in the present context, or not, of a historically-
focused theory.  It is undoubtedly extremely interesting from an art-historical 
perspective.  Art history may very well be useful to an artist-researcher who can benefit 
from an awareness of other artists’ work as it evolved.  However, books written by art 
historians – or indeed by philosophers – are rarely authored by active artists themselves; 
which tends to mean, as was the case with Cixous’ publication cited above, that the 
artist’s work is not only necessarily objectified by the historian or the philosopher, but 
that it emerges as already-made, with artist-biographical detail and critical interpretation 
added for effect.  This fixed state of affairs takes us back to the “gaps in understanding”, 
identified above, as well as to the knowledge-questions posed by Harper: what sorts of 
knowledge are involved in the experience of making new work?  The present research 
project is driven by the need to identify complex writing that can provide the sorts of 
insight I need from the context of an art-practice-based research approach.   
 
At this point I propose to introduce a particular work of the French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze, which seems to me to have placed the visual arts – in the case of a practising 
painter - in a highly particular research position with regard to complex writing.  
Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: Logique De La Sensation (1981) is a two-volume set that Deleuze 
presented to Francis Bacon after its completion.  Volume I, written by Deleuze, also 
includes excerpts from Interviews With Francis Bacon (Sylvester 2012).  In the latter text, 
David Sylvester (DS) pieces together a series of nine (filmed) interviews with Francis 
Bacon (FB), recorded between 1962 and 1986.  Sylvester’s book claims that Bacon’s 
answers were not edited; however, extracts from interviews “were freely interwoven, 
sometimes within a sentence” (2012: 202).   
 Before exploring the usefulness of Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
there are four primary aspects of Sylvester’s book of interest to the present project.  The 
first is the black and white photos of Bacon’s paintings on display throughout the book’s 
pages in a general chronological order in relation to completion dates.  The book also 
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includes black and white photographs that were identified as points of inspiration for 
Bacon and photocopies of other artists’ work.  One example is that of the Spanish 
painter, Diego Velázquez (1599 – 1660), and his painting of Pope Innocent X.  Bacon 
refers to this painting by answering a question related to his own Pope portraits such as 
“Study after Velasquez’sxx Portrait of Pope Innocent X 1953”:     
  
 FB In the Popes […] [the inspiration] comes from an obsession with the  
 photographs that I know of Velasquez’s Pope Innocent X […] [this] opens  
 up all sorts of feelings in areas of – I was going to say – imagination, even,  
 in me (24-25).xxi  
 
Like strolling through an art gallery while reading the artist’s words, the images in the 
book enhance the reader’s experience, encouraging the to and fro movement between 
Bacon and Sylvester’s words and images of artefacts and other photographs that 
energised Bacon’s work.  
 The second aspect is that Bacon insists that his artistic process does not follow 
the logic of a narrative or representation.  For Bacon the artist is someone whose aim is 
to follow her or his own ‘sense’ of how to create something strikingly original.   
 
 FB Well […] although I may use, or appear to use, traditional methods, 
 I want those methods to work for me in a very different way to that 
 which they have worked before or for which they were originally formed. 
 […]. [And], although I may use what’s called the techniques that have  
 been handed down, I’m trying to make out of them something that is  
 radically different to what those techniques have made before (107).  
 
 DS Why do you want it to be radically different?  
 
 FB Because I think my sensibility is radically different, and, if I  
 work as closely as I can to my own sensibility, there is the possibility 
 that the image will have a greater reality (107).  
 
What Bacon refers to as his wanting to use “methods [that] work for me” in the 
discussion above might be understood, perhaps, as related to what Donnelly and Harper 
identified as one of the “key issues” in creative writing: “the individuality of a creative 
writing practice […] [And] a [creative writer’s] own sense of how creative writing 
happens, why it happens, and what the results are of it happening” (2013: 179).  It may 
be that it is by exploring what seems to me to be an individual embodied “sense” or 
“sensibility” of how an artefact was made is where the “knowing how” to see and do 
creative writing is located rather than in the canon within one’s particular discipline of 
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art-making methods as Bacon has suggested above.  Rather this information, related to 
already existing artefacts, forms the basis for the preparatory work from which Bacon 
developed his art-making methods.  This may be why Donnelly and Harper argued that 
“beginning with the nature of creative writing and the activities and understandings of 
creative writers is the only way to ever get closer to an understanding of creative writing 
itself” (179) (writer’s emphasis).    
 Third, the book is a vehicle for understanding how Bacon’s work is guided by a 
visual, rather than verbal, language process.  Bacon commented: “But I did see them, and 
the figure on the right is something […] I always think of that as an image […] they 
breed other images for me.  And, of course one’s always hoping to renew them” (14).  
The images or “figures” (22) that Bacon has identified are of particular interest to this 
project because when I write creatively it is an image – not sounds of words – that 
inspires my decision-making process before words have a chance to strike.  In addition, it 
is clear that Bacon took a particular interest in “chance” and “the accident” that set in 
motion a unique way of working that would seem to me to be free from traditional 
judgments and rational thought (53).  “As one conditions oneself […] by working with 
what happens, one becomes more alive to what the accident has proposed for one” 
(ibid).   
 Harper insists that creative writing is an “eclectic activity, drawing on more 
than word use and compositional practices […] [and] is one of the most individual of 
university subjects” (2013: 60).  If so, it might be useful for us to consider these terms: 
“chance” and “accident” for a moment, as these terms might be useful to a practising 
creative-writer researcher.  Is it possible that what a painter has to say about how his or 
her creative process works might be of interest to a creative writer?  Donnelly and 
Harper argued that there is “interaction between creative writing and other art forms” 
and that this is one of the key issues that “can be addressed […] [by] creative writing 
researchers” (178).  Identifying commonality among art practices such as creative writing 
that is ‘performance-based’ and other inventive disciplines such as “painting, music, 
dance, or theatre” (Donnelly 2013: 128), according to Donnelly, may be one of the 
challenges of creative writing practice-led research that perhaps concerns artistic freedom 
to systematically use certain words or concepts ‘borrowed’ from other artistic domains.  
This ‘borrowing’ may be thought of as a practicing art researcher working as a bricoleusexxii 
(known in qualitative research as a particular type of research and mode of research) as a 
means of exploring creative writing both critically and creatively.  While Donnelly and 
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Harper do not use the term bricoleuse they explain that what a practising creative writer-
researcher does is to explore how we might  
  
 improve the ways in which we develop creative writing within the  
 academy and the many new cultural, societal and economic developments  
 we see going on in the world at large […] [by] knowing how we might go  
 about doing these explorations(180).    
 
 If we consider that creative writing is one of the most highly-individualised 
activities that involves explorations of creative practices such as painting it may be that 
what Bacon identified as a “graph” that Bacon explained, “you see within” (56) that 
Deleuze also named a “diagram” could be useful to creative writer researchers who 
might be eager to test and experiment with expansive creative writing spaces that can be 
observed, for example, in Carson’s Nox.  I return to the notion of a Deleuzian diagram 
identified by Deleuze in Francis Bacon: The Logic Of Sensation in greater detail in the final 
chapter.  In order to understand better how these larger creative writing spaces might 
work, Harper and Donnelly seem to me to be suggesting that a creative writer-researcher 
might want to explore methods associated with making processes that focus on non-
traditional artistic methods.  And it is these aspects that both Bacon and Deleuze explore 
in great detail, meaning that they can seem to function as insights into how we might 
expand the space of creative writing beyond some of the normalised traditions of 
creative writing, thus shedding light on how a more expansive space of creative 
writing/graphic production might be explored.     
 Last, Sylvester’s book illuminates how the question posed might itself influence 
an artist’s answer, providing a more general demonstration of the different status and 
authority of the artist and critic.  For example:  
 
 DS And is it true that people have been trying to find a story in  
 the Crucifixion triptych.  Is there in fact any explanation of the  
 relationship between the figures (22)? 
  
 FB No. […] 
 
 FB […] You have to abbreviate into intensity (176). 
  
 DS But you don’t just abbreviate; you also impose a certain rhythm – a  
 distortion some might say.  […] 
  
 FB Well, I feel that is a misreading of it […]  
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 DS I’d like to question you about a number of factual matters. They  
 mostly have to do with your methods of working, but to begin, I’d like  
 to try to clarify how your early life was divided between Ireland and  
 England (184). 
  
 FB Well, I was born in Ireland, though my mother and father were both 
 English.  My father was a trainer of racehorses and we lived near the  
 Curragh, where more or less all the trainers were concentrated.  I was  
 born in Dublin […] a house called Canny Court, near a small town  
 called Kilcullen in County Kildare.  We were there […].  
 
We might on this evidence demonstrate that in terms of language and other modes of 
communication, the paintings allow Bacon to find his self-expression in a visual form 
that everyday language stutters and stammers to convey.   
 The original French version of Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: Logique De La Sensation 
(1981) Volume II – Peintures is comprised solely of colour photographs of Bacon’s 
paintings.  The diptychs and triptychs are printed on paper pages that fold out so that the 
viewer can take in an approximation, at least, of the full effect of the viewer’s 
engagement with the paintings themselves.  D. W. Smith’s English translation was made 
available in 2003.  It does not include the contents of Volume II.  The original two-
volume edition might be thought of as the work of a philosopher who set out to find a 
way of engaging, as a philosopher, with the processes of art-making, as distinct from the 
later engagement with artistic product, such as we find in Deleuze and Guattari’s What is 
Philosophy? (1994).      
 Deleuze’s philosophical writing in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation takes a 
specific interest in how a particular artist works.   He argues, on the basis of Bacon’s own 
words, that an artist does not rely on a rational logic but rather makes decisions based on 
certain sensations that are registered in the body.  Deleuze asked: “What does this act of 
painting consist of?  Bacon defines it in this way: make random marks (lines-traits); 
scrub, sweep, or wipe the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones (color-patches)” 
(2003: 81).xxiii  It is perhaps this interest in developing philosophical perceptivity about 
aesthetic practice that has attracted the attention of a growing number of practising artist 
researchers.  Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas (cited above) and the Australian architect 
Pia Ednie-Brown in “The Texture of Diagrams” (2000) and Simon O’Sullivan in “From 
Stuttering and Stammering to the Diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and Contemporary Art 
Practice” (2008) have borrowed at least notionally from the complex concepts and 
terminology that is made available in the volumes of Deleuzian philosophy.  O’Sullivan 
argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘minor literature’ as well as to Deleuze’s 
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concepts of ‘the figural’ and ‘the diagram’ can expand contemporary art practices (247). 
For some bricolage thinkers/qualitative researchers, exploring Deleuzian writings has set 
new ways of thinking in motion as to how a creative process might work as an embodied 
experience in a continuous state of evolution, which pays no immediate attention either 
to ready-made art-making theories or to art histories.   
 
By ‘drawing’ on the Deleuzian notion of a rhizome (from Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus 1980/1987) – the practising architect and researcher Mahesh Senagala 
designed “Rhizogramming And A Synesthetic Transformation Of Designer’s Mind” 
(2005: 4-16) – a paper that itself aims to operate as a rhizome.  This paper is of interest 
to my own project as it demonstrates how an arts researcher-practitioner might borrow 
from further aspects of Deleuzian philosophy.  Senagala is an emerging media architect 
who teaches ‘innovative methods’ in the United States.  Rhizogramming, he observes, 
“helps liberate the designer from the clutches of conscious choice that limits the mind in 
the early stages of […] [the] design process” (5).  The paper is complex and is divided 
into sections that seem to flitter between traditional typed registers, a variety of concepts, 
and unusual environmental design sketches and drawings.  Senagala explains to the 
reader that the sections can be read/viewed in any order or by following the “edit time” 
that can be located in an extended column on the left side of the document throughout 
the paper’s pages. Diagrammatology, rhizogram, and rhizogramming are some of the 
concepts that are tested.  The paper also includes seven artefacts or ‘Figures’. In the 
seventeen-page paper, a dozen sources are cited including the work of the social theorist, 
writer and philosopher, Brian Massumi, whose Parables For the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation, appeared in 2002, and to whose work I will return in some detail in what 
follows.  Massumi translated Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia.  It is in A Thousand Plateaus that Deleuze and Guattari not only introduce a 
rhizome (2014: 3–25) but also demonstrate how their writing is one despite its apparent 
adherence as well to certain academic publishing conventions.  As Senagala perhaps 
realised, the critical research is more effective if it can demonstrate a dynamic inward 
visual moving point of interest that might emerge during a creative process where words 
perhaps falter and pause.  This experience might also constitute a particular movement 
that expresses the presence of a non-verbally related but, nonetheless, significant 
meaning.       
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I want to include here a brief exploration of two texts of the French literary theorist and 
philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard: Discourse, Figure (1971/2011) and The Inhuman: 
Reflections on Time (1988/1998).  I have found these two volumes, written and published 
around twenty years apart, particularly useful in addressing a number of issues related to 
creative writing processes.  These books seem to me to suggest that a creative writer can 
explore memories, feelings, and desires as a way to experiment with new ways of writing 
that aim at moving beyond discourse, narrative and certain generic structures.  Harper 
has observed that “the individual creative writer’s needs, desires, feelings and reasons as 
that writer undertakes creative writing […] might well be informed by an individual 
writer’s memory as well as by immediate sensory stimulus” (2013: 107).  Such a remark 
may indicate an opportunity for a creative writer-researcher to explore both discursively 
and imaginatively an individual way of writing that tests the idea of writing as “the very 
stuff of inscription” (Lyotard 2011: 263), or as “graphic” (264), or as “sensory” (283), or 
as “memories of perceptions” (269), or as “memory-effects” (1998: 48) in relation to the 
outcomes of a creative writing practice.     
 In Discourse, Figure (2011, derived from his 1971 doctoral thesis) Lyotard 
pointed out that: “One can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not put color in 
the sentence.  Yet color is meaning” (50).xxiv  This brief reference that I include here is 
indicative of the playful writing of a philosopher, and suggests to me that if writing is 
understood as specifically related to the ‘saying’ of words alone (i.e. “sayable”) “because 
its properties seem analogous to those of […] linguistic space” (50) that understanding 
overlooks the central hypothesis in what follows which is that what a creative writer 
produces is often a graphicxxv reminder of a specific space, time, shape, texture, and 
colour that has been experienced in the body and is experienced anew.  Lyotard’s original 
book title, Discours, figure, seems to me to suggest the importance of questioning the 
valorisation of Discourse – i.e. “saying” – over the figure – i.e. “seeing” (233).  This brief 
outline reveals some of the interest of these works to my own project: Lyotard defines 
certain modes and tendencies in some writing as “graphic” and/or “figural” (262-267) – 
that is, a predominantly visual entity, whose first appeal, even laid out on the published 
page, is to the human senses in general and to the eyes in particular.  I see, and often 
touch – long before I begin to semiotise – words written, that start thereby to resonate, 
as though in my hearing.  According to Lyotard, a “figure” is what “subverts [aural-
related] discourse.  Through the figure words begin to induce in our bodies (as would 
colors) […] a plastic space, and words as sensory things” (283).  Although the book does 
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not actually “do” what it writes about – the book might be argued to float somewhere 
between discourse and figure, thus confusing “sayable” language in the philosophical and 
linguistic traditions with “seen” language, nevertheless the notion of the figural is useful 
to my present undertaking because, in Lyotardian terms, it indicates a shift in the ways of 
approaching and understanding language from ‘phonetic/sound’ to ‘what is seen’.  
Discourse, Figure is also useful because it explores the problem overlooking how writing 
itself is “the figural and the act of […] the graphic’s” (212) that is, related to colour, 
space, shape and line.  “Here one must keep at arm’s length the assumptions, 
interpretations, and habits of reading”, Lyotard observed “that we contract with the 
predominant use of discourse […] which is why writing is continually spurned […] [and] 
the figure becomes […] an underperforming language at that” (212-213).  Is this why 
Lyotard refrains from judging works of art in this text from the 1970s?  He writes 
alongside artefacts (Plates 1-24) while borrowing notions from artists such as Paul Klee 
thus setting-up a relationship – a space between – within which particular sorts of 
observations might be developed.  In other words, what constitutes the visual artefact 
(i.e. figural space) always expresses more than what can be said (i.e. discourse) ‘about it’.  
 Almost two decades after Discourse, Figure was originally published, in 1988 in The 
Inhuman: Reflections on Time Lyotard continued to explore writing that he also called 
“inscription”.  In a chapter entitled: “Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy” Lyotard attempts 
to break down memory linked to inscription, into at least three types of “memory-
effects” (1998: 48–57).  I return repeatedly in what follows to the notion of memory, 
duration, and past experience that recurs in the present.  His three types of memory-
effects, observed in the context of digital technologies and the digital archive or 
document, are useful, I would suggest, as an attempt to understand certain sorts of 
image-production, rather than as an explanation that can be fully explained through 
discourse. I sense that this text – and I use this verb advisedly – I sense that these 
documents allows us to deal with different sorts of image-making by “opening a public 
space of meaning” (48).  
 
In 1967 in Of Grammatology, the Algerian-born French philosopher Jacques Derrida 
pointed out the fact that traditions in Western thought have overlooked the 
consequences of valorising phonetic writing that “forbids” graphic writing that might 
seek to “escape semiology” (1997: 45).  Graphic writing reveals what Derrida suggests is 
“primary”, that is, an immediately visible form of a “living memory” (37). In “Writing 
	   42	  
Before the Letter” (1-93) Derrida asks us to question conventional understandings of 
writing that limit a creative practice of writing to representing sounds of words (i.e. logos) 
rather than making one or more (graphic) images.  Derrida suggests that a creative writer 
has a responsibility to think of writing as image-making that breaks free from a 
Jakobsonian binary analysis of writing not only by “reforming the concept of writing” 
(55) but also by demonstrating a “new method” (Ixxxix) of writing that allows for “non-
phonetic” (non-alphabetic) registers (3).     
 
In 1969 in Visual Thinking (1997), the German art and film theorist and perceptual 
psychologist Rudolf Arnheim took an interest in artistic processes.  He observed that 
creative practices (including a writer’s) are guided by thinking with the “senses” (v).  He 
argued that words alone have no meaning without a relationship to other kinds of bodily 
experiences such as a writer seeing shapes in the mind.  One of the examples of creative 
thinking that Arnheim offers is his own ability to visualise walking through a forest while 
sitting at a desk without the aid of words (229).  He suggested that a creative writing 
process depends on a writer’s ability to focus attention on an inner sensory experience 
(233).   He also pointed out that an artist “operates with the vast range of imagery 
available through the memory […] as well as the imagination” (294).  The idea that a 
creative process is visually-led seems to allow us to move beyond arguments that suggest 
that a creative writing process tends to be word and clause-led, and to open up questions 
as to individual actions and personal thoughts which may well seem, after Lyotard, to be 
figural and expansive, operating visually before even words emerge.     
 
The typography and graphic communications researcher and pedagogue Michael 
Twyman, in “The graphic presentation of language” (1982), draws attention to the 
importance of understanding “the ‘language element’ in graphic communication” (2).  
The New Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics (1993) defines the basis of a poem as 
“an instance of verbal art, a text set in verse, bound in speech.  More generally, a poem 
conveys heightened forms of perception, experience, meaning, or consciousness of lang. 
i.e. a heightened mode of discourse” (938).  Twyman suggests, however, that if we 
continue to valorise linguistics, we thereby overlook the visual connection with writing – 
the visual connection (as I will argue in what follows) that lies at the source of my 
invention of the creative components.  He reminded us in 1982 that writers have an 
opportunity to explore chromatic possibilities, to test electronic apparatus, handwriting, 
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and to remember that writing can be understood as “non-verbal” (6-8) – a negative 
definition to which we might prefer the positive ‘other-than verbal’.   
 
While many writers focus on the relationship between everyday life, speech and writing, 
including the widely-cited W. Ong in his Orality and Literacy: the technologizing of the word 
(1982), the British social anthropologist Jack Goody laid the groundwork in The Interface 
Between the Written and the Oral (1987/1993) for the history of human writing, in which he 
observes that the basis for writing is “graphic art” and “non-verbal” which essentially 
communicates by way of “design” (3-9).  The discipline of creative writing should not 
limit creative writers to a specific set of constraints, Goody argues, as a “lack of response 
to changing circumstances (indicating loose entailment) may indicate that the features 
with which one is dealing are of little importance as a whole” (295).  According to 
Donnelly it is important to bear in mind that the discipline of creative writing is flexible, 
“practice-based” and “imaginative” and is separated from literary criticism and literary 
theory as creative writers focus on the exhilaration of the creative process of doing and 
making of art rather than the outcome (2013: 127–128).  Goody observed, as it relates to 
the meaning of the products made by creative writers, “it might be difficult to see why or 
how useful information was transmitted this way” (1993: 294).  In other words, creative 
writing practices are developed by those “who do” (294) the making of artefacts and 
because there “are few constraints on creative imagination”, meaning is developed (295).  
Goody argues that there need not be a general agreement as to the meaning of an 
individual writer’s work.  “Or to put it another way, writing is the mechanism that 
permits us to change the format of our creative endeavours, the shape of our knowledge, 
our understanding of the world, and our activities within it” (298).  Goody reminds us 
that creative writing research continues over a lifetime.  He also suggests that it is the 
creative writer-researcher who is in a position to announce and convey an awareness of 
an evolutionary path taken since she or he creates ‘works of art’ that can take different 
forms.  
   
Here I want to examine the work of a creative writer and a political scientist who seems 
to me to share a similar concern for how to bring words and visual images together.  Like 
the Canadian poet, essayist, translator and professor of Classics Anne Carson in Nox 
(2010), the American political scientist Robert E. Horn in “Visual Language and 
Converging Technologies in the Next 10-15 Years (and Beyond)” explores the tight 
weaving together of words and visual images in imaginative ways. According to Horn: 
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“Visual language is defined by the tight integration of words and visual elements” (2001: 
1).  Horn pointed out that human beings “do not live by information alone.  We make 
meaning with our entire beings: emotional, kinesthetic, somatic.  Visual art has always fed 
the human spirit in this respect” (6).  
 
Carson’s Nox (2010) seems to me to display a relatively recent example of what I sense is 
the outcome of a highly individualised creative way of writing that may have resulted 
from prolonged experimentation with compositional relationships that involve a variety 
of visual registers, for example: old postage stamps, photographs, dollops of paint, 
smudges, edges, scraps of paper, staples, lines, pencil-rubbings and words.  Horn advised 
us in 2001 that when “words and visual elements are closely intertwined, we create 
something new and we augment our communal intelligence” (1). This creative way of 
writing that Carson demonstrates and that Horn might define as “visual language” in the 
sense of intertwining visual elements including words, is of special interest as in my own 
creative writing process I am experimenting with what I argue is a singular method of 
bringing together a variety of visual registers (e.g. photographs or parts of photographs, 
colour, line) and words.  I present the specific details of these sorts of processes in the 
following two chapters.  
 From my point of view, in Nox, Carson’s visual registers are organised in such 
a way as to make a visual tapestry from what I take to be the living memory of the loss of 
a beloved brother.   It is through personal loss that we learn the limitations of words.  
Carson invents a highly idiosyncratic way of writing, as an imaginative way of expressing 
the pain associated with a loss for which there are no adequate words.  Such an 
emotional experience seems to me to have had a powerful impact on how the artefact 
was developed.  What Carson provides is a grey cardboard box filled with a long folded 
sheet of paper that shows us scraps of evidence photocopied on to it: crumpled paper, 
shards of handwritten letters, torn photographs, all bits and pieces are fragments of 
evidence of a brother’s existence. “Today”, Horn observed “human beings work and 
think in fragmented ways, but visual language has the potential to integrate our existing 
skills to make them tremendously more effective” (1).    
	   45	  
 Carson noted in Nox: “I want to fill my elegy with lights of all kinds” (2010: 
1.0).  “But over the years of working on it, I came to think of translating as a room, not 
exactly an unknown room, where one gropes for the switch.  I guess it never ends”.  
What Carson offers us instead are these scraps of evidence gathered in Nox.  Horn 
noticed: “Researchers and scholars are no longer constrained by the scroll-like thinking 
of endless paragraphs of texts” (2001: 4).  Horn argued: “Messy problems do not have 
straightforward solutions” and are “ambiguous” and “filled with considerable 
uncertainty” (ibid).  Carson suggests one must handle the body of Nox carefully so as to 
not damage the elongated flexible accordion-like order that allows us to consider the 
inseparability of folding and unfolding paper parts that retain a certain attachment.  Horn 
pointed out in 2001 that artists had already begun to create “large visual murals” (6).  My 
hands struggled to place the outstretched Nox back into its box and this struggle caused 
me to make my own set of marks on it.  If Horn is correct and, as the 21st C. continues to 
unfold, art making will continue to involve artists taking a computer and making a new 
visual language, then perhaps we can see a diversity of choices opening for creative 
writers in Nox.  Perry, you may recall, suggested that “creative practice and research 
stretches out tendrils between creative writing and other art forms” (2008: 1).  
 
Horn (cited above) has chosen to use the term “emotional” (from the Latin emouere 
“agitate, move out, remove”) in his effort to facilitate using computer technology that 
breaks away from the limitations of verbal text.   
 A number of other writers have also taken up the notion of “emotion” leading 
to questions related to memory.  In 1899, Sigmund Freud took up the notion of 
“emotion” in “Screen Memories” (202-209), in the context of psychoanalytical enquiry.  
The idea of “emotion” seems to be useful because instead of focusing on the human 
experience as “a collection of material” (202) it focuses instead on the human experience 
as it brings into focus a clear view of chromatic images that might have otherwise been 
overlooked, or forgotten, into a present experience as the image of a living memory is 
unfolding, and as it is powerfully felt in the body.  The notion of “mental life” (209) is 
also important here since it seems to bring into view certain visions inside the individual 
human mind-body that play a “part in informing” as well as in making a “selection” 
(ibid).   Freud seems to me to have left behind a reminder, perhaps, that an artist who is 
searching for images does not have to find images elsewhere, but is likely to have direct 
access to images, can produce images, and select certain images that are not outside the 
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mind-body; and furthermore, that these images may very well be strongly felt.  But what 
do we understand about the notion of memory?    
 
For Henri Bergson in Matter and Memory (1991) “memory, that is, the survival of past 
images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may 
even take its place” (65-66).  In The Creative Mind (1974) he also wrote of “duration which 
science eliminates, and which is so difficult to conceive and express, is what one feels 
and lives” (13).  “Memory” for Bergson is “the continuity of the inner life and 
consequently its indivisibility, we no longer have to explain the preservation of the past, 
but rather its apparent abolition” (153).  However, the historian Luisa Passerini in 
“Connecting Emotions.  Contributions from Cultural History” (2008: 117-127) is 
interested in “the study of emotions”.  This interest has emerged from “awareness” that 
the human life/experience is ephemeral (117).  This sort of awareness, she argues “has 
motivated many scholars to change their vision and practice of cultural history” (117).  
For Passerini the notion “culture” is also important in that it is typically understood as 
related to “text and its connections with the world”, but she also points out that this sort 
of understanding of culture might not recognise the “individual” (117-118).  Passerini 
argued that “different disciplinary approaches can be found […] [that] point to a precise 
choice, of studying emotions that establish connections” (118).    
 
Similarly, Deleuze, while drawing on the work of Bergson in Bergsonism (1991), and while 
addressing the relationship between “intelligence and society”, noted: “What appears in 
this interval is emotion” (109-110).  In what follows I am going to argue that I engage with 
memory that seems to me to trigger strongly felt emotions in my body as a way of seeing 
and knowing that is vital to my creative decision-making process that involves computer-
related apparatus.  
 
While Gregory Ulmer is well-known for his interest in creative invention in Heuretics: The 
Logic Of Invention (1994), prior to this he explored creative writing in the theory class 
Teletheory.  The book Teletheory: Grammatology in the Age of Video (1989) was revised in 
2004.  In Teletheory (2004) Ulmer describes ‘teletheory’ as offering  
 
 a rationale and guidelines for a specific genre—mystory—designed to do  
 the work of schooling and popularization in a way that takes into account 
 the new discursive and conceptual ecology interrelating orality, literacy and  
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 videocy (7). 
 
Ulmer looks at new approaches to learning through academic discourse made possible by 
students investigating the possibilities of an electronic discourse as he assumes that the 
new digital age and apparatus will require institutions to create new practices and a new 
theory of “written performance” (18).    
 In the “Preface” to Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (1994) Ulmer explains that 
this is a continuation of his earlier project that focuses on     
 
applying to academic discourse the lessons arising out of a matrix crossing 
French poststructuralist theory, avant-garde art experiments, and electronic 
media in the context of schooling (xi).  
 
Ulmer is a pedagogue and a professor of literature, and his background is fairly solidly 
literary.  The first chapter begins with Ulmer introducing the term heuretics (from the 
Greek heuretikos “inventive”) arguing that his approach is one of “artistic 
experimentation” (3).  However, rather than operating as a practising artist he operates 
on the basis that literary theory “influences” creative choice (ibid).  This may well limit 
his ability to engage with the visual aspect of a creative writing process despite uptake of 
his digitally-informed "logic of invention".  Although he has much to say about digital 
technology and the development of writing what is important however in this book is his 
sense that affect has been left out of writing on the digital up until the late 1990s.  With 
respect to creative decision-making, Ulmer’s exploration Bastick’s intuitive thought 
processes is interesting: under certain conditions they spark sudden insights or the 
experience of “eureka” (from the Greek heureka meaning “I found [it]”).  
 According to Ulmer:  
 
 Chorography as a method of invention writes directly the hyperbolic intuition 
  known as the eureka experience. It is first of all a means for stimulating  
 this experience, for transferring it from the living body to an apparatus, 
  whether print or electronic, for “writing” or artificially performing intuition 
  “outside” the organic mind and body and entrusting this process to a machine 
 (both technological and methodological).  The study of grammatology  
 has demonstrated in detail how print favors and supports or augments  
 an analytical mode of thought based on the fit between the properties of 
 verbal discourse and abstract demands of logic (140).  
 
Ulmer suggests that the intuitive process that he uses is informed by “verbal discourse”, 
but Bastick points out that intuition precedes verbalisation (Bastick 1982: 298).  
Nevertheless, Ulmer’s exploration of an intuitive method in theory and in practise helps 
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us to consider how psychological experience and the feelings of a creative writer who is 
using digital technology may play an important role in terms of decision-making.  But if 
we wish to understand the embodied experience and the visual aspects of a creative 
writing process that involves using computer apparatus, we may need to involve 
practising creative writer-researchers whose experience might be less influenced by 
literary theory.  I explore Ulmer’s intuitive method in detail in the chapter that follows.  
 
I want to introduce N. Katherine Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999).  Hayles similarly has a literary background 
although perhaps the “posthuman” has a few problems merging the visual with the 
verbal?  The book begins with Hayles discussing “a nightmare” that resulted from her 
reading Hans Moravec’s Mind Children: The Future of Robots and Human Intelligence (1988).  
She explains that Moravec has invented “a fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon 
purees the human brain in a kind of cranial liposuction, reading the information in each 
molecular layer as it is stripped away and transferring the information into a computer” 
(Hayles 1999: 1).  She writes more generally about the changes to the notion and the 
experience of the self that she calls “posthuman”.  I want to identify some of the changes 
that she highlighted as the posthuman self – such as embodied processes, and feedback 
loops – that initially seemed to fit with my hypothesis that involves memory as she refers 
to this book as a “rememory” (13).   
  Hayles cites four defining characteristics of the posthuman that she notes are 
changes in viewpoint: the first, “privileges informational pattern over material 
instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of 
history rather than an inevitability of life” (2); the second, regards the Western tradition 
of believing human thought is the foundation of human identity as the by-product of “an 
evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show” (3); the third, considers a 
body as a manipulable “original prosthesis” that is replaceable and interchangeable so 
that controlling the body “becomes a continuation of a process that began before we 
were born” (ibid); and the fourth, “configures human being so that it can be seamlessly 
articulated with intelligent machines” (ibid).  Hayles suggests this is how the human being 
(the self) becomes posthuman – a cyborg.  How does Hayles deal with this posthuman 
outlook?  She explains that in the chapters that “follow [she] will show what had to be 
elided, suppressed, and forgotten to make information lose its body” (13).  She seems to 
me to suggest that a practitioner using a computer can imagine hidden memories lost in 
the body and can use these to make certain choices that can lead to the production of 
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artefacts that are “rememory” (13).  According to Hayles – and I am clearly interested in 
this perspective – “[the] feedback loops that run between technologies and perceptions, 
artefacts and ideas, have important implications for how historical change occurs” (14).  
She finds “technologies are fascinating because they make visually immediate the 
perception that a world of information exists parallel to the ‘real’ world” and argues that 
to succeed what is required is making “artefacts that could embody it and make it real” 
(ibid).  My own sense, and the case I make in the chapters that follow and in the creative 
work included in this portfolio, is that computer technology provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for artists, scientists and literary theorists to consider creative processes.  
Sometimes a creative writer makes use of digital technologies with a different aim from 
that of a scientist or literary theorist.  Hayles concludes that “we can fashion images of 
ourselves that accurately reflect the complex interplays that ultimately make the entire 
world one system” (290).  While her narratives are informative it is hardly clear that she 
contributes much to the notion of a changed creative practitioner who enables us to see 
how using a computer can make images of ourselves visible, by actualising them in a 
creative invention.   
 
Carrie Noland has written a chapter entitled “Digital Gestures” in Morris and Swiss’ New 
Media Poetics: Contexts, Technotexts, and Theories (2006: 217-242).  Hayles also contributed a 
chapter to this book, entitled “The Time of Digital Poetry: From Object To Event” 
(181-209), and writes ‘about’ the products made by artists as if the artefacts they make 
can be accounted for with her words.  Hayles’ contribution is interesting as it touches on 
a notion of time that seems to me to be similar to that outlined by Bergson (although 
there is no memory-image in Hayles) and it draws attention to visual registers.  But from 
my point of view Hayles’ objective is to position the visual within the discursive, rather 
than the figural, which is not useful to the position I am outlining here.  However, while 
there are a number of writers who made contributions to this anthology, each is clearly 
limited by what has been called the ‘literary turn’.  I was hoping this might not be the 
case.  It has been my experience that those who identify themselves as working within 
the context of ‘literature’ as opposed to working as an ‘artist-researcher’ tend to focus on 
the outcomes of creative practises, rather than on how an individual expert artist brings 
an artefact into being, and reflects on the processes involved.  This clearly signals my 
difficulties with the notion of the ‘literary’, and it foreshadows my developing argument 
in the remainder of the thesis. 
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I chose to explore Noland’s “Digital Gestures” as she has taken an interest in what she 
calls “this [human] body and its kinetic energies in […] digital writing” and how this 
operates “in a variety of highly inventive ways” (217).  Noland’s reference to “computer-
based writing concerned with recalling to the user’s consciousness a memory” and 
“energies that drive inscription” initially seemed promising as I want to bring to the fore 
my specific decision-making process that involves experimenting with a computer-related 
apparatus that I connect with memory and certain energetic-feelings as these are 
experienced in my body (217-218).  One of the potentially far-reaching implications of 
Noland’s literary analysis, pertinent to my project here, is her identification of “memory” 
that she seems to me to link to “kinetic energies” and “small motor movements 
involving only the fingers and wrist” that she also associates with the use of computer 
apparatus (217).  However, Noland is compelled to validate her notion of digital gestures 
by citing the research findings of other theorists of digital writing, such as Christopher 
Keep, Mark Poster, and Mark Seltzer, all of whom (including Noland)xxvi persist in 
focusing attention on the computer keyboard instead of considering that an artist might 
use a digital pen and tablet.   
I was hoping this would not be the case as my digital inscription practice involves 
the latter.  Given the title of this chapter, this surprised me for two reasons: first, because 
digital pens and digital tablets were available in 2006xxvii when Noland’s chapter was 
published; and second, because Noland claims that she is interested in “animation 
programs [that] extend the visual experience of the verbal construct” (218).  But 
animators commonly use a digital pen and tablet along with various computer programs. 
Furthermore, Noland draws attention to already made artefacts throughout this chapter 
(such as Jim Andrew’s “Nio” or Robert Morris’ Blind Time)xxviii and attempts to identify 
how she recognises what the artist “seems to be attempting” (227), rather than searching 
for a way to advocate and/or enable the production and documentation of a specific 
individual expert artist’s decision-making process.  Admittedly, any account of those 
decision-making processes may be lost.  Nonetheless, Noland’s spectatorial position 
creates an objectifying distance between her “analysis” and the phenomenon that is being 
investigated (218).  Could it be that this distance is why Noland identifies memory at the 
start of the chapter, but does not return to it?  By contrast, in the case of my project 
here, it is the artist-researcher who is exploring the processes of experimenting with 
digital technology and who is immersed in this new discipline – hence, this immersion 
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erases the distance of objectification by having direct access to creative decision-making 
process.     
Another notion that initially seemed promising toward the start of Noland’s 
chapter is her announcement of: “Pulling ‘gesture’ in the direction of movement rather 
than emphasis (which can be achieved by vocal inflection as well), away from rhetoric 
and toward dance” (ibid).  But this statement is followed by her observation that she 
“hope[s] to restore the choreographic dimension of the word” (ibid).  Noland asserts that 
“digital works distinguish themselves from these earlier efforts by the increased liberty of 
movement they accord to both entire semantic units and individual letters” (ibid).  In 
other words, she seems still to want her notion of digital gesture to draw upon linguistic 
structures, whether literal or metaphoric.  But what do we understand by the notion of 
“kinetic energy” (217)?  Does it tend to manifest in semantic units or letters?  Is gesture – 
the act, amongst other options, of indicating – connected to logos?  
 
In 1971 Lyotard took up the notion gesture, in the context of French literary theory.  He 
argued that “gesture is […] in opposition to linguistic signification […]: it is experienced, 
lived” (Lyotard 2011: 15).  Moreover, in 1994 Melrose pointed out that what  
 
we know in general terms about kinetic theory, or the theory of movement,  
is that when a substance is heated, the atoms and molecules which make up  
that substance move and vibrate more violently, emitting radiation.  In the  
bodies at work […] these ‘substances’ are multiple, immensely difficult to  
pin down, [and] […] as these function within the internally shifting  
specificities of any performance event, [therefore] must now admit to 
indeterminacy as its major principle: however precisely we can attempt to  
verbalise ‘what is going on here’, we are by definition unable to name 
the constituent parts of any given event, since these vary not just with  
spectator difference, but arguably internally (1994: 234-235).     
 
If it is possible to link the very short synopsis of Lyotard’s description of “gesture” 
(above) with Melrose’s description of “kinetic theory” then one might surmise that 
kinetic energy and gesture are perceived in the mind-body of the artist during a 
performance that is not in consort with linguistic structures (i.e. linguistic signs, 
discourse).  But Noland alleges to have identified “a kinetic body that both generates and 
obscures signification achieved through written signs” (219). 
 
In the text below Coessens et al remind us: 
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 Artistic integration, transaction and transformation are primarily non-verbal, 
 non-explanatory.  They originate in the human faculties of synaesthetic  
 perception, non-linguistic conceptual thinking, reasoning, motor-sensory 
  and kinaesthetic exploration; they draw upon memory, different forms of  
 consciousness and the artist’s encounters with the outside world (2009: 116).   
 
From the text immediately above one might conclude that kinetic energy is directly 
linked to an artist’s memory that is itself “non-linguistic” – or, in more positive terms, 
“other-than-linguistic”.  This may raise questions as to the degree to which contemporary 
artistic culture could systematise, codify, and control the development and proliferation 
of various theories that valorise linguistic structures (e.g. words, text) and omit other 
modes (e.g. visual, felt) of enquiry.  It is on the bases of these sorts of observations 
above I would argue that Noland’s understanding of the terms “kinetic” and “gesture” 
does not account for a specific logic of creative production.  This may be the result of 
Noland’s acknowledged familiarity, in the philosophical context, primarily with the work 
of “Plato, Hegel, Husserl, Foucault, and Derrida” (2006: 222) instead of what I sense are, 
perhaps, more relevant resources: Bergson, Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard, 
philosophers who seem to me to have taken a particular interest in exploring a creative 
process and how it works instead of its status as something reified, that already exists.    
 
I want to add a very brief note here related to Noland’s citing Derrida.  Like Noland, we 
know that Derrida also chose the word “memory” as significant to his work.  But unlike 
Noland he asked, “what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychical 
[memory] writing” (1978: 199)?  Derrida pointed out: “Memory, thus is not a psychical 
property among others; it is the very essence of the psyche” (201).  This may be contrary 
to the case that Noland is attempting to make.  Derrida seems to me to have emphasised 
the importance of the psychic image-stuff and noted that what would be “fruitful” is the 
“deconstruction of logocentrism” (230).  Yet Noland is interested in what she calls 
“differences between discrete types of signifiers: tapping on a, s, or r” (2006: 236).  Her 
examples here, in other words, are alphabetic, hence tightly linked to certain rules that 
regulate writing.  These differences in focus are at the core of the present research 
project.  I would argue it is this differentiation that lends itself to the sort of creative 
practice-led enquiry I am calling for here, and attempting to demonstrate.  Noland asks 
us to view digital inscription through the lens of a literary and linguistic theory that 
valorises certain textual structures.  Whereas I am interested in exploring digital 
inscription through the lens of a practice-led research investigation that is orientated 
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toward a particular artist-researcher’s need to experiment and investigate a specific 
creative decision-making process as it is experienced and perceived in the mind-body.   
 
Noland describes digital inscription as – for example – “verbal-visual works” (231), 
“language in motion” (233), “the gestures the letters execute on the screen” and how 
these “provide an experience for the viewer” (238).  But does spectating by the viewer 
demand knowledge of practices and processes that are required of a specific expert 
digital artist?  What are the implications of documenting creative digital inscription 
processes and practises that might be incommensurate with the individual artist’s digital 
enquiry?  From my point of view Noland’s objective is to position the visual aspects of a 
digital artist’s work within the discursive, rather than the figural.  It seems to me that 
discourse does not apprehend (from the Latin apprehendere “to grasp, to take hold of”) a 
method of all possible modes among which the digital artist might choose.  Andrews et 
al suggest that what might be useful is to understand the term “digital” as including 
“written text, but [it] may also include other modes and formats that may not be 
sequential” (2011: 4).  They also suggest the digital may be used as a means “to explore” 
(ibid).  But they also warn against assuming that one can interpret “the movement of 
meaning from non-verbal systems into words” (ibid).  If it is not possible to take for 
granted the move from a non-verbal system into words, then how can Noland account 
for the experience and research trajectory of a particular artist’s making process that she 
has suggested is moving (gesturing) visually?   
 
Given my account above, what seems to me remarkable about Noland’s “Digital 
Gesture” is that not only does it draw attention to digital inscription, but it has also 
offered an opportunity to accentuate the position I am fighting for.  Analysing artefacts 
cannot measure this position, since the activity of making artefacts is action orientated 
and aims at the development of a highly individualised creative decision-making process 
that is likely to be ‘other-than’ what can be observed by engaging with the outcome of 
the creative process.  Furthermore, the “genre” (217) noted by Noland, such as “digital 
poetry” (217) and “digital literature” (219), may seem to be easily validated by way of 
affiliation with existing literary genre or theories; but this activity of grouping together 
expert named artists, who may work independently to bring artefacts into being, seems 
to me to tend to obfuscate the individuality of an artist’s development in expert decision-
making that is normally hidden from a spectator.  It seems to me to follow that what is 
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“normally hidden” is frequently overlooked by critical and otherwise authoritative 
writers, as Goddard indicated above (2010: 119).  If we recognise this, and if digital art-
researchers who are also expert practitioners fail to document her or his creative 
decision-making processes, I would argue, this will contribute to the erasure of what 
Melrose calls “disciplinary specificity, disciplinary expertise, and performance-making 
processes” (2012: 305).  
 
Where Noland seems to me to differ from the common literary response, first, is in her 
recognition that artists who engage in digital inscription “create verbal-visual works” 
(2006: 231).  Second, in her suggestion that an energetic force as it is experienced in the 
body guides the performance of a particular artist that may involve “visual properties” 
(237).  Nevertheless, with all of the attention she places on the digital gesture, plainly her 
objective is to limit those ‘gestures’ and ‘kinetic energy’ that drive a creative digital 
inscription practice, to replicating general linguistic-based structures.  But there is 
another way to explore digital inscription instead of classifying an artist’s practice as if it 
was designed to fit into the structure of a generic category or attempting to replace the 
visual by assembling complex tropes or “written signs” (219).  My argument is that 
practice-led research by an artist should focus on that particular digital practitioner’s 
expertise and experience – likely to be highly individualised as Coessens et al, Donnelly 
and Harper, and Melrose have suggested above – with the aim of documenting insights 
into the creative decision-making process as this is being experienced in the mind-body 
of the expert practitioner, throughout the whole span of artistic-research enquiry.   
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Chapter 2 
Sensing the Logic of the Art of Writing and Publication 
Note to examiner/reader: 
Please begin with a copy of the first and second editions of The Clara Ann Burns Story 
(enclosed). The first edition was published early during this doctoral research and is out of 
print.  A facsimile of the first edition has been provided, made from saved electronic files.  I 
want to draw attention here to the differences between the first and the second editions of 
The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011).  Despite the first edition having been published by 
Monkey Puzzle Press in Boulder, Colorado, I sensed – as did my publisher Nate Jordan – 
that the outcome of the editing process of the first edition did not demonstrate the overall 
visual presentation (i.e. line, colour) that was anticipated in the working manuscript.  A 
comparison of the first and second editions reveals what is, in terms of the present research, 
this important difference.  The page numbers in both the first and second edition of The 
Clara Ann Burns Story (TCABS) and the publication years are identical.  The first edition can 
be easily identified, as the cover is primarily black with a single framed photograph, while the 
second edition’s cover displays lighter variations in colour and layers of images.   
The reader of the overall research undertaking is invited to experience the overall 
affect and effect of the two editions.  The hope is that the second edition of The Clara Ann 
Burns Story along with the critical writing that follows will be seen as the outcome of what 
creative writer-researchers do –	   that is, invent artefacts to open critical discussions for future 
possibilities within the discipline of creative writing.  It has long been suggested that a 
creative writer’s work is guided by words, but the discipline of creative writing can no longer 
be easily compartmentalised, nor understood as valorising logos (from the Greek “word, 
speech, discourse”) over tekhne (from the Latin “art, skill, craft in work; a system or method 
of making and doing”).  Just as literary and ethnographyxxix theory differentiates ways of 
writing, a creative writer has direct insights into specific creative methods of making and 
doing writing that are unavailable to a spectator.   
In 2008, for example, in “The non-verbal and the verbal: expanding awareness of 
practice-led research in creative writing” Perry argued that there is widespread 
misunderstanding about what creative writers do as “predominantly about words” (3).  She 
reminded other creative writer-researchers who understand her or his creative writing as 
visual to remember that if  
 
your art involves ways of revealing knowledge that are, for example, visual,  
and you are being asked to explain/verify/justify it verbally, then it figures  
that you will get frustrated and begin to fight against this, and demand that  
your non-verbal work be recognised for its very non-verbalness […] [and] 
fight for recognition of our creative work in and of itself (8).   
  
I understand my creative writing process as the manifestation of a visual mode.  My central 
thesis is that the visual presentation itself is the product of a visual method of creating 
writing as the work situates itself before the structure of apperception, thus it is not 
implicated in signification that others might describe as the illustrative or thematic focus of 
the written components.  I am asking that the artefacts be considered kath’ auto. xxx  
Furthermore, because I did not edit the first edition and because I self-edited the second, I 
am asking that the second edition is valorised over the first, as it reflects the outcome of my 
creative writing process.  As I am requesting that the artefacts be recognised as expressing 
themselves, the critical engagement that follows relates quite specifically to the creative writing 
decision-making process itself, in the context of the self-editing of the second edition of 
TCABS that I judge to be essential to it, as opposed to an explanation or interpretation of 
the artefact(s).  My creative process I am going to argue is visual, thus TCABS is not the same 
as traditional kinds of writing that conventionally serve as its conveyance.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
                              
   
 
 
The knowledge and expertise of the artist, the multiple entries and exits of her or his 
practice, remain hidden … 
(K. Coessens, D. Crispin, and A. Douglas, The Artistic Turn, 2009: 90). 
 
Throughout the project of this doctoral research I have become increasingly aware that 
the training I have received has provided me with an awareness of a vast number of 
writers from a variety of different research disciplines.  These writers are (or have been) 
keenly interested in assisting in an exchange of knowledge related to the emergence of 
creative methods, heuristic practises, and the impact of computer (digital) technology on 
the activity of creative writing.  In the previous chapters I have indicated that a practising 
creative writing-researcher’s performance (from the French parfornir “to do, carry out, 
accomplish”) sometimes involves an enquiry (from the Old French enquerre “ask, inquire 
about”) that spurs an investigation (from the Latin investigare “to trace out, search after”) 
that seeks to put to use modes, methods, and techniques borrowed from other 
disciplines such as literary and aesthetic theory.  Recently, however, in what some have 
called the Computer Agexxxi a number of technological changes and inventions have 
begun to impact human experience; amongst other results, certain areas of creative 
research are now directed in significant part through creative practice itself, where that 
practice is experimental.  Thus, the outcome is produced organically in real-timexxxii and is 
activity-based, thereby setting up a situation wherein there is an intertwining of the 
creative researcher’s actions, and observations of those actions, as a practising creative-
researcher moves to and fro between these.  Hence this kind of research maintains 
cohesion with certain notions, modes, experimental methods, concepts, and techniques 
specifically related to a particular artistic discipline and the researcher’s unique inventive 
individuality.   
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At this point my own difficulty should be clear: how to go about articulating and 
archiving some of the specific details of the creative writing process that led to the 
production of The Clara Ann Burns Story (TCABS) (Smith 2011) for the use of other 
practising creative writer-researchers.  My aim in making TCABS was to test a creative 
writing process that involves recording memory by using computer-related apparatuses 
and how this might be grasped expert-intuitively.  An evaluation of the specific details of 
this intuitive way of creating writing needs to be acknowledged (rather than, 
dogmatically, as these matters are traditionally taught) to shed light on an unusual 
creative writing process, and to inaugurate a new way of understanding how a different 
(heuristic) creative writing process works, as it is likely to bring new work into being.  
This kind of creative writing process is not driven by a traditional semiotic conformity 
that might be associated with linguistics or theoretic consensus; rather, it follows a 
singular mixed-mode pathway that seeks to extend the doing and making aspects of 
creative writing that may be missing from earlier more traditional kinds of creative 
writing research projects (or perhaps could not have been discussed or made as some 
computer apparatus such as digital pens and digital writing tablets have only recently 
become available).  This project involves a simple plan: to investigate a specific creative 
writing process (i.e. decision-making) that led to the publication of TCABS by weaving 
in and out of contextualised critical discussions, borrowing certain phrases and notions 
(from the Latin notionem “concept, conception, idea”), and threading together an 
interrelationship between these phrases, notions, text boxes (for instance, see right) and a 
number of images made through the use of a digital writing tablet and pen.  By 
undertaking this creative research project, I am arguing that the interlaced discussions 
and images in this chapter come close to describing and expressing, in the complexity of 
their combination, the precise agencementxxxiii (or productive apparatus) of the creative 
writing process I am accounting for and documenting here, which none of these 
borrowed notions or images express in isolation.  
 
From the perspective of creative writing research, the practising creative writers 
Donnelly and Harper in Key Issues In Creative Writing (2013) concluded that creative 
writing research “always returns us to the often personal actions of individuals, to their 
thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (179).  No doubt, some work will be 
required to account for how the working thoughts, feelings, and emotions of a practising 
creative writer-researcher guide a creative writing process.  In my own case, that creative 
“All 
concepts are 
connected 
to problems 
without 
which they 
would have 
no meaning 
and which 
can 
themselves 
only be 
isolated or 
understood 
as their 
solution 
emerges”  
(Deleuze 
and 
Guattari 
1994: 16).  	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process involved taking in-hand computer-related apparatuses that resulted in the 
production and publishing of more than one material artefact.  The complexity of this 
work is revealed through reference to some of the terms Donnelly and Harper are using: 
they identify and emphasise “personal actions of individuals”, “their thoughts”, 
“feelings” and “emotions”.  The stress they place on these sorts of terms comes into 
sharp relief in the context of the significant “technological changes” – in the technical 
sense (from the Latin tekhne “art, skill, craft in work; a system or method of making and 
doing”) – of recent decades.  How do we combine the personal actions of a writer with 
“disciplinary expertise” required by technical change?  Yet isn’t it “disciplinary expertise” 
in creative practices that has the potential to “improve the ways in which we develop 
creative writing in the academy […] and how we might go about doing these 
explorations […]” (180)?   
From my point of view, a focus on personal actions, individual thoughts, feelings 
and emotions, such as I document here in the creative portfolio, indicates that perhaps a 
different creative writing process may have already been imagined that could actualise 
and realise a connection between personal actions, emotions and feelings, and new 
computer-related technology – as I attempt to demonstrate in the published book 
attached.  But how would a practising creative writer-researcher more generally identify 
how personal actions, thoughts, feelings, and emotions might be connected to the use of 
new technology?  Might we argue that a creative writer-researcher, who has, for a 
number of years, been testing and experimenting with a method of creating writing 
through the use of computer technology, has already mastered a particular kind of 
digitally-supported “disciplinary expertise” (with regard to tekhne)?  According to Melrose 
in “Disciplinary ‘Specificity’ And The Digital Submission” the “expertise of professional 
performance practitioners whose interest is such as to direct them to the 
postgraduate/higher degree programme of a university, is likely already to entail complex 
modes of enquiry […]” (2012: 299).  In Melrose’s argument, the practitioner-researcher 
will tend already to have mastered the discipline, and in part her undertaking, in the 
research context, is to produce an informed account of her own disciplinary (or 
interdisciplinary) practices.  The significance of specific disciplinary “expert recall” in a 
higher degree set-up, is that   
 
by taking the adequate digital inscription itself of the ‘knowledge 
objects’ specific to expert performance-making process as external  
measure of the latter, the expert-practitioner post-graduate/higher degree 
candidate will begin to obtain an insight into the knowledge specificity of 
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her practice that is currently unusual in the higher degree set-up.  In such 
an undertaking, where knowledge systems are overlaid, the one upon the 
other, it is likely that the performance practitioner will begin to be able to 
dissolve complex notions that an unreflective language use has the 
capacity to render monolithic (312).    
 
Melrose’s argument, that is concerned with how we recall research and document it, 
suggests to me that expertise is related to a complex “knowledge object” involving a 
layering of knowledge practices that is internally differentiated as opposed to pre-existing 
externally or following a linear pathway.  Nonetheless, research activity is required to be 
rigorous and involve editing and re-editing, and it is required to pose its questions and 
then to seek to answer them.  This seems to me to pose a conundrum for creative writer-
researchers.  In her essay Melrose advised her readers that Lyotard’s observations on 
time, ‘memory-effects’, and digital technologies may be of interest to researchers who, in 
a higher degree set-up, may be looking for a basis for the selection of past data that can 
be grasped expert-intuitively, and exploited as such in the research outcome.    
The nature of creative writing in creative writing research practices, in Donnelly 
and Harper’s terms, always begins with a practising creative writer’s own understanding 
of creative writing, as this is the “only way to ever get closer to understanding creative 
writing itself” (179).  In my own case, in terms of TCABS, what is of interest in research 
terms is the issue of making a highly individualised artefact with computer-related 
apparatus that I am going to argue involved an intuitive method of recording (from 
graphy- “to write or record”) memory (from the Old French record “memory”).  What I am 
implying is that the terms “writing”, “recording”, and “memory” are interrelated not only 
etymologically but that this relationality can also be realised in research terms as a 
particular kind of creative writing practice that might be called “creative digital graphic 
art”, by which I mean writing creatively with computer-related apparatus for the purpose 
of recording memories, involving decision-making that is not limited to and by words 
alone.     
In this chapter, where the creative writing decision-making process resulted in 
publication of artefacts within the doctoral research context, it might be that one could 
argue that expertise has been acknowledged within the wider community of creative 
writing and within a particular higher degree set-up.  Thus, what may be useful to 
consider here in research terms are some of the originating impulses of a heuristic (from 
the Greek heuretikos “inventive”) creative writing process as it is experienced in the body 
of a practising creative writer-researcher. 
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The practising creative writer and pedagogue Katharine Haake in “To Fill with 
Milk: or, The Thing Itself” (2013: 79-102) maintained that 
 
part of any education in creative writing needs […] to extend  
beyond doing to seeing the practice itself – not just what we’re  
making but what we are doing when we are making it and how it  
might move out, into, and through the world.  And we begin  
with language as a critical analogue of narrative, taking up, from  
Derrida, the long familiar (to us) idea […] [there are nothing but  
signs].  […] If signs are capable of producing meaning not as  
some transparent representations of an external reality but  
only in relation to each other, the same can be said of stories,  
and successful creative writing teaching depends, as well and at  
least part of the time, on preparing students to become more active  
agents in this larger field of literary discourse (81).   
 
For Donnelly and Harper, however, a focus on “literary discourse” fails to display the 
distinguishing characteristic of the discipline of creative writing.  According to Donnelly 
and Harper, burgeoning creative writers who are “students want access to a kind of 
culture capital that’s not specifically ‘literary’ but much more amorphously creative” (xiv).  
Plainly, for Harper (2013: 57-59), as well as for Perry (2008: 4-5), creative writing choice 
is not limited to words or certain kinds of writing apparatus.  My own sense is that one 
might be able to argue that if the meaning of a particular “signifier” is dependent on use, 
then different creative writers may work differently as opposed to following a “familiar’’ 
path; one such ‘different work’ is likely today to employ computer-related apparatus to 
produce an artefact or artefacts in ways that have not yet been considered by dominant 
discourses of creative writing.  It seems to me to follow that the artefacts produced from 
this kind of experimentation should be read/examined differently from traditional kinds 
of “literature”.   
 
The capacity for writing itself to capture and preserve memory has engendered 
much debate in philosophical writing, and my argument here is to draw on philosophical 
writing in an attempt to engage with the conundrum noted above.  The notion of 
inscribing (writing, graphic art) through experiments with digital technology, and its 
relationship with memory, calls to mind Lyotard’s The Inhuman, published in English in 
the 1990s, he writes about the nature of memory in the digital context, and suggests that 
memory-effects, inscribed digitally, are of a number of different types, involving different 
sorts of actions in the practitioner.  A second writer much concerned with the 
relationship between writing and memories was Derrida.xxxiv  In his Writing And Difference, 
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and in particular the chapter entitled “Freud and the Scene of Writing” (1978: 196–231), 
Derrida meditated (I am paraphrasing) on the possibility of future developments in 
human technology, speculating on the production of a “writing machine” that would 
have the capacity to provide a writer with an apparatus with which to produce an 
“image” of the material of “memory” itself, as opposed to representing a phonetic (i.e. 
sign) code.  Derrida projected that: “Psychical [memory] content will be represented by a text 
whose essence is irreducibly graphic” (199) (writer’s emphasis).  
 
Having cited Freud’s notes on the “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’” 
(1925) – the surface of which Freud imagined could be used as an “alternative” (207) for 
reproducing specific details of missing memory – Derrida considered how Freud’s 
metaphorical “mystic writing pad” could be used as a recording apparatus of living 
present memories as these are perceived, and how this recording might be possible in the 
future on the basis of the ways certain decisions are made during a writing process.  I 
shall want to go further in the present chapter, arguing that it is in terms of this precise 
situation that I sense psychical memory working in a creative writing and visual process 
that today does not need to involve speculating on a “mystic writing pad”.  However, the 
notion does allow us to focus today on the actual experience of a practising creative 
writer-researcher who is using a digital writing pad and pen – and other kinds of digital 
technology such as digital photography – to record memories.  
 
Haake, writing on creative writing itself, by way of contrast, identifies “signs” that 
she explained, (above) produce meaning in relation to each other and that also have a 
relationship with “stories”.  In an effort to describe this in further detail, Haake 
explained: “I begin not just with the idea of a story but with the idea of a story in relation 
to all other stories, a vast sea of stories to which students aim to add their own” (2013: 
83).  My approach in the present portfolio is a kind of reversal of Haake.  Rather than 
searching for relationships between already existing stories, what I propose exploring 
here is a digitally-supported creative writing through a psychological and philosophical 
exploration of what I propose to argue, in what follows, and with graphics in mind, is the 
“image-stuff” of living memory as it is experienced in the body, and testing how to 
produce writing that is multimodal, rhizomatically-developed, that values the visual at 
least as much as the supposed ‘stories’ it tells.  The communications researcher Dylan 
Yamada-Rice in “Traditional Theses and Multimodal Communication” (2012) described 
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multimodality as having “always existed, contemporary multimodality utilises a vast array 
of digital technologies, which seem to emphasize the lacking of monomodal [writing] 
[…]” (157).  
Assuming that the artefact(s) produced by a creative writer in the computer age 
should be read and/or perceived differently from more traditional genres of ‘literature’, 
perhaps we might observe that certain digital apparatuses are techno-graphic in nature, 
rather than ‘techno-logical’: what this makes possible, and indeed prioritises it, is figural 
inscription (writing) as was suggested by Lyotard in Discourse, Figure in 1971.  If, as 
Lyotard indicated, writing, as it is being “inscribed” by an artist, wavers between 
“transformation” (235) – from discourse to figure – in a double gesture (i.e. words/visual 
patterns), then this kind of Lyotardian set-up should mean that it is possible to argue for 
the valorisation of the figure (visual) over discourse (verbal): a multi-modal method of 
writing/graphic-art production ensues, particularly when the computer apparatus and its 
imaginative potential is literally taken in-hand.  Lyotard, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, reversed the order of discourse/figure, and in so doing crushed “the signifiers 
as well as the signifieds, treating words as things […]” (1972/2008: 244).  If we consider 
Lyotard’s observations related to writing/inscription in the 1980s, it might also be 
possible to argue that we need to ask if, in the digital age, the creative writer is someone 
who has the freedom to experiment not only with “doing things with words” (in the 
Austinian tradition, Austin 1962) but also “how to do things/how things are done, with 
images/figures”.  Haunting Lyotard’s essays in The Inhuman is the notion that writing 
(inscribing) with computer technology can provide human beings with the freedom not 
simply to make another narrative, but rather to provide the means to explore the human 
experience itself in a specific body, in relation to other bodies, as the material of 
memories.  
Before exploring Lyotard’s essay “Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy” in The 
Inhuman (in which he focuses on time, memory-effects and digital inscription in some 
detail), I want first to explore his essay entitled “Rewriting Modernity” (1998: 24-35).  In 
this essay, while drawing from Immanuel Kant (imagination) and Freud (free floating 
attention), Lyotard emphasised the importance of reconsidering “traditional” 
understandings of writing by addressing what he meant by the term “postmodern” in his 
earlier work entitled The Postmodern Condition (published in the original French in 1979).  
In The Postmodern Condition Lyotard took as his point of interest the notion of 
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“knowledge”, as it relates to what he called “the grand narrative” (1984: xxiv).  
According to the literary theorist Terry Eagleton in Literary Theory in 1983:  
 
Postmodernity means the end of modernity, in the sense of those grand  
narratives of truth, reason, science, progress and universal emancipation  
which are taken to characterise modern thought from the Enlightenment  
onwards (2010: 200).   
 
But in “Rewriting Modernity” Lyotard argued: “Postmodernity is not a new age, but the 
rewriting of some of the features claimed by modernity [that promised to liberate] [...] 
humanity as a whole through science and technology” (1998: 34).  From my point of 
view, Lyotard was clarifying in this essay, that the term “postmodern” (that he first used 
in 1979) was misunderstood by some researchers.  He argued that the term 
“postmodern” does not signal a “new age” or the end of “modernity”.  Lyotard 
understood that the kinds of writing that were being produced and to which he drew his 
attention were simply adding to narratives that already exist.  He insisted that writing is 
“returning to the most traditional forms of narrative” (ibid).  He also remarked that he 
found it to be “disturbing […] there’s no longer any question of free forms given here 
and now to sensibility and the imagination” (ibid).  In his concluding remarks, Lyotard 
postulated on “computer engineering” and “new technologies”, from which we might 
infer that computer technology would spur writers in the future to resist making 
traditional narratives, considering instead how to gain access to “free imagination” as 
new computer technology becomes more widely available (1998: 34-35).  The digital age 
quite distinctively allows what might be called ‘meta-writing’ or ‘meta-graphic’, and as 
such it is likely to foster new ways of thinking about writing and images as tools for the 
imagination.  The philosophy of technological development, and its impact on the 
human body and writing itself, is important throughout Lyotard’s essays in The Inhuman 
(1998), but “Logos And Techne, Or Telegraphy” (47-57) is most pertinent to the present 
investigation on the relationship between time (duration), memory and creating writing 
by using computer apparatus.  I return below to Lyotard’s account of writing as it relates 
to memory-effects and the potential impact of computer technology on writing itself, as 
the implications of his analysis might lead some creative writer-researchers to re-examine 
positions regarding their own uptake of tools like a digital pen and writing tablet for the 
purpose of inscribing, inventing, archiving, and re-actualising memory.  
 More recently, the pioneers of creative writing and research Donnelly and Harper 
concluded that emotions, thoughts, and feelings are key modalities that drive the creative 
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writing practice along with “[huge] technological changes” that are provoking questions 
related to “disciplinary expertise” (2013: 180).  Yet, as Donnelly and Harper noted, their 
own research does not go far enough.  They call for creative writer-researchers who have 
knowledge related to creating writing by using new technology and a highly 
individualised ‘felt’ “as it happens” way of writing to share some vital information related 
to her or his expertise (180).  
Perhaps some of the elusiveness of grasping the “now” of the doing and making 
of creative writing lies, in part, in what Perry suggested in “The non-verbal and verbal: 
expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (2008), is the result of a 
misunderstanding of what creative writing is.  According to Perry creative writing can be 
“seen as visual, performative, aural and tactile, and perhaps other – perhaps modes that 
have not yet been named” (8). As I have already pointed out above, Perry insists that we 
understand creative writing as not solely a matter of words.  Rather, she suggested that 
her own creative writing practice involves the use of a “keyboard” upon which she 
“wrote/typed” (whereas when I edited the second edition of TCABS I held in-hand a 
digital pen that I moved on a digital writing tablet) during certain “moments” of a 
“performance” or “practise sessions” that Perry argued “were responsive to sound, 
movement, mood, ambience, colour, performance, thought, sensation” (4-5).   
 
I want to turn at this point to the first and second editions of TCABS: in light of 
some of the introductory notions briefly set out above.  I am going to argue that while 
the difference between the first and second edition of TCABS is primarily visual – and, 
therefore, the self-editing decisions plainly were not based on judgments that concern 
“word choice” – how I experience my creative writing process is not as a series of 
“moments” that can be separated from what Perry has called “Other moments of my 
writing […]’” (5).  In contrast, I imagine my creative writing process as an activity that 
involves a fluid inner perceptual experience.  This inner embodied experience operates 
differently from the ways what is produced from the activity of creative writing might be 
perceived by an outside spectator.  My creative writing process triggers the emergence of 
the emotions and the luminous “image-stuff” of living memory that shifts my focus and 
branches out in different directions; and, this imagining, triggering, shifting, and 
branching is not clearly definable in terms of separable “moments”.  Rather, it seems to 
me, from the experience with which I am concerned here, that memories put on a kind 
of “show” that has a direct relationship with how I feel as I am watching these memories 
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on a kind of “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 2).  I do not propose to try to generalise here 
on behalf of other creative writers, but I would argue that my account represents a case in 
point where memory plays a significant role in writing and visual production.  Because 
what I am watching is moving, it is not possible to stop the process and examine certain 
“moments”, as this would end the movement of the process itself.  On the other hand, 
the elements, which seem to stick, and to which I return, are plainly significant, if not 
marked specifically in temporal terms.  Plainly, I seek to mark them through digital 
inscription.  
While this difference between my understanding of how my creative writing 
process works and Perry’s observations might appear inconsequential, in that Perry 
suggests that she can identify different “moments” during her own creative writing 
performances or rehearsals, I would argue that I cannot differentiate between where 
particular areas of significance begin or end.  Circling around this difference is the notion 
of durationxxxv that can be linked to an intuitive method (in philosophical terms) and the 
expert-intuitive processes in creative writing decision-making that Melrose outlines 
(Melrose 2011).  Indicative of that notion of duration and expert-intuition decision-
making, in brief, is the formulation that how certain individual creative decisions and 
actions are made is on the basis of the intersection of moving images, memory, feelings 
and emotions, that I shall return to as I proceed to set out these research findings in the 
light of the changes made to published texts.    
 I want at this point to reiterate observations from Harper in his “Creative 
Writing Habitats” (2013): Harper contends (and I am paraphrasing) that creative writing 
is one of the most highly individualised of university disciplines that often involves 
recording memory and deploying emotional investments (48–60).  His discussion in this 
particular essay focuses on the fact that, in his view, although memory, psychological 
responses, and emotional resources often guide a creative writer’s thoughts and actions, 
these aspects of creative writing have not yet been investigated by creative writer-
researchers.  In a revealing section of his essay, Harper opens up a number of questions 
related to the memory, physical, psychological, and emotional aspects of creative writing 
and “individual free will” (59).  “All we can confidently state”, Harper offers, “is that this 
kind of investigation has not yet been undertaken and that recognising this absence 
would only be acceptable if we were entirely confident that no new knowledge will be 
found in undertaking this kind of work” (ibid).  
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The idea, from this experienced researcher in the field, that notions relating to 
“recording”, “psychology”, “memory”, “feelings” and “emotions” have been erased or to 
a great extent are absent from published academic discourses related to creative writing 
is, in light of the few philosophical notions I have assembled above, surprising.  How 
might a practising creative writer-researcher go about documenting this sort of 
investigation that Harper indicates would be useful to others?  I am arguing that it can 
only be achieved in mixed-mode, where the researcher is already a published writer, and 
that what is needed is a tightly related connection between creative writing and the 
critical commentary.  Inscribed in these questions is my own crisis.  I sensexxxvi that my 
own crisis relates quite specifically to my own creative writing judgements that piloted 
certain actions, particularly those that resulted in the second edition of TCABS.  What is 
at stake, in these terms, is a particular kind of seriousness of knowledge of creative 
decisions that I have made throughout the past five or more years of research and 
creative decision-making.    
Along these lines, the disciplines of performing arts, philosophy, psychology and 
anthropology may be useful to the discipline of creative writing, not so much in 
evaluating the outcomes of a creative writing mode of production – as literary theory and 
aesthetics attempt to do – but in lending ideas to a creative writer-researcher who is 
working as a bricoleusexxxvii and is investigating, in this specific case, what I think my body 
did as it moved, observed, and felt while bringing the second edition of TCABS into 
being.  This particular creative writing research takes the emergence of a new perspective 
seriously, as it concerns the potential connection between creative writing technological 
innovation and memories, emotions and making things with images as well as words.  
 
Finally, let me conclude this introduction with a brief overview of the following 
thesis, presented in sections. I begin with Freud’s notion of “screen memories” that he 
related to emotions, feelings and childhood memories, thus suggesting what I was 
viewing when I was writing TCABS.  Second, I borrow the notions of “intuition”, 
“memory”, “image”, and “duration” from Bergson, that he argued concern the 
experience of life itself in all its fluidity.  I explore Bergson by comparing his intuitive 
method to the one identified by Ulmer.  Third, I continue to explore Bergson’s intuition 
through Deleuze, who took a particular interest in Bergson’s work and linked intuition to 
emotions and creativity itself, in a manner in which I sense is intrinsic to how I 
experienced making TCABS.  Fourth, I return to Lyotard’s meditations on the potential 
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for writers to use new technology to capture and re-actualise memory.  Related side-
notes and figures are also interspersed throughout, in an attempt to draw attention 
visually, as well as discursively, to the emergence of the agencement of the research 
document itself that is not separate from but connected with the creative writing making 
process in question.  Last, I explore the notion of “doing things with images” through an 
analogy that might be thought of as deriving from speech act theory, in that the image 
itself can be shown, as context change, perhaps to do more than it shows.  It might be 
possible to argue that my inclusion of certain photographs in TCABS can resonate, for 
example, with certain sorts of affective as well as informative engagements with a 
spectating audience.    
	  
 
… artistic research can be defined as knowledge of the process of creativity, not its outcomes …  
(K. Coessens, D. Crispin, and A. Douglas, The Artistic Turn 2009: 26). 
 
I want to begin by borrowing the notion of “screen memories”xxxviii that was coined by 
Freud in 1899 in his sometimes-maligned paper, “Screen Memories” (1899).  Freud 
creates “screen memories” for himself, for the purpose of revealing insights into 
childhood memories.  Although this investigation of memories formed the fundamental 
basis for subsequent theorising – such as The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) – nevertheless 
his “screen memories” have been largely ignored by the wider psychologist community.  
The United States born Professor of Psychology, David L. Smith, noted in 2000 in “The 
Mirror Image of the Present: Freud’s Theory Of Retrogressive Screen Memories” that he 
was aware of only one psychoanalytic writer who contributed to this subject (2000: 7).  
As I have already indicated in the introduction, I am claiming that while making the first 
and the second edition of TCABS, I focused on watching living present memories that 
worked for me in that process.  After all, many memories tend to use visual modalities 
that are highly personalised perceptions when compared with the widely used code of 
verbal language.  I was and remain interested in studying these memories and recording 
them, as this process seems to me to bring to light information related to the human 
The 
sociologist 
Karin 
Knorr- 
Cetina 
describes 
“epistemic 
[knowledge] 
practices 
[…] [as] 
dynamic 
constructive 
(creative), 
and perhaps 
conflictual” 
(2001: 183- 
184). 
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experience itself.  I want to note here that I recorded the word “screen” as I was viewing 
a distinct memory while making the TCABS (Smith 2011: 2).  That ‘innocent’ use meant 
that I immediately found Freud’s screen memories to be extremely useful in helping me 
to wrestle with the paradox of having to use words to describe the creative writing 
process.  In 2002 Melrose called this sense of recognition by a practitioner of a notion 
used in theoretical writing “empirical fit” (sfmelrose.org.uk/adjustyourset/).  What it 
underlies in this case was the fact that, in its most authentic sense for me, it was not 
words that came to me but visual images – thus valorising the showing to the self that 
triggers the writing instead of listening.     
It seems as though screen memories, and some of the phrases Freud used to 
describe what he meant by choosing these exact words, connote similar ideas that come 
close to defining what I was looking at when I was engaged in the creative writing 
process that led to the publication of TCABS, while to a spectator (if one were to have 
been observing me writing using a digital pen and writing pad, as well as computer 
keyboard) it might have appeared that I was holding a digital pen in my right hand and 
making certain motions with my body, while looking at or glancing at or around a 
computer screen.  Nevertheless, when I write creatively I am not specifically looking “at” 
a computer screen or the product that I am making.  Nor am I paying attention to what I 
am doing with my hands.  While I might register the experience of engaging in a creative 
writing practice, this always has a direct relationship to a particular memory that the 
activity of writing sets in motion, whether I am moving my hands or eyes or not.  From 
my point of view, the activity of writing does not distract my attention from seeing the 
memory unfold, it intensifies it visually as if appearing on a “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 
2).  The activity of writing activates and intensifies certain emotions in the way that 
seeing and experiencing a loved one in a coffin might trigger certain deeply felt 
emotions.  Images in this sense, one might argue, “do” certain things to a spectator such 
as triggering certain kinds of emotion or affect – that is, they have performative force.  
What I mean is that the experience of watching certain kinds of memories unfold and 
my creative writing process are inseparable, as if I am viewing a film on a large movie 
screen occupied by figures (in the Lyotardian and Deleuzian sense), and that seem to me 
to intersect with Freud’s screen memories.xxxix  These appear in the form of moving, 
luminous, silent chromatic images that guide a creative writing process that seeks to 
illustrate and thereby illuminate a living memory as opposed to the visuals in TCABS 
“illustrating” an already written text.   
The 
philosopher 
Emmanuel 
Levinas in 
1963 in The 
Theory of 
Intuition in 
Husserl’s 
Phenomenology 
noted:  
“there is a 
multiplicity of 
modes of 
internal 
intuition: 
perception is 
not the only 
reflective 
intuitive act.  
In fact, an act 
of reflection 
may occur in 
memory, 
imagination, 
or in the 
Einfuhlung 
[empathy].  
The general 
theory of 
intuition 
therefore 
applies to 
reflection.  We 
find there 
again the 
parallel of 
imagination 
and memory 
and the 
exceptional 
privilege role 
of perception” 
(1995: 135).   
	   69	  
Freud describes screen memories as “fragmentary recollections” of early 
childhood that “aroused powerful emotions” and resulted in emotional feelings of “fear, 
shame, physical pain, etc. [resulting from] […] illnesses, death, fires, births of brothers 
and sisters, etc.” and are not available to all adults (1899: 202).  These express highly 
individualised visual characteristics that are not understandable before adulthood.  Screen 
memories do not produce the same sort of “emotional effect” when the particular 
memory was recorded in the body of a child, suggesting that screen memories are the 
“emotional effect” of what was “omitted” during a particular childhood experience but 
not “erased” (203).  In this way, emotions would seem to have a direct correspondence 
with what screen memories are selected, how those memories appear visually, and how 
they are “recorded” (ibid).  
If screen memories are focused on intensely, according to Freud, they have the 
potential to reveal the unfolding of visual scenes of the “most momentous turning points 
in your life”, and are driven by “powerful motive forces” (206).  Although screen 
memories are the result of human hardship, nevertheless, Freud wrote: “forsan et haec olim 
meminisse juvabit” (207).xl   It is this sense of arriving at an embodied felt (sensory) 
understanding of the transformational effect of, for example, the memory of death, birth 
or illness, that, Freud argued, are extremely well remembered as highly detailed and clear 
images of watching oneself as an event unfolded.  “Further investigation of these […] 
childhood memories”, Freud remarked, “taught me that they can organise in other ways 
and that an unsuspected wealth of meaning lies concealed behind their apparent 
innocence” (204).  Recognition of how “memory” works, of what can only be viewed by 
the individual, seems to me to require some of us creative writer-researchers to begin to 
identify how these might be working within our own body, that might very well involve 
recognising aspects of the kinds of memory fragments Freud identified, and how we 
might be able to record these by taking in-hand new computer-related apparatus such as 
a digital camera, digital pen and writing pad. 
Freud seems to me to have, early on in his work, identified a process by which 
one can gain access to “knowledge” (208) through a practice of enquiry that explores 
private, deeply felt, hidden inner embodied memories that are always interesting because 
 
 inaccuracy of recollection [in the case of screen memories] does not  
play any considerable part here, in view of the high degree of sensory 
intensity possessed by images and the efficiency of the function of  
memory in the young […] that serve the purposes of the repression and 
replacement of objectionable or disagreeable impressions […]  
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[having instead] made a place for themselves in mental life -  far  
later […] (209). 
    
 I have suggested a notional connection between Freud’s “screen memories” and 
the creative process I used in making TCABS that involved a method of showing how 
certain life-altering childhood memories can be recorded, the details of which were not 
known in advance.  The implications of the idea of screen memories, for the discipline of 
creative writing, may be useful in posing a number of questions related to what informs 
particular judgments that might not be piloted by words.  For example: How can we 
establish a connection with visual origins that perhaps have been brought about by 
personal and emotional manifestations?  Could an alternative method of writing on a 
computer gain its grip on recording memories, preserving these, and shining a different 
light on unsettling individual turmoil and disturbances that perhaps might be of value, 
not only in the artistic sense, but also the psychological?  While the practice of borrowing 
from Freud’s scenarios is not new, exploring and borrowing from the notion of screen 
memories is, at least according to David L. Smith as I have indicated above.  
Furthermore, according to David L. Smith, Freud himself provided a very limited 
number of examples of screen memories (2000: 7).  Perhaps, as Freud implied, what is of 
interest is the powerful emotional content of childhood memories that are tacit.  Yet it is 
possible to trigger their emergence, looking at how the colourful details of moving highly 
unique and affective scenes can “show” something about the human experience that 
appears in fragments, in non-chronological order, and shedding light on the image of the 
human struggle itself that can be studied.  While screen memories, emotions and effect 
might assist in opening up a discussion in relation to the usefulness of sharing the inner 
visual workings of childhood memories, this also gives rise to a question that concerns 
where the visual image-stuff of memories – and of memories-inscribed via creative 
writing more generally – “comes from”.  
“Comes from” is a delicate issue and a metaphor (from the Greek metaphora “a 
transfer”) that constitutes a challenge to many traditional ideas about how the mind and 
body work.  Freud noted in “Screen Memories”, for example, that a wound to a face that 
resulted in images of blood loss and a surgeon sewing stiches into the skin resulted in the 
formation of a cicatrix, thus the scarxli itself displays visible evidence that the body itself 
records (preserves and/or inscribes) certain visual reminders of its wound (the body is not 
separate from the mind), which the body continues to carry throughout a lifetime, 
marking a place on the body where the body has attempted to heal, but not erase, the 
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mark of the wound (203).  What this suggests to me is that the specific details of the 
visual “image-stuff” of memories, in the present scenario, is safeguarded for 
reproduction purposes and is already somewhere – engraved (Freud 1899: 207) in me – 
and that the memories come to me from me, for example from a metaphorically named 
sub- or un- conscious agency, and my engaging in the activity of creating writing seems 
to me to trigger memories.  But we need something more than this, because one of the 
questions that Freud did not address was how memories continue to exist inside the 
body/mind over a lifetime, making them available for viewing or recording purposes.  
Thus, we must link this to a theory of time that can perhaps give us a perspective on the 
activity of writing that has not yet been created.    
 
I have, above, borrowed Bergson’s notions of duration and intuition from a series 
of essays in The Creative Mind (1974) that were written between 1903 and 1923, to clarify 
my contention that the movement of an emerging creative writing process as it is 
experienced is fluid rather than a series of separate moments. In The Creative Mind 
Bergson asserts:   
 
Intuition doubtless admits of many degrees of intensity, and philosophy  
many degrees of depth; but the mind once brought back to real duration 
will already be alive with intuitive life and its knowledge of things will  
already be philosophy.  Instead of discontinuity of moments replacing  
one another in an infinitely divided time, it will perceive the continuous  
fluidity of real time which flows along, indivisible. Instead of surface states  
covering successively some neutral stuff and maintaining with it a  
mysterious relationship of phenomena to substance, it will seize upon one  
identical change which keeps ever lengthening as in a melody where  
everything is becoming but where the becoming, being itself substantial,  
has no need of support (127).  
 
Duration, according to Bergson, is not a series of separate moments.  The ever-changing 
experience of life itself is not a separate series of events set side-by-side.  In very simple 
terms (I am paraphrasing Bergson), duration and space are different.  Time is continuous 
and space can be measured.  Time must not be spatialised.  Instead of thinking of time as a 
sequence of separate events, duration is the fluid experience of life itself.  In other words, 
the past and the present are contemporaneous.  Duration is continuously persistent, 
whereas space emerges with movement.  Movement is distinct from the space covered.  
Therefore, only space, and not duration, is quantifiably measurable.  Additionally, 
analytical Kantian-like logic is based on language (words), whereas duration (experience 
of life itself) cannot be grasped by the intellect.  Consequently, Bergson introduces his 
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philosophical method of intuition.   Intuition, in Bergson’s view, is what allows one to 
“sense” movement (change).   
If we extend Bergson’s notion of duration to a creative writing process as it is 
experienced, it is not one-dimensional – i.e. decomposable to a series of moments that 
can be judged according to rules of analytical language as if one moment begins and 
another ends – because the experience of a creative writing process, like experience itself, 
is dynamic and not divisible.  Duration is not a sequence along a line (past, present, 
future) that can be stopped at any point and examined.  These are some of the reasons 
why it might be useful to contemplate duration further, as it relates to an intuitive 
creative writing method that involves recording memory.  According to Bergson, 
intuition has a direct relationship with how the images of memories survive and are 
perceived.  But rather than starting by investigating Bergson’s chapter “Of the Survival 
of Images.  Memory and Mind.” in Matter and Memory (1911/1991: 133-177), I want to 
first approach Bergson’s notions related to memory, through the work of the writer and 
professor of English, Gregory Ulmer, for comparative purposes.  
In Heuretics: The Logic of Invention (1994), Ulmer opened his introduction to a 
chapter entitled “Hypermedia” by advising his readers: “Writing as technology is a 
memory machine, with each apparatus finding different means to collect, store, and 
retrieve information outside of any one individual mind (in rituals, habits, libraries or 
databases)” (16).  Ulmer is a pedagogue keenly interested in teaching an inventive 
method of writing for educational purposes that involves the use of a computer on the 
basis of an intuitive method.  The particular kind of intuitive method that Ulmer is 
interested in is made possible when certain personal, environmental, and experiential 
conditions prevail.  According to Ulmer, these conditions are the result of rehearsals that 
trigger a “Psychological Gesture” that can be linked to a “eureka intuition” (142), the 
latter of which was identified by Bastick in 1982 in Intuition: How We Think and Act.  
Ulmer described an inventive writer as a kind of   
 
chorographer [who] uses the mystory to guide the exercises of the  
Method (actively searches for or creates repetitions among the discourses  
of society).  And these repetitions do not produce ‘grand designs’ but  
‘miniaturizations’ bringing the heterogeneous items of information into 
order around a detail or a prop (a strange attractor) in the setting. […].   
Chorography as a method of invention writes directly the hyperbolic  
intuition known as the eureka experience.  It is first of all a means of  
simulating the experience, for transferring it from the living body  
to apparatus, whether print or electronic, for ‘writing’ or artificially  
performing intuition ‘outside’ the organic mind and body and  
	   73	  
entrusting this process to a machine (both technological and  
methodological).  The study of grammatology has demonstrated in  
detail how print favors and supports or augments an analytical mode  
of thought based on the fit between the properties of verbal  
discourse and the abstract demands of logic (139–140).xlii 
  
Plainly, Ulmer is focused on verbal associations, possibly recalling Romain Jakobson’s 
workxliii in the early days of structuralism, on supposedly linear and associative axes in 
writing.  From my point of view, one of the difficulties with an associative approach to a 
creative writing process is that it exchanges fixed positions set side-by-side, with 
positions that seem to extend in space, thus forgetting that a creative writing process 
might not be constructed by moving forward through a linear set of words, phrases, or 
meanings that need to be articulated on the basis of a set of codes related to binary rather 
than complex logic.  Donnelly, for example, understood that it is important not to 
“associate knowledge with certainty as traditional models might do (e.g. validation 
through replication), [because] the knowledge in creative writing is in the discovery that 
takes the writer beyond routines of writing, in the questions that arise and that are 
answered through the writing process” (2013: 123).         
Ulmer’s intuitive method needed mentioning here in some detail, as it assisted in 
helping me to identify a path toward a Bergsonian intuitive method (applied less to 
Philosophy than to creative decision-making) that I am arguing resonates with how I 
experience recording living present memories.  Bastick’s “intuitive method”, upon which 
Ulmer’s theory of a “Psychological Gesture” rests, is based on sudden flashes of insight 
or “Eureka” experiences (Bastick 1982: 1), suggesting certain moments when something 
is discovered.  While Bastick notes Bergson’s intuition, Bastick’s intuition is not the same 
as the intuitive method that Bergson identified.  The notion of developing “image-stuff” 
in the mind was articulated by Freud, and co-opted by the Lacanian tradition, but 
because Freud was so focused on the verbal cure (“the talking cure”, “chimney 
sweeping”) – or, to use the terms cited by Jacques Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis – the “more Anna provided signifiers, the more she chattered on the 
better it went.  It was a case of the chimney sweeping treatment” (1973/1977: 157).  This 
account suggests that the sufferer of repression has to master the transgressive “image-
stuff” through verbal language, to a non-judgemental (paternalistic) other, to make 
progress, whereas I am making no such assertion.  Recognition of what can be intuitively 
sensed, and what can only be thought, seems to me to be useful in identifying the 
activities involved in a creative writing process.  In 1980 the industrial engineer Stuart E. 
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Dreyfus and the philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus collaboratively noted that an indicator 
of an expert performance is a  
 
change from analytic thought to intuitive response [that] is evident 
to any expert […] controlling a complicated mechanism […] [who] no  
longer needs principles, can cease to pay conscious attention to his  
[or her] performance and can let all the mental energy previously used  
in monitoring the performance go into producing almost instantaneously  
the appropriate perspective and its associated action (1980: 12–14).      
 
In this way, an expert practitioner is able to work without having to focus on what sorts 
of actions need to be taken during the performance, but, rather, is focused on what is 
guiding the actions.  From this it seems to me that from a perspective regarding the 
acquisition of certain skills in a pedagogical setting, as in Ulmer’s case, skill acquisition 
would certainly produce “eureka” experiences.  But this would not seem to be necessarily 
a part of an expert’s experience, however much an observer might insist otherwise.  In 
other words, in expert creative writing terms, decision-making logic would not need to 
be discursivised during the doing and production of an artefact, because discourse is not 
the master code.        
If, in writing creatively, and focused on visual production we are dealing with an 
expert intuitive “method” of decision-making that is progressive, then it would seem to 
me to follow that an artist could systematically trigger the emergence of, for example, the 
“image-stuff” of screen memories, as a part of the creative writer’s expertise.  According 
to Ulmer, however, “eureka” insights emerge out of the way memory supposedly 
“stores” certain information by gathering ideas into different categories and classifying 
these as “common feelings, feelings that are based in eccentric, subjective, idiosyncratic 
physiognomic perceptions” (1994: 142).  The notion of storage suggests that memory is 
“held for future use” at certain fixed points that present thought and experience has 
access to.  But this would mean that new categorised memory stores are constantly 
forming and holding certain fixed information that could potentially be quantified.  
According to Bergson in The Creative Mind, if change is a part of reality then it is 
important that we consider once again the idea that the past exists in the present  
 
because of some act of charity on the part of the present, in short – to get  
away from metaphor – by the intervention of a certain particular function  
called memory, whose role is presumed to be to preserve certain parts of the  
past, for which exception is made, by storing them away in a kind of box.   
– This is a profound mistake (1974: 150-51)! 
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While Bergson’s intuitive method is not solely based on duration, he argued that many 
problems result from applying analytic thought to problem-solving that does not take 
duration into account, resulting in mistaking memory as parts of the past that are stored 
in “a kind of a box”.   
In the chapter “Of the Survival of Images.  Memory and Mind.” Bergson 
resolves the metaphysical dilemma of dualism that insists on separating mind/body and 
matter by introducing a theory of memory, that renounces the premise of stored 
memories on the basis of cutting the experience of life into pieces of abstract units (a 
little like snapshots), offering in its place temporality on the basis of an embodied 
experience that determines three processes: movement of pure-memory, memory-image 
and perception   
 
                                   
 
of which no one, in fact, occurs apart from the others.  Perception is never a  
mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnatated with  
memory-images which complete it as they interpret it.  The memory-image, in  
its turn, partakes of the “pure memory,” which it begins to materialize, and of  
the perception in which it tends to embody itself: regarded from the latter point 
of view, it might be defined as a nascent perception.  Lastly, pure memory, 
though independent in theory, manifests itself as a rule only in the colored and  
living image which reveals it.  Symbolizing these three terms by the consecutive 
segments AB, BC, CD, of the same straight line AD, we may say that our 
thought describes this line in a single movement, which goes from A to D, 
and that it is impossible to say precisely, where one of the terms ends and 
another begins (Bergson 1908/1991: 132-133).    
 
Bergson’s analysis of the “survival of images” suggests to me a closeness to my own 
claim to be watching the “image-stuff” of screen memories during the act of perceiving 
very special types of luminous moving memories, the details of which become clearer as 
these are recorded digitally, and the outcome of which aspires to be an illustration of 
living memory and emotion, as opposed to, for example, narratives.  Building on 
Bergson’s intuition and duration, but also Freud’s screen memories, seems to me to allow 
me to go beyond everyday recollections to the extent that there is an effort involved in 
recordingxliv these.  Many of the terms (e.g. intuition, duration, and memory-image) and 
the conclusions of Bergson’s essays influenced the Lyotardian and Deleuzian traditions.   
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In The Inhuman (1998) Lyotard explained, “as Bergson puts it, ‘shock’ [ebranlement] 
by shock, in the amnesiac material point, is ‘retracted’, condemned as though into a 
single high-frequency vibration, in perception aided by memory” (42).  Deleuze and 
Guattari explained in Anti-Oedipus that they believed Bergson had shown that the living 
being and the world resemble each other “always in the process of becoming, 
developing, coming into being or advancing, and inscribing itself within a temporal 
dimension that is irreducible and nonclosed” (1972/2008: 96).  The implications of 
Bergson’s revelation of experience itself as moving memory-images with which to 
investigate reality, however difficult it might be to describe it in words, to quantify or 
qualify, or how under-theorised it might be, seems to me to offer some answers to some 
of the questions that Donnelly and Harper asked other creative writer-researchers to 
investigate, and which resonate with my own concerns related to memory.  While there is 
still the question of the relationship with memory and emotions that Freud touched on, 
it was Harper and Donnelly who specifically asked “how to bring together a community 
of people with shared interests but one which locates itself […] [in] the often personal 
actions of individuals, to their thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (2013: 
179).  I want to explore emotions in further detail to investigate the possibility that these 
might bring together a community of people in a shared experience (even if the 
emotional colour and weight of that experience is likely to be different).   
 
In Deleuze’s Bergsonism (1966/1991) we find a number of observations related to 
Bergson’s work.  Deleuze opens the first chapter entitled “Intuition as Method” with 
these words:  
 
Duration, Memory, Elan Vital mark the major stages of Bergson’s  
philosophy.  This book sets out to determine, first, the relationship  
between these three notions and, second, the progress they involve (13).   
 
This book also offers a means of exploring the relationship between memory, intuition, 
creativity, and emotion that Deleuze effectively identified as of continuing interest.  He 
offers a number of insights, upon which a 21st C. practising creative writer-researcher 
might draw.  If what we are now acquainted with are the personal thoughts, feelings, and 
emotions of a creative writer, worked on and worked through by that writer, then the 
discipline’s role is no longer to represent emotions that are preserved in an artefact, but 
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rather to explore an emotional investiture in a way that is affective.  For Deleuze the 
affect  
 
is more complex; it undoubtedly depends on the intersection of two lines  
[…] making way for or bringing about the insertion of one line into the  
other, the intersection of one line with the other (53–54).   
  
In this sense, and I return to this notion in the chapter that follows, the affect, for 
Deleuze, seems to me to resemble a diagram for the productive artist.  Deleuze considers 
the affect to be an inner experience of preparing the self to receive something of the past 
that he describes (quoting directly from Bergson) as 
“something like the focusing of a camera” (56).  I have 
rejected the notion of the snapshot, above, as an attempt 
to break down the affects into wordable units, but I want 
to retain here the look, and of “focusing”.  What seems to 
me to be invaluable in this aspect of Deleuzian 
philosophy are the implications of emotional interactions 
between a creative writer’s experience and that of a 
reader/spectator, such as those identified by Passerini 
(see right) that are conveyed through textual details such 
as flowers and photographs that Passerini considers to be 
emblematic of “emotional flow”, and that “would have 
been lost in a typed transaction” (2008: 120).     
In Bergsonism, Deleuze points out that Bergson, in 
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1935), argued that: 
“The theory of the creative emotion is all the more 
important as it gives affectivity a status that it lacked in 
the preceding works” (Deleuze 1991: 134 n.34).  If 
Bergson’s “theory of creative emotion” is significant, 
elevating, as it does for Deleuze, the importance of 
“affectivity”, how does one identify how affect is “in the 
work” rather than “in the writer”?   
If we extrapolate this notion of “creative 
emotion” from philosophical writing to creative writing, might we suppose that an expert 
creative writing process, which works through an intuited emotional investiture in us that 
affects us, is perhaps produced by a belief that an ability to sense “the specific mirror of 
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emotions”, as Passerini argued, is not expressed by “words” or by simply typing words 
(2008: 120)?  “The most recent development”, Passerini explained, “on the frontier of 
new sources – new texts – no longer concerns orality, but rather visuality […]” (121).  
This shift away from a focus solely on words towards making “another kind of text” – if 
we accept it – will require a creative writer, as we move through the 21st C., to become 
more than a “wordsmith”.  In this setup, a creative writing performance would require 
replacing those earlier models in which typography or words alone served as a touchtone, 
with the corollary that literary theory and literary emulation lose some of their established 
power.  However, this is not to attack the use of words within the discipline of creating 
writing; rather, it is to loosen our understanding of the primacy of “words” in order to 
demonstrate that an expert intuitive creative writing process works within the body of 
the creative writer, and might concern knowing how to tap into an “emotional flow”, 
thus requiring the recording of certain kinds of registers (e.g. memories) that are not 
limited to typography or words.    
Such a shift means we need to continue to broaden our outlook, as both Deleuze 
and Passerini seem to me to suggest.  We need to do something more important than 
simply follow accepted models of “storytelling” that, according to Deleuze, oblige us to 
move from “one term to the other” rather than exploring ways in which “the 
actualization of a memory [is] useful […] [as] the body imitates the whole life of the 
mind, and [how] we [are] able with a leap to place ourselves in the pure past” (1991: 109).  
Deleuze effectively outlines, perhaps in terms that are too vague, how affect appears in 
the body as recollected images that are not connected to representation, but rather it 
works through an emotional experience that is “felt”.  Could it be, perhaps, that emotion is, 
as Passerini proposed, in the “emotional flow between” or the “flow that is expressed in 
a different way than words” (2008: 119-120)?   
I am asking this question once again here because, according to Deleuze, if we 
conclude that emotion can be “represented”, we are failing to notice the “potential (en 
puissance), the nature of emotion as pure element […] itself [is what is] generating new 
ideas” (1991: 110).  If this is the case, where the emotional work of creative writing might 
“flow between” what is shown and seen and is felt but is not said – between creative 
writer and the reader/spectator – then we might need to broaden what can constitute the 
logic of a creative writing practice, recognising that perhaps some of what enters into the 
activity works on the basis of “felt” or “sensory” experience such as those explored by 
Deleuze in the 1980s in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation.  This is where Deleuze 
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explained how it is “assemblage” (i.e. agencement) as it is seen “which allows the eye to 
function like the sense of touch […] the joining together of two senses of touch and 
sight […] on the same plane of the surface, equally close to each other and to ourselves” 
(1981/2003: 99) (writer’s emphasis).  From this observation, should we modestly declare, 
perhaps, that what is now needed in creative writing research is a new emotional “flow” 
or logic, or a “sensory logic”, rather than the logic of a linguistic and discursive code?  
This might combine visual elements such as photographs, unique handwriting, flowers, 
and so forth, actualised through digital inscription and analogical analysis with 
investigations of emotions or sensations on the one hand, and making new kinds of 
artefacts on the other.  Such an agencement would focus on recognising that, in spite of the 
difficulty of identifying emotion or sensory experience quantitatively or qualitatively, the 
sensation of an emotion such as love, like the sound of music, is perhaps the vibratory 
surging force that is moving through living embodied experience, connecting all of us if 
we are willing to open ourselves up to feeling the “flow”.          
I am suggesting that emotions and sensations are vibratory like music because 
Deleuze, in an attempt to clarify what he means by emotion in Bergsonism, uses an 
analogy, asking his reader to imagine the vibration of music expressing love felt in the 
body, not for a specific person, but rather a love, the quality of which is dependent upon 
essence rather than object (1991: 110).  Deleuze continued:   
  
Although personal, it is not individual; transcendent, it is like the God in us. […]  
In short, emotion is creative (first, because it expresses the whole of creation,  
then because it creates the work in which it is expressed; and finally, because  
it communicates a little of the creativity to spectators or hearers) (110–111).  
 
If memory is a potential “en puissance” (power) of emotion, of affect to communicate 
love, for example, multi-modal texturality through an intuitive (memory-based, in the 
Bergsonian sense) method of creating a “flow” of emotion that is visual instead of oral, 
might be useful to those of us who are interested in showing what is felt but cannot be 
said.  While emotions may be democratised, memories are personal and visually 
idiosyncratic.  As Passerini tells us of letters written by Jews who were killed in 
Auschwitz: “A few salutations such as ‘adoree’, ‘mon tout’ and ‘mon amour’ punctuate 
the letters, paltry scraps of loving words suffocated by the atrocity of events” (2008: 
126).  However, it is love that “allows people to endure current oppression and to look 
forward to future realities” (ibid).  What I want, as a creative practitioner-researcher, to 
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know is this: can we creative writers use digital apparatus to capture, preserve, and show 
how this works?   
 
I have borrowed a number of notions above, including Freud’s “screen memories”, 
Bergson’s “duration”, Dreyfus’ “expertise”, Deleuze’s “emotion” and Passerini’s 
“emotional flow”, to document, in part, the creative writing process that I used in 
making TCABS – but also a thinking through of what might be involved; still these 
notions do not go far enough.  From some observations and arguments above, we might 
suppose that an expert creative writer-researcher, having experienced the creative writing 
process, brings with her/him what she/he is seeing, without the need to consciously run 
through a series of binary steps, rules or guidelines.  However I would argue, rather, that 
that writer is completely “absorbed” in that creative process (Smith 2011: 2) while doing 
and making the work.  Her/his ability to make certain choices, in the terms that I have 
set out, is inscribed in the creative writer’s possession of and ability to discern quite 
clearly that the creative writing process is different from the outcome.  Yet Lyotard’s 
identification of the paradox that is experienced by an artist’s “anamnesis” (1998: 55-56) 
may be indicative of a creative writer’s ability to distinguish what is important, and to 
execute her/his own process.xlv  At the very least, such “anamnesis” would be indicative 
of the sense of a creative writer’s identification of “tacit” knowledge (Donnelly 2013: 
125), and/or a kind of knowing that is “not translatable to a verbal mode” (Perry 2008: 
4), suggesting what Melrose calls a “model of intelligibility” or “ways of seeing, knowing 
and doing” (2012: 299), applicable to creative writing production processes.  Donnelly 
describes knowledge of creative writing as acquired by a creative writer through her 
creative writing practice itself.  However, Donnelly also notes that this is “difficult to 
communicate in the often narrowed essential ideal of quantitative scientific analytical 
methods and measurable outcomes generally associated with traditional academic 
research” (2013: 123).  This is why I am arguing that knowledge of the creative writing 
process can be manifested through an “expert” (Donnelly and Harper 2013: 180) 
intuitive creative writing process that is experienced by the creative writer but is 
unobservable to an outside spectator.  The spectator might mistake the process for what 
she/he observes is the artefact – that might seem to have resulted from a series of 
sudden insights or “eureka” moments; and, furthermore, who might also observe that 
the emergence of these “eureka” moments is the leitmotif of the product rather than the 
emergence of a creative process.   
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 To take these notions further, however, I want to add an observation made by 
Lyotard in The Inhuman (1998) in his enquiry related to “how time is synthesised in our 
thought and in our [art] practice today” (65), computer technology and what he called 
“memory-effects” that he characterised as opening a  
 
public space of meaning and generates a community of users-producers  
[…] because it is endowed with persistence by its being marked on a spatial  
support, conserves the sign of the past event, or rather produces it as  
available, presentable and reactualizable memory (48). 
 
I sense that Lyotard’s exploration of memory-effects is useful because of his modest 
attempts to break down memory, linked to inscription, into at least three types of 
memory-effects (48-57).  I want to run through Lyotard’s account, offering it as an 
attempt to understand certain sorts of image-production, rather than an explanation.  My 
sense is that this will allow us to deal with different sorts of image-making and to open 
“a public space of meaning” (48).   
Leading up to the notion of “memory-effects”, Lyotard takes his reader on a 
journey that necessitates meetings with the following researchers: Hubert L. Dreyfus, on 
an intuitive method of data selection that is not based on “pre-established codes or 
readability” (15); Kant, on reflective judgment “not guided by rules” (ibid); Husserl, on 
an intuitive “object” that can be looked at while a practitioner is choosing certain data  
(ibid); Bergson, on memory as a “material point” of an image (39); Leibniz on perception 
(ibid); and Freud, on remembering from the standpoint of “it inscribes effects without 
the inscription being ‘memorized’ in the form of recollection” of the past in the body 
(21), and renovating the past (in the form or a simulacra of the past) – for the purpose of 
re-presentation and reconnecting the past in the computer-realm that he links to writing 
(i.e. digital inscription). Memory-effects resonate with Lyotard’s philosophical 
disciplinary expertise, and his investigation seems to me to be useful to my own enquiry 
related to how a practising creative writer-researcher might be able to record the effects 
of living memories, as creative invention.  Lyotard draws attention to the fact that an 
absolute “present” cannot be grasped, and that computer technology sets up a situation 
that allows for the “detemporalization” and “delocalization” of the simulacra of living 
human memories that can then be re-actualised, preserved, and made “telegraphable” for 
future use (49-50).   
 Lyotard’s memory-effects are: 1) breaching 2) scanning and 3) passing.  These, he 
notes, correspond with three different kinds of “temporal synthesis”: habit, 
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remembering, and anamnesis, all of which are linked to technological (computer) 
inscription.  The first memory-effect, breaching, surrenders actions to the sorts of 
habitual behavioural patterns that can be found in cultures or subcultures, in the sense of 
following a common selection process, that are structured by laws such as: chronology, 
language, genetic patterns or placing a series of elements together (e.g. ocean, water, 
wave).  But once the selection process transfers these different elements onto a 
computer, this data is free from immediate space and time, and from regulation by states 
or rooted cultures.  Thus, habits are no longer in control of enforcing how certain 
individuals’ acts are conducted – hence, acts of “telegraphic breaching” are made 
possible (51).  The second, scanning, affects remembering, implying that scanning is “the 
intervention of a meta-agency which inscribes on itself, conserves and makes available 
the action-reaction pair independently of the present place and time” (ibid), in this way 
what was forgotten via scanning is made re-actualisable; and, furthermore, “questions the 
culture of habit from which it emerges” (53).    
Passing, the third memory-effect, is connected with beguiling writing techniques, 
and requires increased amounts of energy, as there are no rules in this way of writing 
using computer apparatus.  Lyotard offers the metaphor of Dogen’s mirror, calling on us 
(and, I would argue, on practising writers) to shatter the memory of traditional ways of 
making writing, beginning the practice again and again with a clear mirror, thus driving a 
continuous inventive process (55).  Lyotard’s explanation of how a practitioner proceeds 
in the case of “passing” is derived explicitly from Freud’s psychoanalytic method of 
“remembering, forgetting, and working through” that informs how passing and 
anamnesis is attainable.  However, rather than working, as did Freud, through a verbal 
method, or a listening analytic method that must be heard, this work is “letting work in a 
free-floating way what passes: the signifier, however senseless this might appear” (56).  If 
we apply the metaphor of “passing” to TCABS it might be thought of, perhaps, as an 
instance in which a specific object emerged from the activity of creative writing with a 
new digital apparatus, that reached a fleeting point of public instantiation, but 
nevertheless the creative enquiry continues to drive the inventive writing process that 
involves taking in-hand that new digital apparatus.  This continuation of breaching, 
remembering, and passing or “working through” is perhaps demonstrated through my 
doctoral project, which seeks to work these knowledge-practices through others’ 
knowledge engagements.  In 2013, Harper asked: “How much does a certain kind of 
writing instrument – a computer, a pencil, mobile phone – influence the way in which I 
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write” (54)?  It seems to me that Lyotard’s investigation of the kinds of decision-making 
processes that are perhaps involved in making an artefact, by taking in-hand new digital 
apparatus, can help us to explore and understand, discursively, the complexity of 
precisely that.    
 
                                         	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
  
Can an image “do more than it shows”? While my 
central focus in this chapter is on the creative writing process 
itself, rather than on how TCABS might be interpreted, I want to 
offer the following analogy in an attempt to understand how choosing a particular 
photograph might “do more than it shows”, rather than to offer an explanation of what 
one or more photographs shows.  It might be possible to argue that my inclusion of 
certain photographs and images in the second edition of TCABS can resonate, for 
example, with certain sorts of affective, as well as informative, engagements with a 
spectating/readerly audience.  Plainly, creative writing is considered by some creative 
writer-researchers to involve performance (from the Old French parfornir “to do, to carry 
out, finish, accomplish”).  In 2008, for example, Perry described (and I am paraphrasing) 
her experience of “doing things” with dancers in a performative academic setting while 
In the “Foreword to 
the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary 
Edition” in Clifford 
and Marcus’ Writing 
Culture: The Poetics of 
Politics of Ethnography 
(1986/2010), 
under the heading 
“Performing 
Ethnography” 
the ethnographer 
Kim Fortun  
clarified for us that  
“[…] we must read 
texts as texts, 
looking at how they 
are put together, 
start, flow, and 
finish, noticing how 
footnotes, images, 
and textboxes  are 
put to work, 
imagining 
[…]”(2010: xii). 
In “Towards a New 
Epistemology: The 
“Affective Turn”  
A. Athanasiou 
P. Hantzaroula & 
K. Yannakopoulos 
wrote:   
“A component of 
special importance to 
critical theory’s turn 
to affect is the 
commitment to 
theorising the 
performative 
interpellation of the 
subject in ways that 
exceed the naïve 
binarism of 
voluntarism and 
determinism: the 
subject is both 
formative and 
forming: it both 
embraces and resists 
the norms that 
subject it” (2009: 14).  
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engaging in her creative writing practice.  To use Perry’s terms: creative writing is both 
“verbal and non-verbal” (4).  If we creative writers are "doing things with words" (Austin 
1962), or “with dancers”, and we extrapolate this to visual practices in creative writing 
performative terms, it seems to me that we can readily talk about a creative writer "doing 
things with images” where things done are widely experienced. “One of the principles 
underlying theories of practice-led research” Perry argues, “is that practice reveals new 
modes of knowledge of production and performance” (8).  
As I have sketched out above, I have been arguing that the images in TCABS are 
simulacra of living memories, or “screen memories”, that I can readily access through my 
expert-intuitive process that the writing itself illustrates.  And I view the wording, 
ordered on the page, as a methodical illustration of the memories that the words 
punctuate.  Perhaps one could argue that this “doing things with images” in the creative 
writing context could extend, in a performance analysis, to how a performer can “do 
things with certain gestures”, as Melrose argued (e.g. Melrose 2003)?  When we think of 
film, painting, or photography, plainly visual images can make a viewer experience more 
than she or he sees.  The issue with the visual is perhaps amply demonstrated with my 
own response to the image of an anonymous child on crutches (Smith 2011: 21): to 
include that image amongst others "does things" to and for an onlooker – i.e. it is likely 
to trigger certain sorts of engagements and responses in the viewer.  Although one might 
argue that this specific image depicts a sick or ‘hurt’ female child, amongst other images 
of the female, that gendered image also triggers recourse to a number of ways of 
understanding, that include the viewer’s memories of the infliction of pain, of one kind 
or another, on a child.  The field is relatively open, however much otherwise the image-
stuff might be my own.  If, in performative terms, an image can "do more than it 
shows", it is possible to argue that the inclusion of an image can trigger – for example – 
certain sorts of affective as well as informative engagement, not least when it is used in a 
particular context; yet the precise context of the experience, and the reader’s attitude to 
it, remain relatively open.  Perhaps, in performative terms, it is enough to observe that, 
“something happens”.    
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Chapter 3 
A Study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process 
To Examiner/Reader: 
“A study of a Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process” is an exploration of the creative 
process that led to the emergence of “pity for meat” (enclosed, a newly completed 
unpublished portfolio) that is comprised of an index [i–iv], a portfolio guide [v-vi] and 62 
separate artefacts [1-62]. Together these comprise a two-volume set. You are invited to 
explore these volumes moving to and fro.  This movement should be useful as it will 
help to restore the visual and instrumental qualities (e.g. texture, variation, sound, depth, 
weight and so forth) intended.  The order presented is valid from the viewpoint of a 
diagram or sensory logicxlvi of a practising creative writer-researcher.   
                                                                                                                             H.A.S. 
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1. Introduction 
  
 
… developed on a plane of consistency giving it a “diagrammatic” function … 
creative flight … a living block … an unknown landscape … opens a rhizomatic 
realm of possibility … a lunar landscape, with its pours, planes, matts, bright  
colors, whiteness … there are only inhumanities … a body that is already 
deterritorialized … forming strange new becomings … make rhizome 
everywhere, for the wonder of a nonhuman life to be created … (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2014: 190-191). 
 
Donnelly in Key Issues In Creative Writing (2013), in a chapter entitled “Creative Writing 
Knowledge”, asked: “How might research-led practice compliment practice-led research 
and suggest new approaches to writing processes?” (130).  The aim of this final chapter is 
to archive the creative writing process that manifested in the production of “pity for 
meat”.  It arose out of a creative writing practice-led research enquiry that explores how 
research might suggest new approaches to creative writing processes, and bring a new 
understanding of an experimental method of creative writing into being.  This enquiry, in 
general terms, seems to me to be supported by a statement made by the professor of 
Creativity and Poetics Nigel McLoughlin (see Donnelly et al, Key Issues in Creative Writing) 
who noted that “in the future [creative writing] will be much more informed by theories 
of how students learn and what research tells us about how the creative process works” 
(2013: 168).  It is on these sorts of bases that I propose it is possible to argue that what a 
creative writing process might entail has not yet been thoroughly researched.  If we are 
still concerned with the knowledge-status of creative writing in practice, we might have 
to begin by acknowledging – as McLoughlin and Donnelly seems to me to be suggesting 
(above) – first, that creative writing processes are unavailable to an outside spectator; 
and, second, that new ways of discussing creative writing processes need to be identified.   
Twyman reminded us in “The graphic presentation of language” (1982) of the 
importance of understanding “the language element in graphic communication”(2).  As I 
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noted in a previous chapter, The New Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics defines the 
basis of a poem “as an instance of verbal art, a text set in verse, bound in speech.  More 
generally, a poem conveys heightened forms of perception, experience, meaning, or 
consciousness of lang., i.e. a heightened mode of discourse” (1993: 938).  Twyman 
suggests that if we continue to valorise linguistics we are overlooking the “visual” or 
“graphic” connection with writing – a visual connection that, as I argued in the previous 
chapter and will continue to argue in what follows, is at the source of my invention of 
the creative written components of this project (1982: 7). 
What follows this introduction are two simple questions that are meant to act as 
signposts to discussions circulating around developments in the research domain, where 
those discussions specifically aim at exploring creative processes and creative writing 
practice-led research.  Recalling the words of Arnheim in Visual Thinking (1997) who in 
1969 stressed the importance of understanding that   
 
works of art are not the whole of art; they are only its rare peaks. […] If one  
looks through the literature on art education one often finds […] a tendency to  
treat the arts as an independent area of study and to assume that intuition and  
intellect, feeling and reasoning, art and science coexist but do not cooperate.  
[…] The scientist or philosopher can urge [her or] his disciplines to beware of  
mere words […]. But [she or] he should not have to do this without the help of 
the artist, who is the expert on how one does organize a visual pattern.  The artist  
knows the variety of forms and techniques available, and [she or] he has means  
of developing the imagination.  [She or he] is accustomed to visualising 
complexity and to conceiving of phenomena and problems in visual terms  
(295-296).  
 
For Arnheim, “visualising” and “feeling” are key components of artistic processes.  But it 
was Perry who drew attention to the visual aspects of creative writing in “The non-verbal 
and the verbal: expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing” (2008); 
she posed a similar argument as Arnheim’s (above) stressing the importance of what is 
happening during the creative act.  According to Perry not all creative writing practices 
are informed by words: “It’s also about the practice of writing: what happened when the 
writer (the maker) was doing the material work of writing” (2008: 8).    
Perry is one of the most eloquent creative writer-researchers contributing to 
creative writing practice-led research. She stresses the importance of creative writing 
practice-led research that focuses on the creative process itself.  According to Perry, 
there is almost no research available connected to the specific details or far-reaching 
ways of doing and making creative writing (2).  Perry is interested in methods of writing 
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that are “non-verbal or at least partially non-verbal, and [are] not translatable to a verbal 
mode” (4).  She notes oversights that link creative writing to “traditional kinds of text-
based research” (ibid).  Perry collaborated with a visual artist (Annette Iggulden) and 
produced two artefacts that Perry describes as “not readable”, rather they  
 
function instead as an image of text, on one level – but numerous other  
ways […] including the material effects of the artist’s process in  
physically creating the work, and even the effects of my own processes  
in physically writing drafts of the story.  The functions of the text in  
this collaboration are clearly complex and […] the function of the writing  
may be misconstrued or limited by perception of it as something that pins  
down meaning and structure.  It’s a stymied understanding of text itself: not  
only of creative writing text (5).   
 
The question she does not seem to have addressed, as yet, is the specifics of a “non-
verbal” process.  While she does identify that when she is writing she is responding to, 
for example “sounds”, “movement”, “colour”, and “sensation”, how these might be 
influencing her creative writing decision-making is less clear.  How might the “non-
verbal” be generated and adjusted in the mind and body of the creative writer before it is 
recorded?  This is an interesting direction that I intend to explore in some detail in what 
follows.  A “non-verbal” (or ‘other-than-verbal’) method of writing relates quite 
specifically with the creative writing process that led to the production of the “pity for 
meat” portfolio, included in this submission.  I am going to argue it emerged from a 
“visual” and “felt” logic with which words are incommensurate.  As a way of helping to 
demonstrate what cannot be said with words, I have presented “pity for meat” first, as 
well as presenting images and citing observations from other researchers in this chapter 
that serve the aspirations of the present doctoral enquiry by outlining the creative 
writing-making process I am responding to here and attempting to document.  
It is crucial to understand that the creative process I am referring to is felt and 
seen in my body and therefore discursivisation is incommensurate with it or other-than-
words.  In 2001 Horn in “Visual Language and Converging Technologies in the Next 10-
15 Years (and Beyond)” reminded us: “People think visually. […] [Visual] language has 
the potential for increasing human “bandwidth,” the capacity to take in, comprehend, 
and more efficiently synthesize large amounts of new information” (1).  More recently, 
Coesssens et al, in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto (2009), reminded us that when it comes 
to practice-led research: “Not all results of this kind of research can indeed be expressed 
through words – more often than not a research project’s essence can only be 
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demonstrated rather than told” (179).  In the previous chapter, I cited a number of 
researchers’ findings and used these to help archive some of the details of the creative 
writing process that led to the emergence of The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011).  I 
described this process as not informed by words, but rather as guided by the luminous 
“image-stuff” that constitutes an aspect of my lived memory in the present tense; and 
that the creative writing process itself seeks to illustrate and thereby illuminate that lived 
memory; and, finally, that the visuals more directly transpose live memories, and shape 
and punctuate them via an intuitive method (which is part of expertise).   
In that same chapter I proposed that this overcomes any sense, such as we might 
find elsewhere, that the visual registers are an illustration of an already written text, to 
which they are secondary – which would make me a jobbing illustrator.  I contended that 
I view the word order on the page as a methodological illustration of the image-stuff that 
inhabits me, and that the decisions were made on the basis of how I felt about what I 
see.  It is on these sorts of bases that I am going to argue in this chapter that the creative 
process that led to the production of “pity for meat” is a continuation of the creative 
process that I sketched out in the previous chapter (with the exception that the process 
no longer triggers primarily childhood memories).  However, as a practising creative 
writer-researcher, I am continually striving to re-search, further explore, and develop my 
creative process, and it is the details of these particular developments that I am 
documenting in what follows.  
To summarise what this will encompass, I will be drawing attention to how I 
sense what the hyphenated terms “rhizomatic-creative-writing” might suggest, and how 
this might be useful as we search for new ways of exploring the creative writing process. 
This hyphenated term is an extension of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of rhizomatic 
writing, identified by these two writers in 1980 in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1980/2014: 24).  This concept seems to me to be of interest, despite 
computer-related advancements and cultural changes that have occurred over the past 
three decades.  My understanding of Deleuzian theory is that it emphasises the 
importance of the growth of concepts xlvii  that can help liberate the mind (that is 
connected to the body) from following disciplinary rules of hierarchy and of similitude, 
and readjusting the focus of the body/mind toward a creative action-orientated approach 
to all that we do and make.  This liberated approach seeks to break away from old 
patterns of thought and action, allowing for new possibilities to arise, and permits, for 
example, the emergence of an agencement (see, textbox, right, and the full text of John 
“Agencement is 
a common 
French word 
[…] one 
might use the 
term as both 
the act of 
fixing and the 
arrangement 
itself as in the 
fixtures and 
fittings of a 
building or 
shop, or the 
parts of a 
machine” 
(Phillips 
2006). 	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Phillips “Agencement/Assemblage” 2006).  I am proposing that it is this liberation that 
lends itself to the sort of enquiry I am calling for here that concerns a practising creative 
writer-researcher participating in an experimental creative writing process unhinged from 
the paradigm of prediction for the purpose of capturing certain affective aspects of the 
diagram (in the Deleuzian sense) of a creative process.  I return in what follows to the 
pertinent details.  Although these specific terms “rhizomatic-creative-writing” are not 
given by Deleuze and Guattari, nevertheless, extending or expanding Deleuzian concepts 
outside of Deleuzian theory is as Deleuze and Guattari intended.xlviii  These particular 
hyphenated terms are meant to suggest what a creative writing process might feel like, 
and/or what it might look like, when there is a readjusting of the focus of a practising 
creative writer-researcher toward suspending habits of thought in order to explore 
beyond common ways of writing, temporarily disabling all images of pre-established 
models of writing as the creative process begins.  Within the domain of creative writing, I 
have observed that very little, if any, emphasis has been placed on revolutionising the 
creative writing process in a creative writer’s mind-body as she or he perceives and 
records inner visual and non-visual sensory phenomena and processes.  
 
Massumi, who translated A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014), 
explained in “Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements” that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use of the term “draw”, indicates 
 
an act of creation.  What is drawn (the Body without Organs, the  
plane of consistency, a line of flight) does not pre-exist the act of  
drawing.  The French word tracer captures this better: It has all of  
the graphic connotations of “to draw” in English, also mean  
to blaze a trail or open a road. “To trace” (décalquer), on the other  
hand, is to copy something from a model (2014: xvi).  
 
Following in the pathway of Deleuzian theory that asks us to consider how we “have 
been inspired, aided, multiplied” (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 3), “A Study of a 
Rhizomatic-Creative-Writing Process” is an attempt to assist in restoring the power of 
exploring creative processes to its creators by presenting these research findings that 
document an experimental creative writing process.  This kind of process is meant to 
suggest a creative writer remembering being – heterogeneously – on a journey in the 
middle of coming and going, so that, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari: “your loves 
will be like the wasp and the orchid” (25), transforming the materials of the world – 
computer, digital pen, paper – and wandering through diverse experiences of artistic 
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activity.  Immersed in this milieu between what is known and not yet known, the hope is 
that as the future unfolds practising creative writer-researchers can freely seek the joy of 
exploring new realms of possibility, recording the territory of a newly imagined world 
with its vibrant colours, lines, and shimmering objects, so as to share the wonder of the 
human experience by engaging in a creative writing process that seeks to bring new 
forms of invention into being that are not yet named – consequently expanding the 
domain of creative writing, and blurring the boundaries between research and artistic 
production.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
  
write: from 
the Old 
English 
writan “to 
score, 
outline, 
draw a 
figure of”	  
-graphy 
“process of 
writing or 
recording” 
from the 
Greek – 
graphia “write, 
draw, 
represent by 
lines drawn; to 
scape, 
scratch” 	  
	   92	  
2. Why “rhizomatic [-creative-] writing”?    
 
… in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 20).  
Becoming is a rhizome, […] not a tree (239). 
The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark (316).   
 
One of the fundamental questions Donnelly and Harper asked in 2013 in Key Issues in 
Creative Writing in the opening chapter entitled “Introduction: Key Issues and Global 
Perspective in Creative Writing” is:  
  
Given this forecast and realistic understanding that we cannot continue 
(for the most part) to teach within the same framework as we have in the 
past, what is the best way to talk about creative writing practice in the 
academy today (xxi)? 
 
As a practising creative-writer researcher and doctoral candidate working within the 
academy during the second decade of the 21st C. I share Harper and Donnelly’s concern 
for shifting how we discuss creative writing.  As I embarked on this creative writing 
practice-led research enquiry, while exploring resonances of exchange between the arts, 
science, and philosophy, I was struck by Deleuze’s oeuvre including his collaborative 
work with Guattari.  I am interested in their understanding of “becoming”, “process”, 
and “art” (see captions above).  In particular, I felt that there was something crucial 
about the notion of a “rhizome” (1980/2014: 3–25; 328-29), as well as Deleuze’s concept 
of the diagram, which intensified my doubt about mimicking the structure of other 
creative writers’ work, despite the fact that so many artefacts made by other creative 
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writers are very much admired.  As I researched these Deleuzian notions, while in the 
process of making what eventually became “pity for meat”, I was on the lookout for how 
some of the discussions and concepts circling around Deleuzian theory might possess a 
communicative potential that could assist creative writer-researchers by offering a 
different set of assumptions than traditional ways of thinking about creative writing.    
I propose that it might be worthwhile to consider the notion of “rhizomatic-
creative-writing”, because, if we are searching for new ways of discussing creative writing – as Donnelly and Harper seem to have indicated (above) that we should – then I am 
supposing that what I understand about the Deleuzian notion of “rhizomatic writing” is 
that, at the very least, it suggests that the experience of life is chaotic and unpredictable, 
and therefore we should explore different ways of writing that do not conform to fixed 
models of writing, as there are a multitude of different ways of creating writing.  But 
before I characterise what I mean to suggest by drawing on the Deleuzian term 
“rhizomatic writing”, I want to briefly turn attention away from Deleuzian theory toward 
“pity for meat”.  I am reminding the reader that I am referring to it throughout this 
discussion (and continue to in what follows, below) for demonstration purposes, similar 
to the ways a cartographer might have made a map for the purpose of pointing at a 
territory to assist in clarifying what can be shown but cannot be fully expressed through 
words alone.   
 
According to Harper, there are “absences in our approach to understanding creative 
writing, in the past” (2013: 57); and, according to both Donnelly and Harper, an 
exploration of creative writing “always returns us to the often personal actions of 
individuals, to their thoughts but also to their feelings and emotions” (2013: 179).  In the 
spirit of sharing what I sense is personal knowledge xlix  that draws from my own 
experience, I want to point out that for a number of decades I targeted developing and 
refining my creative writing skills by taking in-hand coloured pencils, various kinds of 
pens (e.g. calligraphy, fountain, ballpoint, colourful felt-tip pens), watercolour brushes 
(and watercolour paint), and experimented with how I might be able to move these 
implements on different kinds of paper (e.g. lined, sketchbook, notebook, poster board) 
to create a particular organisational layout.  I considered how I felt about the application 
of colour, as well as how the shape of the marks that I made (that were not limited to 
alphabetic registers) should be or could be improved.  However, in the academy during 
post-graduate creative writing training, certain demands were made: first, the creative 
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writing process was limited to using a computer keyboard; second, the decision-making 
process was limited to a particular set of English alphabetic registers; third, and finally, 
the creative writer must mimic the general structure of products made by well-known 
Western writers.  While the outcome of this approach resulted in my publishing several 
free verse poems, I nevertheless, continued to be concerned about my perception that 
this systematic method of mimicking the products of other creative writers seemed to me 
to result in artefacts that were limited chromatically and guaranteed the erasure of any 
sort of distinctive individual mark made by the creative writer’s hand.  This concern 
seems to me to be supported by the words of the academic-writing researcher Eric Borg 
and the art and design researcher Stephen Boyd Davis who pointed out that typewriters, 
in contrast to computers, “create possibilities, but also carry their own limitations, which 
may not be immediately apparent […] typewriters do not easily support other ways of 
providing information […]” (2012: 20).  They suggest writing done on a typewriter or 
keyboard conceals the unique mark of a particular writer, consequently valorising similar 
“design” over “graphical information design” (ibid).  In creative writing terms, for 
Harper: “Creative writing is such an eclectic activity, drawing on more than word use and 
compositional practices” (2013: 60).  This position I propose is supported by several 
writers who developed methods of making writing that, in my view, go beyond 
traditional generic models of writing.  For example: Carson’s presentation of Nox (2010); 
Perry’s introduction of her “collaborative improvisation performances with dancers” 
(2008: 4); and Saterstrom’s introduction of The Pink Institution (2004).  I wondered about 
the specific details of how these writers experienced their own creative process.  What 
did it feel like?  What did it look like?    
When I was given the freedom to use a digital pen and digital (writing) tablet I 
was able to very simply transfer the skills and techniques I had developed through many 
years of experimenting with colourful pencils, brushes, and pens and moving these on 
various kinds of paper.  Like traditional writing implements a digital pen and digital 
(writing) tablet are extremely sensitive to pressure and subtle hand movements and the 
computer programs that support this apparatus I would argue greatly expand creative 
writing choice in terms of chromatics and recording the precise idiosyncratic hand/body 
movements of an artist.  This led to the publication of the second edition of The Clara 
Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011) during the course of this doctoral research project.  
Following publication, rather than returning to focusing on making traditional kinds of 
writing, I was interested in continuing to work with a digital pen and digital tablet as well 
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as with other kinds of digital apparatus such as a digital camera, while focusing on the 
creative writing process itself rather than the product.  
I would like to ask at this point that reader/examiner please briefly glance 
through “pity for meat”.  In Harper’s terms 
 
creative writing draws from as many areas of human knowledge as the  
creative writer requires to undertake and, most often, attempts to  
complete a creative writing project, and because creative writing  
combines contemporary actions as well as memory, the event of doing  
creative writing as well as the creation of evidence of artefacts created  
during the doing it, research in creative writing possesses a wealth of  
areas of investigation (2013: 109). 
 
As I document the decision-making that led to the contents of the portfolio that is the 
outcome of a highly personalised creative process, what I notice most of all when I page 
through this portfolio is that the agencement of each element is different from the next.  
This sort of diversity is what is implied in the term “rhizomatic” which returns me to the 
question above: Why rhizomatic [-creative-] writing?  But before I return to this specific 
question I want simply to propose here that reclaiming the term: handwriting (i.e. digital 
handwriting or in-hand digital inscription) may be a positive way of expanding the 
domain of creative writing.  Perhaps there might be room for prosperous development in 
this area.  
 
In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalisim and Schizophrenia (2014), Deleuze and Guattari 
chose to title the first chapter: “Introduction: Rhizome” (2014: 3-25).  But what is a 
rhizome, and what use might we make of it?  In botanical terms a rhizome (from the 
Greek rhizoma “mass of tree roots”) is a subterranean root or tuber that, as it reproduces, 
tends to sprout mulitiple unpredictable offshoots that develop into new plants.  What 
Deleuze and Guattari seem to me to have been interested in is that, when a rhizome 
reproduces, it demonstrates for us that the world is not organised as a fixed highly 
discplined structure.  Therefore, realising this, we need to explore the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the world, and make maps of the world, that should also demonstrate 
how our knowledge of the world, and our experience of the world, is like a rhizome (or 
rhizomatic) – evolving, shifting, and changing in a chaotic unpremeditated way.  Their 
reference to: “an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map” (20); 
“avoid[s] reverting to old procedures […] however different they may be” (23-24); and 
writing that is not a “tracing of other books” (24), seems to me to be particuarly useful to 
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my own concern for identifying a creative writing process (in the doctoral creative 
writing practice-led resarch context) that does not aim at mimicking the artefacts of other 
creative writers – no matter how much these are appreciated.  To use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms, I sense that a creative writing process aims at “progress toward 
development” (24).  This way of writing, they clarify, is not about making a “plot”, rather 
it is finding “another way of travelling and moving” and “do[ing] away with foundations” 
(24-25).   
What I think Deleuze and Guattari might mean here – assuming that a 
rhizomatic way of writing might have a relationship with a creative writing process – is 
that “rhizomatic writing” suggests that a creative “process” of writing should not aim at 
“tracing” or imitating the structures used by well-known writers.  Rather, each artist 
should develop a unique creative process through experimentation.  I am suggesting this 
because Deleuze and Guattari noted a continual exploration of ways to “avoid reverting 
to the old procedures” (23).  A rhizomatic-like approach to writing might be 
fundamental to creative writing decision-making and may allow some of us to challenge 
older methods that valorise traditional Western models of writing.  It is my belief that the 
real work of creative writing is in making something that is highly individualised, in terms 
of the artist seeking to establish what Melrose identified as “signature practices […] [that] is 
practised, and tends to be im-pressed, rather than to have its own ‘thingness’ […] and 
[concerns] the aspiration to singularity in expert decision-making” (2012: 304–305).  This 
suggests to me that the aim of the artist is focused on invention rather than similitude.  
My argument here is that a “rhizomatic [-creative-] writing” process might be 
fundamental in beginning to see why it could be useful to allow a creative writer to 
change the way writing is made.  For Harper, creative writing is not “controlled 
elsewhere […] [it] clearly involves our individual writerly agency and, indeed, our 
individual free will” (2013: 59).  I am going to proceed to argue that it might be useful for 
some of us in the creative writing practice-led research realm to identify how a 
rhizomatic model of intelligibility might assist in understanding the complexity of 
creative writing processes, particularly as it relates to creative writer-reseachers whose 
practices, in performative terms, Melrose suggested are “likely to be characterised by a 
highly individualised and often idiosyncratic processes” (2012: 301).      
 
Recently, several writers have taken up the Deleuzian notion of a “rhizome”, 
and/or “rhizomatic”, in the context of creative arts practice-led enquiry.  For example, in 
	   97	  
2007, from the point of view of dance research Kim Vincs in “Rhizome/Myzone: A 
Case Study In Studio-Based Dance Research” noticed that we 
 
are no longer in the era of positivist, objectively verifiable research outcomes,  
at least in significant areas of the arts and humanities. […] This is a different 
cultural moment that draws on a subjective understanding of knowledge.  I  
like to draw my understanding of this cultural moment from French  
philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.  They model knowledge as  
a rhizome, a web of interconnecting elements [...].  The subjectivity of the  
artist, itself a complex, rhizomatic web, is part of this field in which knowledge  
is produced (2010: 99–100). 
 
In 2009 Coessens et al, in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto wrote that a  
 
rhizomatic description of the domains of art and research implies dismantling  
the frontiers, opening the territories and deterritorializing space from the side  
of arts, as well as from the side of scientific research.  By borrowing […] notions 
[…] from Deleuze and Guattari […] we acknowledge the complexity of  
both realms, as all territories and their centres are shifting and dynamic. The  
idea of the artistic turn implies an explicit experience and recognition of  
these shifts (2009: 87).   
  
In 2013 Robin Nelson in Practice As Research In The Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, 
Resistances argued: 
 
 A pedagogy in preparation for PaR doctorates requires development, and 
supervisors need to be educated in the processes entailed.  Models must  
be established which not only suit arts practitioner-researchers but which also  
are accepted by the broader academy and applicable in cognate domains.  
We need to be critically reflective on the range of possible models for PaR  
PhDs in order to establish a rigorous equivalent to that in other HE domains. 
[…]  This book aims to convince by articulating a conceptual model and  
fresh approaches to rigour in PaR.  It may even be that the rhizomatic  
model affords a new research approach appropriate to new ways of thinking  
in the twenty-first century (2013: 17).  
 
Drawing on these examples, I am going to proceed to argue that if – as Donnelly and 
Harper have indicated (above) – the domain of creative writing is in need of new ways of 
discussing creative writing I am proposing that “rhizomatic-creative-writing” might be a 
useful imaginative metaphor to help us deal with this impasse of exploring writing from 
the perspective that a creative process is likely to be in a state of change, unpremeditated, 
and continuously forming and reforming, rather than focusing on artefacts where the 
outcome of the activity of creative writing has ended.   
From my point of view Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a “rhizome” and 
“rhizomatic writing” were made precisely for artists and others who are interested in 
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investigating a method of making writing that leads to the development of what they call 
“a process that challenges all models” (2014: 20).  This development would aim at 
enriching the artistic domain by adding to the diversity of existing artefacts and sharing 
knowledge related to heuristic techniques and ideas that might have been borrowed from 
other fields of research such as science and philosophy.   
 
Coessens et al in The Artistic Turn reminded us of the 
 
need for an artistic turn […] [that has] emerged with a degree of  
urgency, not just because knowledge of making and theories of making  
have been long neglected in favour of more deductive, scientific ways  
of knowing.  It has also emerged as a reaction to the degree to which 
modern culture is itself formulated, regimented and rationalised through 
science in its application, rather than in its invention (2009: 180). 
 
The focus in A Thousand Plateaus is antithetical to conforming to traditional hierarchical 
models exemplified by Deleuze and Guattari drawing attention to the traditional 
disciplines such as linguistics (e.g. Chomsky), psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud) and theology 
(e.g. Manichaean), implying that the documents produced by these writers or that 
religious system do not come close to representing all possible models of logic of a 
particular society, or culture, or images of thought, or ways of working.  “Writing” they 
tell us “has nothing to do with signifying.  It has to do with surveying, mapping, even 
realms that are yet to come” (2014: 4-5).    
One of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari clarify what they mean by 
“rhizome” and/or “rhizomatic writing” is by asking their readers to consider Noam 
Chomsky’s hierarchical “tree” model (see Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures, 2002).  In 1957, 
Chomsky was interested in constructing a series of linguistic modelsl that have a tree-like 
structure to show how certain rules of language can be represented.  What Deleuze and 
Guattari seem to me to be concerned with is that the structure of a “tree” serves a 
political function, in that if a “State” bureaucracy of a particular territory supports this 
kind of model, such as in educational academies, these “tree-like” structures, with single 
trunks and symmetrical root systems, impose a disciplinary regiment on a certain 
segment of a population.  If we take this idea and extrapolate it, then we might ask: if 
knowledge is limited to a particular structure that is fixed, how then might new 
knowledge be produced?  How can new ideas and things be invented if we are constantly 
aiming at replicating the general structure of existing models?  What are the implications 
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for creative production if, in “academic culture” (2014: 24) and elsewhere, the aim is to 
trace the general structure of a symmetrical “tree-like” model?      
What these writers seem to me to imply is that, rather than assisting in bringing 
new ideas, artefacts, and inventions into being, the intention of proliferating the “tree” 
structure is to regulate the status-quo (from the Latin “the existing state of affairs”) under 
the guise of cultural development, by demanding that thoughts and actions follow a set 
of clearly defined genealogical-like “laws” that are both binary (e.g. yes/no) and 
hierarchical (e.g. one, two, three).  In this way creative freedom is usurped as these 
structures impose conformity to a certain set of disciplinary guidelines that function by 
monopolising and regulating organisational patterns (agencement), and limiting choice to a 
particular set of registers and/or pathways – thus preventing choice from deviating from 
the dominant models.  What I think Deleuze and Guattari mean is that instead of 
focusing on “tree-logic”, we need to develop an image of what is giving life to a plant.  In 
other words, what brings things like plants into being?  What brings new writing into 
being?  Rather than the “tree” model, Deleuze and Guattari use the less restrictive 
concept of the “rhizome” and “rhizomatic writing” which they discuss at length.  They 
also deploy the notion of a “machine”, drawing attention to how certain mechanisms 
might be working in a culture by “forgetting instead of remembering”, in order to take 
into account how its parts are made up of individuals who take certain actions that can 
lead to what they call a “mobile machine, a stem for a rhizome […] [a line] of 
chance”(24). 
As I strongly sense that my engaging in the activity that led to the production of 
“pity for meat” resonates with the approximate characteristics of the principles of the 
Deleuzian rhizome, before proceeding to explore the notion of a diagram, I want to run 
through a Deleuzian account of the six rhizomatic principles that Deleuze and Guattari 
argued assume “very diverse forms” (7), offering it as an attempt to deal with certain 
sorts of creative writing production, rather than an explanation.  My feeling is that 
Deleuzian theory may not have a place in interpreting the outcome of a creative writing 
decision-making process (as literary criticism and theory attempted to do), but it does 
assist in reminding us that creative processes do not follow a systematic, determinable, 
step-by-step, pre-established pattern, rather emerge in unpredictable ways indicating how 
the world evolves in a chaotic, complex, dynamic arrangement that is continuously 
making connections as it does what it does and makes what it makes. 
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The first principle characteristic of a rhizome is “connectivity”, which is linked 
with the second, “heterogeneity”, that Deleuze and Guattari characterise as “any point of 
a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (7).  They emphasise that a 
rhizome works as a connection in a chaotic, unorganised way, searching, as it is moving 
between heterogeneous things and ideas, seeking a myriad of new connections.  They 
criticise linguistic models for being “not abstract enough” (ibid), advocating for a method 
of a rhizome that displaces the focus on language onto other dimensions and alternative 
“registers” (8).  An example of an alternative register is, perhaps, their presentation of an 
excerpt from the score of the Italian composer Sylvano Bussoti’s “Five Pieces for Piano 
for David Tudor” (3).  The third principle, “multiplicity”, implies the inability of a 
rhizome, that is itself a multiplicity, to be reduced to a single relationship between an 
object or subject, implying that everything is always connected to something outside of 
itself, but, at the same time, a particular multiplicity cannot expand without the 
multiplicity changing its form.  The notion of multiplicity also coincides with agencement 
that can be linked to a “plane of consistency” (8-9).  I want to note here Melrose’s 
argument (unpublished paper, 2012; see also Phillips 2006), that agencement “bears the 
signature” of the complex “logics of production, expert intuitive processes” of a 
particular artist or group of artists that is likely to be unavailable to an outside observer.  
Melrose indicates that a practising artist-researcher’s oeuvre (the body of work produced) 
demonstrates the evolution of a specific experimental decision-making process that 
continually aspires to escape “an already-existing state of being” so as to enable the 
invention and emergence of a new agencement.  The fourth principle, “asignifying 
rupture”, is characterised as operating “against the oversignifying breaks separating 
structures or cutting across a single structure” (Deleuze and Guattari 2014: 9), indicating 
that writing, as I have expanded on the notion in this document, to include other visual 
registers, can be offered as a rhizome that is an experiment, thus no longer primarily 
attributable to signifying codes – provided a reader/user knows how to view it as such. 
They advise: “Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, 
extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the 
entire plane of consistency” (11).  The fifth principle, “cartography”, is linked to the sixth 
principle, which is the art process “decalcomania” that they identify thus: “a rhizome is 
not amenable to any structural or generative model” (12).  Deleuze and Guattari 
repeatedly ask their readers to write, to draw experimental maps that can be continually 
modified, torn, drawn or mounted on a wall, conceived as a work of art, are detachable, 
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and most importantly have multiple entry points and exits. “But why is a model still 
necessary” they asked (24)? 
Bringing this discussion back to creative writing, what I want to ask, as a 
consequence of the former question, is: if we no longer need a “model”, on what sorts of 
bases are specific decision-making processes made?  In creative writing terms, Harper sets 
out a similar perspective that appears to me to resonate with Deleuzian theory in terms 
of noting certain political problems derived from his experience as a researcher teaching 
creative writing in the academy and as a practising creative writer.  Harper wrote    
 
creative writing cannot truly be taught in the way it has been taught  
to date and […] teachers of it need to embrace a more holistic sense  
of what creative writing involves – including what it involves in  
terms of habitat formation and reformation. As creative writers it  
might be we recognise that already, but that modern systems of  
education have worked against us fully developing such a way of  
teaching (2013: 60).   
 
We practicing creative writer-researchers can begin to develop ways of sharing what it is 
that we do know, and what we can know, about how we experience a creative writing 
process, by borrowing the notion of the diagram from Deleuze, since he proposed a very 
interesting theory in 1981 in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, concerning “[recording] 
images that are already there” (2003: 71).  But it was in fact other researchers who 
explored this notion further and, I would argue, have shed additional light as to the 
usefulness of a diagram, as we begin to focus on experiencing the creative process itself.     
 
3. A diagram? 
 
 
  
“Rather than associate knowledge with certainty as traditional models might do (e.g. 
validation through replication), the knowledge in creative writing” according to Donnelly 
“is in the discovery that takes the writer beyond the routines of writing, in the questions 
that arise and that are answered through the writing process” (2013: 123).  If, as 
Donnelly suggests, creative writing knowledge implies that a creative writing process 
truly aims at the work of discovery, rather than conforming to traditional models of 
writing; and, if already made artefacts show us the end product of a creative writing 
process, rather than the creative process itself, then how might a process inform a 
diagraphein  
dia – from the Greek “through, throughout” + graphein  “write, draw” 
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creative writer that “takes the writer beyond the routines of writing”?  What Donnelly’s 
“traditional models” and “validation through replication” call to my mind is Lyotard’s 
the grand récit (see The Postmodern Condition 1984); and The Inhuman (1998), as well as 
Derrida’s logocentric epoch (see Of Grammatology 1997: 4). What I mean to suggest (to 
reiterate an argument I have already made above) is that the inner journey of exploring 
the creative process in the creative writer’s mind-body might not be solely made of the 
stuff of verbal language.  In Key Issues In Creative Writing, in what are in my view two 
revealing pages, Harper asks his readers repeatedly to “imagine”; also noting that 
“creative writing is taking place […] in the memory of the creative writer”, as well as 
drawing attention to those “emotional […] feelings that influenced the creative writer as 
the maker, the composer, the agent of the creative writing” (2013: 58-59).  It might 
therefore be that these same two key questions can be asked when the matter of a 
creative writing process is raised: first, how does the creative process feel? And second, 
what does the creative process look like?  
In the previous chapter I described how I sensed that emotions and chromatic 
living memory-images play an important role in my decision-making; and that I do not 
focus on the writing as it appears on a computer screen, rather I am looking at what 
appears to me to be a kind of a screen or “movie screen” (Smith 2011: 2); second, that 
my writing is a recording of what I see; and furthermore, that I make choices based on 
how I feel using an intuitive method (that according to Melrose 2011, is part of expertise).  
In addition, as I indicated above, The Clara Ann Burns Story (Smith 2011) emerged from 
an effort to allow my creative process to include digital pen and writing tablet, and to 
make writing that does not aim at representing traditional forms.  During the creative 
writing process that led to what I eventually titled “pity for meat” I strove to push my 
process even further beyond traditional models.  I started with a sense of setting the 
image-stuff of living memory in the present tense (that inhabit me) in motion, allowing 
these to dance freely in a disorganised way as if a projector that has a kaleidoscope-like 
lens was scrambling the memory-images so that I could make choices based on certain 
movements that I sensed felt “right”.  I paid particular attention to where certain image-
stuff was making what, in my view, were interesting connections by overlapping and 
shifting.  The creative writing practice provides an opportunity to re-examine what I 
experienced (sensed in my body) but overlooked in common everyday experience.  
Although these fleeting free-floating ephemeral imaginings and sensations are difficult to 
discuss because they are other-than-verbal, the selection process I used seems somehow 
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close to Deleuze’s concept of the diagram that he identified in Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation (2003).  Rather than an agent that generates a content, the diagram signals the 
artist’s way of seeing and doing, and is energised and potentially productive.   
A fundamental aspect of the diagram is that it refers to a visual world of an 
artistic process of a painter who is attempting to escape from the limitations of 
traditional models of art making.  In Sylvester’s Interviews With Francis Bacon (2012), Bacon 
explained: “although I may use, or appear to use, traditional methods, I want those 
methods to work for me” (107).  Using the words as well as the paintings of Bacon as a 
primary guide, Deleuze explores how an artist seeks not to conform to already existing 
ways of making an artefact, through his concept of the diagram.  Two of the many ways 
that Deleuze describes the diagram, for example, are: “the experience” and “optical space” 
(2003: 81) (writer’s emphasis).  A (rhizomatic) creative process, first of all, does not trace 
traditional models; second, it is experienced in the body; and third, and finally, from my 
own point of view, it is actualised in an inner optical space inhabited by felt experience: it 
seems to me to follow that a diagram might be a useful metaphor with which to deal with 
the difficulty of the paradox of having to use words to describe a creative process that is 
essentially seen and sensed (felt) in the body.  In order to expand upon what I believe is 
the relevance of the diagram and the need for a balanced discussion I will be drawing 
from a carefully selected group of writers whose research findings seem to me to support 
this diagrammatic approach to exploring a creative process.  
 
Both Deleuze and Guattari, in 1991 in What Is Philosophy?, attempted to directly identify 
how sensation works as it affects the flesh of the human body and perception by 
offering, for example, the following explanation as it relates to artistic decision making:    
 
The being of sensation, the bloc of percept and affect, will appear as  
the unity or reversibility of feeling and felt, their intimate intermingling like  
hands clasped together […] flesh gives us the being of sensation and bears  
the original opinion distinct from the judgement of experience–flesh of  
the world and flesh of the body that are exchanged […] (1994: 178).  
 
While the phrases above are extremely useful in shedding light on the importance of 
perception and sensation as it is experienced in the body of an artist, it was Deleuze who 
studied what a particular individual artist – Francis Bacon – had to say about his own 
creative process in a series of interviews with David Sylvester (see David Sylvester 
Interviews With Francis Bacon, 2012).  Deleuze was also concerned with what an artist can 
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do as opposed to focusing on what one or more artefacts might be attempting to narrate, 
signify, or represent.  While Bacon identified in his interviews with Sylvester what he 
called a “graph”, which he described in his own words as   
 
involuntary marks are much more deeply suggestive than others, and those  
are the moments when you feel that anything can happen […] the marks  
are made, and you survey the thing like you would a sort of graph.  And you  
see within this graph the possibilities of all types of fact being planted.  This is  
a difficult thing; I’m expressing it badly.  But you […] suddenly see through  
this graph […].  Isn’t it that one wants a thing to be as factual as possible and  
at the same time as deeply suggestive or deeply unlocking of areas of  
sensation other than simple illustration of the object that you set out to do?   
Isn’t that what all art is about (2012: 56)?      
 
It was Deleuze who borrowed Bacon’s “graph” and developed the concept of the 
“diagram”.  Working with a diagram also gives me the impression of being a “suggestive” 
vehicle for discussing creative decision-making that does not necessarily conform to 
ready-made structures – although plainly these structures remain, and may well help us 
organise experience for a reader or viewer.  “The diagram is […] sensation, even a 
coloring sensation, is ephemeral and confused, lacking duration and clarity […] felt […].  
Only then will something emerge from the motif or diagram” (Deleuze 2003: 91-92).  
The function of the diagram seems to be to focus on making certain decisions during the 
creative process that are not pre-mediated, thus allowing “accidents” and “mistakes” to 
happen: “The diagram […] is a frenetic zone in which the hand is no longer guided by 
the eye [having given the eye a haptic function] […] which appears as chance, accident, 
automatism, or the involuntary” (111).  I would argue that it might be possible to apply 
the notion of a diagram to a creative writing process that relies on chance, and a kind of 
experimentation that seeks to free the artist’s hand and mind from traditional ways of 
doing and making writing.  Deleuze, for example, drew attention to what he called 
“automatic writing, where the hand seems to be guided by a ‘foreign, imperious will’ in 
order to express itself in an independent way” (103).  I want to note here that Deleuze 
deploys the notion of the “diagram” in other texts,li however I sense that the “diagram” 
that he identified in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003) somehow overlaps with 
how I experience discoveries and decision-making in my creative process.  For example, 
Deleuze refers to “intuition” and “rather than claiming to pass judgement, simply 
indicates what was not right”; he adds the idea of “the direct action on the nervous 
system” all of which are fundamental to my own assumptions about creative processes 
(88).  According to Coessens et al. in The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto: “Artistic integration, 
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transaction and transformation are primarily nonverbal, non-explanatory” (2009: 116).  If 
artistic processes are indeed primarily nonverbal and non-explanatory it may be that the 
notion of a diagram can help researchers who might be lacking words to describe the 
undiscovered inner-world of the artistic experience, and the actions she or he takes in 
this regard.     
Deleuze characterised the diagram as 
 
suddenly inserted into the head [of an artist] […] [that triggers] the  
emergence of another world […] these marks, these traits, are  
irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are 
nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative. They are no longer  
either significant or signifiers: they are a-signifying traits.  They are  
traits of sensation […] as if the hand assumed an independence, and 
began to be guided by other forces, making marks that no longer  
depend on either our will or our sight. These almost blind manual  
marks attest to the intrusion of another world into the visual world  
of figuration (2003: 82).   
 
This description of a diagram that emerged in 1981 inspired my interest in wanting to 
test some of Deleuze’s and Bacon’s observations (cited above) against more recent 
publications related to the diagram that appears to be more widely recognised as a 
complex inner visual (figural) tool that an artist triggers, as the creative process begins, as 
a means of ridding the process of clichés, and moving between what is already known 
(figurative: representation, illustration, narrative), and what is not yet known (potentially 
another world or worlds).    
In terms of creative writing practice-led research the description of the active and 
productive emergence of “another world” in an artist’s mind reminds me of how Perry in 
“Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis” (1998) described her writing process.  
She identified “images and ideas flowing” and “writing before the inspiration dissipates, 
distorted in sleep and dreams, or lying still and letting the flow spend itself” 
(http://www.textjournal.com.au/oct98/perry.htm).  While Perry does not identify a 
diagram per se, she wrote: “I was in a fertile writing period, I resorted to typing with a 
blank screen, unable to see my text”.  Her reference to “something originating a long 
time ago […] in imagination, that at first has little connection with marks on paper” and 
“exegesis seems distant from the processes of writing” strikes me as shedding light on 
how her creative writing process works visually or at least it has a strong visual 
component.  This is the essay in which Perry argued that the mandatory exegetical model 
that draws “upon literary theory” that she explained is “distant from the process of 
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writing I just described”, may have been the reason why she wanted to “suggest possible 
directions for future models”.  Ten years later in 2008 in “The non-verbal and the verbal: 
expanding awareness of practice-led research in creative writing”, Perry argued that 
creative writing can be a visual art-form and as such she suggested creative writers should 
“fight for recognition of our creative work in and of itself” (8).  While in Perry’s terms 
we might not have the “verbal-language” capacity to adequately describe an artefact in 
discursive terms, my own sense is that the diagram might be a useful tool in the practice-
research realm to explore a creative writing process that works non-verbally and visually 
or by what Perry (in 1998) had called “images and ideas flowing”. 
The architects Ben van Berkel and Caroline Boss explained  
 
diagrams are best known and understood as visual tools […]. The  
essence of the diagrammatic technique is that it introduces into the  
work qualities that are unspoken, disconnected from an ideal or  
an ideology, random, intuitive, subjective, not bound to a linear  
logic – […] There are three stages to the diagram: selection,  
application and operation, enabling the imagination to extend to  
subjects outside it and draw them inside, changing itself in the  
process (1998).    
 
They emphasise that they are interested in how the diagrams might be a “virtual 
organisation” that can assist in transforming a project during the process.  In my view, 
one of the most interesting aspects of this description of the diagram is that it offers a 
new approach to creative processes that invites deviation and irregularity rather than 
habitual actions and aiming a priori (from the Latin “what comes first”) at a fixed 
outcome.   
 
Recently O’Sullivan took an interest in the Deleuzian notion of the “diagram” in “From 
Stuttering and Stammering to the Diagram: Deleuze, Bacon and Contemporary Art 
Practice” (2008).  He proposed (and I am paraphrasing) that although Deleuze explored 
the notion of the diagram in relation to Bacon’s paintings we might apply the diagram to 
other kinds of art practices that draw on the unforeseeable that “goes beyond conscious 
control, if only to circumnavigate the reproduction of just-more-of-the-same” (255).  
O’Sullivan wrote that he would be interested in a  
 
project to identify how specific artists incorporate this lack of control ‘into’  
their practice, or simply, how they contact and somehow ‘use’ that which  
is outside them ‘selves’. How, for example, they might mobilise chance  
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(and perhaps error) in the production of something new (ibid).     
 
O’Sullivan is interested in various kinds of artistic practices that he suggests already 
produce what is seen from within the body that is not represented in the outside world.  
When art, “really is art”, to use his terms, there must be an opposition to habits, 
including habits of sight, and as such this means that the practice is “is always located at 
the edge of things” (256) but also – as he puts it – “involve the utilisation of these 
glitches as points of indeterminacy that might finally allow something new, something 
different, to emerge” (257-258).  But from this perspective, while it is extremely 
insightful and useful in terms of arguing that the Deleuzian diagram is applicable to a 
wide variety of art practices, what I am also interested in are the questions I have already 
posed above: what does a diagram feel like?  What does it look like?  How is it energised, 
and to what effect (that the artist recognises)?    
 
Senagala in “Rhizogramming And Synesthetic Transformation Of Designer’s Mind” 
(2005: 4-17) begins by claiming: “This paper is intended to be a rhizome” (4), while at 
the same time showing us something he made that he calls a “rhizogram”.  What is a 
rhizogram?  In my understanding, it is a combination of a rhizome and the diagram but 
also what Massumi calls “biograms”.  Massumi in Parables For The Virtual: Movement, 
Affect, Sensation (2002) contends that  
 
biograms are usually perceived as occupying the otherwise empty and 
dimensionless plane between the eyes and the objects in the world […]  
projected on an invisible screen […] more-than visual […] combining  
senses, tenses, and dimensions on a single surface (187).   
 
One of the ways Senagala describes “rhizograms” is: “by-products of the process of 
diagramming” (2005: 9).  He is less interested in the rhizograms (the products) and more 
interested in revolutionising the diagramming (processes).  In his discussions he refers to 
the traditions of architecture placing importance on “transforming the visual perceptions 
of the designer through spatial, tectonic and visual exercises” (5) rather than training 
architects to explore temporality and sensation.  His contention is that introducing 
traditional approaches to design processes to students is “hardly conducive to creatively 
exploring and generating architecture that is both viable and acknowledges the systemic 
complexities and the myriad interconnections between the components of the life-world 
system” (6).  These aspects of Senagala’s theory provide a set-up for his conception of a 
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“diagram” that he proposes belongs to “epistemological space which allows connections 
to be made from the images and ideas abstracted from the world” (6).  
Senagala adds:  
 
While most of the present discussion has focused on the act of sketching,  
the method is applicable in any medium. The author and collaborators  
have carried out experiments where the rhizogramming actually begins on  
a computer screen, albeit with the computer’s interface completely  
and intentionally blurred (13).     
 
He describes “rhizogramming” as involving a practitioner noticing   
 
what is changing, moving and fluctuating in his or her sensory field  
and draws, without looking at the drawing and without privileging any  
particular event/sensation […] any fluctuation in the perceptual field 
that stimulates the senses: auditory, olfactory, haptic, and taste.  […] 
Thus, an element of serendipity and playfulness is introduced into the 
process and the clutches of conscious choice are relaxed (8).  
 
In order to do this, he advocates developing both: “synesthetic sensibility” and 
“proprioception” (15).  To give you an idea of what I sense Senagala means by 
this, let us look at the textboxes to the right, and consider what Massumi has to 
say about synesthetic experience and proprioception: 
 
 Call proprioception and viscerality taken together—as two  
complimentary dimensions of the “medium”-depthlii perception most  
directly implicated in the body’s registration of the in-betweenness of  
the incorporeal event–mesoperception. Mesoperception is the synesthetic  
sensibility: it is the medium where inputs from all five senses meet,  
across subsensate excitation, and become flesh together, tense and  
quivering. Mesoperceptive flesh functions as a corporeal transformer  
where one sense shades into another over the failure of each, their  
input translated into movement and affect. […]  Mesoperception  
can be called sensation for short (2002: 62). 
 
For Massumi and Senagala, as for my account here, sensation is important.  Might it also 
be important to an expert practising creative writer-researcher more generally?  Senagala 
notes examples of “collaborative”, “rhizomatic experiments [that have been] carried out 
in creative writing” (2005: 16).  He cautioned his readers, however, that from his point of 
view “collaboration does not necessarily mean that [writing] is automatically rhizomatic.  
A rhizome has to form relationships and connections that would link the participants, 
their perceptions, ideas, events, resources and actions” (ibid).  Senagala’s understanding 
synesthesia from the 
Greek syn – 
“together” + aisthe 
“to feel, perceive” 
proprioception from 
the Latin proprius 
“individual” + 
perception 
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of rhizomatic creative writing suggests to me that a creative writer who writes 
rhizomatically operates on the bases of “synesthetic sensibility”, engaging with 
“proprioception” as a means to actualise and realise future creative possibilities.   
 
Donnelly and Harper have asked: “What might our future roles as creative 
writers in higher education be” (2013: 180)?  I would argue that in the future increasing 
numbers of practising creative writer-researchers will study creative writing 
rhizomatically, shifting their focus away from traditional models regardless of how much 
these artefacts are admired, and toward the diagram (in a Deleuzian sense), that might 
generate a figural space of highly detailed memory-images along with associated affects.  
This change has the potential to liberate the perception of the creative writer, who will 
make decisions based on rigorous experimentation with a new apparatus and materials. 
She will explore ways to make artefacts that have yet to be named – that initially can only 
be sensed.  To use Harper’s terms: “we do not yet know all that there is to know to 
explore; or, indeed, entirely how to explore it.  […] It might well be informed by an 
individual writer’s memory as well as by immediate sensory stimulus” (2013: 106-107).  
In adopting such an approach my argument is that practicing creative writer-
researchers will need to identify and distinguish themselves as creative writing practice-
led researchers and artists, clarifying that she or he has a different aim than traditional 
methods of writing – not to disparage traditional methods but to offer an alternative 
approach that allows practitioners to discuss, research and explore the evolution of her 
or his creative decision-making process.  This will also require a shift in thinking about 
the creative writer and the artefacts.  As I elaborated above, in the introduction to this 
chapter, I am interested in how future practising creative writer-researchers might freely 
seek the joy of exploring new possibilities, recording a newly imagined world with its 
vibrant colours, lines, and shimmering objects by taking in hand new digital technology 
such as a digital pen with the objective of sharing the wonder of the human experience 
by investigating the evolution of a creative writing process and moving between research 
and artistic realms of production.  But can we find the justification to apply this 
rhizomatic research principle to creative writing in the university research context?    
Senagala, quoted above, provides us with a process: “Rhizogramming is a 
synesthetic and perceptually transformative process that forms a rhizome between the 
designer, a set of multi-sensory perceptions of events and the design choices” (16-17).  
Can we rephrase this, replacing the terms “designer” and “design” with “creative writer” 
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and “creative writing”?  I am suggesting that Senagala’s notion of rhizogramming is a 
useful tool for creative writers who choose: first, to experiment with new digital 
technology as a means to develop a different approach from the norm – in the realm of 
practice-led research – on the basis of a high level of skill and a priori knowledge acquired 
from prolonged investigation and rigorous testing; and second, to place greater 
importance on the individual experience in the mind-body than measuring and 
interpreting the results produced.  
However, I want to clarify, before concluding this chapter, that while Senagala’s 
observations on the usefulness of the rhizome, diagram, and synesthetic 
“transformation” of the “mind” of a practitioner seem to me to be of interest, 
particularly in light of rapid computer developments and cultural shifts, the aim of my 
creative process is not to make “rhizograms”.  While I cannot be certain of how Senagala 
experiences his own synesthetic and proprioceptive processes, he did suggest that it is 
imperative that the rhizome follows “multiple pathways” and makes diverse connections, 
which implies a process that is endlessly new and, in the most notable of cases, singular 
to the expert practitioner (Melrose 2011).  
My own argument is that, by taking in-hand a digital pen in making “pity for 
meat”, I made decisions on what was to be recorded based on sensing connections 
between the “image-stuff” of specific memories as I set the creative process in motion 
where memories are overlapping with each other.  If we recall Bergson’s imperative: 
“there is no perception that is not full of memories” (1991: 33) then on the bases I have 
outlined above and in the previous chapters I am going to argue that in making “pity for 
meat” I made connections between a number of living memories that are overlaid, in the 
present of making, with the perceptions that are singular to me: my reader may or may 
not want to trace these in detail, at this point, from the word map I provide here, 
following the page numbers provided:   
 
blue maps [viii], orbs [1], ink cloud [2], inscription [3], wheelbarrow [4], ghostly 
figures [5], slaughterhouse [6], fingerprints [7], gun [8], wildflowers [9], sympathy 
[10], roses [11], butterflies [12], Degas [13], a butcher [14], tears of blood [15], 
blue [16], sprouting branch [17], silence [18], messages [19], casual conversation 
[20], a lace umbrella [21], dead cat [22], translucence [23], a crypt [24], the 
appearance of an image in the mind [25], relationships [26], breast tissue [27], 
stamps [28], a portrait of Mac Daily [29], friendship [30, 31], ink splatter [32], 
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rose [33], a kiss [34], pink [37], body parts [38], an apology [39], remembering 
[40], cracked cement [41], Odette [42], missing faces [43], crying bodies [44], a 
sycamore [45], radiant spirit [46], hope [47], records [48], erasure [49], a single 
gesture [50], sensations [51], Sakura [52], roots of trees [53], loss [54], the act of 
writing [55], an embrace [56], visible shifts [57], honey [58], invisible light [59], 
affection [60], a perceptual stream [61], resonances common to a body [62].  
 
Plainly, these words do not capture what I was seeing and feeling in my body during the 
creative writing process of which the artefacts serve as a map.  If the reader follows the 
word map, and traces in turn the visuals, she or he might become aware that a rhizomatic 
approach to creative writing has required experimenting with new materials – digital pen, 
writing tablet, paper – putting together a new chromatic agencement generated by 
memories as experiencing the world unfolds.  The work that has emerged was inspired 
by the idea of making an unusual researcher-practitioner contribution to the discipline of 
creative writing that is demonstrated, rather than solely told in words. From my point of 
view it brings to the fore one of the most profound challenges that creative writing 
research must address if it is to evolve beyond rewriting and logocentrism.  The 
challenge of this undertaking should have been apparent throughout this research 
enquiry: to participate in the evolution of a new way of experiencing a creative writing 
process – by exploring a method of recording complex living memories mixing image-
stuff and broken words as these are seen and felt in the body, for the purpose of 
showing how creative writers can, and are, doing things with more than words.    
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Conclusion 
 
 
In “Sensing the Logic of Writing: Creative Writing Reimagined”, which comprises 
creative and critical components, I have explored the specific details of a highly 
personalised creative writing process that involves using computer-apparatus to certain 
ends.  
In the “Introduction” I noted that I would be drawing notionally on existing 
thought in the domains of philosophy, science, and the arts, testing to see whether 
elements from these other disciplines might assist in my developing a way to discuss how 
a new way of writing is invented and theorised.  I reflect on a figural creative writing 
decision-making process – which then leads to the production and/or investigation of 
artefacts around which this project is based.  I discussed how the creative and critical 
components might swing between a more explicit discourse in the research process, and 
a figural artistic process that seeks to communicate and illuminate living memories in the 
present tense, for the reader/viewer.   
I then set out in search of terms of reference in Chapter 1, encountering the 
richness of the key texts that inform this research.  In the following chapters these texts 
have assisted in my developing my own argument, which sheds light on what a ‘practice 
as research’ approach allows a research undertaking to do that is not available through, 
nor possible in, literature-based research.  What this practice-led research approach has 
allowed me to explore – that traditional modes of research would not – has led to the 
arguments in Chapter 2 and 3 that indeed involve literature-based research; however, 
these chapters are accompanied by creative components that offer a second major 
engagement with the notion of practice as research itself.  I have presented these two 
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elements in such a way as to invite the reader to move between the two, such that each 
element illuminates and informs the other.   
In Chapter 2, I began by drawing attention to TCABS (Smith 2011).  I noted that 
my writing triggers the luminous image-stuff of living memories that the writing itself 
seeks to illustrate and the words punctuate.  I identified what Melrose calls an “empirical 
fit” (2002) between this experience and five concepts: 
 
1) What Freud called ‘screen memories’ (1899) that I sense are re-actualised and 
realised in TCABS, for example on pages 1, 5, 9-10, 17, 25-26, and 56-58;  
2) What Bergson identified as ‘intuition’, ‘memory-image’ and ‘duration’ (1991), 
none of which is plainly visible in TCABS, but which are vital to my creative 
writing decision-making process; 
3) The way Deleuze suggested that intuition, emotions and creativity itself are 
linked (1991) and the emotional way of writing that Passerini identified as 
‘the specific mirror of emotions’ (2008: 120). While emotions and/or affect 
seem to me to inform my creative decision-making process, a sympathetic 
reader/examiner might register what Passerini called ‘emotional flow’ in 
TCABS, for example, on pages 1 and 95.  Passerini reminded us: “It is very 
difficult to speak about emotions: you cannot grasp them and pin them 
down, they are an elusive object” (120). 
4) What Lyotard identified as ‘memory-effects’ (1998: 47-57) that he described 
as a way of writing with computer apparatus that “conserves the sign of the 
past event, or rather produces it as available, presentable and reactualizable 
memory” (48).  It seems to me that pages 2, 4, 6, 37-38, 39, 42, 47-48, 51, 52, 
53, 54, 55, 63, 65-66, and 79-81 in TCABS are reactualised memory.   
5) With what I identified as ‘doing things with images’ through an analogy 
derived from speech act theory: the image itself can perhaps be shown, as 
context changes, to do more than it shows.  I suggested that it might be 
possible to argue that my inclusion of certain photographs in TCABS can 
resonate, for example, with certain sorts of affective as well as informative 
engagements with a spectating audience, see for example pages 21 and 23.    
 
In Chapter 3, I began by drawing attention to “pity for meat”, which I have identified in 
terms of a creative writer’s portfolio.  This includes: an index [i–iv], a portfolio guide [v-
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vi] and 62 separate artefacts [1-62].  In this chapter I noted that the creative process that 
led to the emergence of “pity for meat” is a continuation of the process identified in 
Chapter 2, with the exception that it no longer triggers childhood memories; and in the 
case looked at here in detail, the memories are set in motion as if projected on a screen 
from a projector with a kaleidoscope-like lens.  The continuation of the process between 
these two artefacts leads me to suggest that what I am dealing with here is a mixed-mode 
research method involving creative perception and production.  Thus if an 
examiner/reader who explores the entire portfolio, or the “index” comprised of 
thumbnails of the contents of the portfolio that allows for scanning multiple images 
quickly, she or he might be reminded of the ‘rhizomatic writing’ that Deleuze and 
Guattari proposed, that they have suggested might allow the deconstruction of dominant 
linguistic models and is in a constant state of change.  I have also emphasised the 
usefulness of the notion of a Deleuzian ‘diagram’, as an energised and productive visual 
tool that assists a graphic artist who engages in a rhizomatic approach to decision-making 
during the creative process and that is proprioceptive and synesthetic.  
 
I propose to conclude this final chapter by suggesting that I have not only discussed a 
method of recording complex living memories mixing image-stuff and broken words as 
these are seen and felt in the body, but I have also shown – through both critical writing 
and documented creative writing practices – that creative writers can, and are, doing 
things with more than words.  The movement that I have sketched out above between 
the creative and critical components would not have been possible through a traditional 
literature-based research mode.  This individualised practice-led research approach has 
allowed me to explore the specific details of an alternative sensory logic of writing that 
seems to me to imply the possibility of reimagining creative writing as a significantly 
visual art practice, that in this instance, included drawing on memory as a similarly visual 
phenomenon.  This visual phenomenon might well be a mode of knowledge production, 
conserving and making available, presentable and re-actualisable highly individualised 
moving chromatic images of the human experience, that perhaps would have otherwise 
been overlooked, or forgotten, and are felt in the body.  It might be possible to speculate 
on the bases of the research findings presented in this project that the writing of ‘creative 
writing’ itself, while it draws plainly on linguistic convention and discursive tradition, 
equally draws on visual convention and tradition.  As such, it need not be limited by the 
notion of story-telling or even the signifier; rather, it is a method of documenting a 
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specific expert creative decision-making process that is distinct from the practices of 
making (complex) marks with a digital apparatus – marks that might or might not resonate 
for one or another viewer/reader.   
 
What are some of the implications of this enquiry?  It suggests to me that we 
practising creative writers and visual artists should begin to work together, to learn from 
each other, as uniquely skilled artists who might be experimenting and testing new 
computer-related writing apparatuses, and who need to find new ways of investigating 
our practices.  I suggest we consider how we can discuss a creative writing process as a 
graphic or figural art practice in the Lyotardian sense that is rhizomatic in the Deleuzian 
sense.  Some might argue that Deleuze et al and Lyotard have written and been written 
about for years, and might point out that these theorists were, themselves, expert writers 
but not artists.  My response, on the basis of what I have attempted to demonstrate in 
this research undertaking, is that they have outlined important ways of seeing, knowing 
and doing; yet the impact of their words for creative writing research, as I have carefully 
demonstrated, had not yet been realised, but needs to be – as so many commentators 
suggest.  What seem to me to be invaluable in this aspect of Lyotardian and Deleuzian 
philosophy are the implications that each writer, through different processes of critical 
investigation, has identified affectivity as key, and in particular in terms of the interaction 
between a creative writer’s experience and that or those of a reader/spectator – such as 
those identified by Passerini.  Finally, in light of the impact of computer technology, I 
would argue, we might want and be able to do something more significant than simply 
follow existing models of writing, which point surely has clear implications for teaching 
creative writing in the university, particularly in the set-ups specific to the Departments 
of Literature.  We might want to consider shifting creative writing to Visual and/or Fine 
Arts departments, reimagining and re-imaging new ways of writing altogether.   
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i The title of the chapter as it appears in the original document: “Silent” Speech.  
ii There are conflicting policies and theories about how to show possession in the case of a proper name. 
The extract below, for instance, seems to me to suggest a pragmatic choice based on sound and/or 
function of the proper name.  
For example, J. Straus in The Blue Book of Grammar and Punctuation (2015) noted: 
 
Some writers and editors add only an apostrophe to all nouns ending in s. And some add 
apostrophe + s to every noun, be it Hastings’s or Jones’s. […] Care must be taken to place an 
apostrophe outside the word in question.  For instance, if talking about a pen belonging to Mr. 
Hastings, many people would wrongly write Mr. Hasting’s pen (his name is not Mr. Hasting). […] 
Another widely used technique is to write the word as we would speak it.  For example, since 
most people saying, “Mr. Hastings’ pen” would not pronounce an added s, we would write Mr. 
Hastings’ pen with no added s. But most people would pronounce an added s in “Jones’s,” so we’d 
write it as we say it: Mr. Jones’s golf clubs.  This method explains the punctuation of for goodness’ sake 
(http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/apostro.asp).   
 
For consistency purposes I am choosing to add an apostrophe to all proper names ending with s (rather 
than apostrophe + s) to show possession.  
iii See Lyotard (2011: 54).  
iv The translators of Discours, figure (Anthony Hudek and Mary Lydon) or the publisher (University of 
Minnesota) of Discourse, Figure (2011) may or may not have considered the consequences of changing the 
original title from Discours, figure to Discourse, Figure.  From my own point of view the original title strongly 
suggests a hegemonic discourse repressing the figure.     
v Lyotard wrote: “This leads us to examine […] graphics, which is even more interesting” (2011: 262).   
vi Drawing attention, perhaps, to the figural aspects of writing in “Seeing Through Discourse, Figure” 
(http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia12/parrhesia12_hudek.pdf) Antony Hudek (who translated Discourse, 
Figure into English) wrote: 
 
The complexity of Lyotard’s phrasing, with its words taken at face value (all their possible 
meanings layered one on top of the other) and neologisms (“dé-jeu”) is indicative not only of the 
often perilous task that awaits any translator of Lyotard’s writing, but also of the ambiguity 
Lyotard invests in the proper pronoun (“s’attendre” as “waiting for each other/oneself ”) and thus 
of the care he takes in foiling [déjouer] the grasp of the philosopher, the historian, and the 
biographer-critic. This evasion is playful, no doubt, but also deadly serious: un-game, dé-jeu. The 
solution Lyotard proposes to translate this elusive strategy is to translate the verb “s’attendre” in 
the language in which it is written, or writes itself—whatever language, presumably, this may be. 
vii On subject of visual (figural) ‘art’ in Discourse, Figure (2011) Lyotard proposed: 
  
One can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not put color [spelling as in text] in the 
sentence.  Yet color is meaning […] unsayability of the world and a destiny of silence […]. The 
hope of enclosing the whole object within discourse [as ‘conversation’ or ‘dialectic’] must be 
abandoned if this is indeed our hope—and this is what one must attack in Hegel.  On the other 
hand, the space of designation does indeed dwell in discourse, but on this side of what it signifies, 
in its expression.  I call it provisionally “space of designation” because its properties seem 
analogous to those of that space and contradict those of linguistic space. What they have in 
common is the figure, which I will call figural space […] offering it its object as image […]. But 
let there be no mistake: this “interiority” of figural space in relation to discourse is not dialectical 
(50).  
viii For some writers the figural refers to a writing that is strongly associative and not visual images. This is 
not what I mean here. The figural introduces into art-making visual fluctuations that resist the linear 
linguistic (structuralism) rules of a series of ‘signs’ (signified/signifier) by violating the linearity of linguistic 
structures.  These are the sorts of structures that were developed by Ferdinand de Saussure in General 
Course in Linguistics (1916/2011).  In taking a language focused perspective to creative (artistic) writing there 
is an attempt to replace a visual image (graphic) by assembling complex tropes.  This is attempted through 
an associative compilation of words, recalling Romain Jakobson’s work, in the early days of structuralism, 
on supposedly “linear” or “associative” “axes” in writing.  Both for Lyotard, as well as Deleuze and 
Guattari, the figural concerns cultivating affective moments in relation to the act of the artist (that are 
marked by an event that takes place during a particular ‘time’ that is not chronological and marks a 
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particular space) that resists dominant power structures, whether these are related to a prevailing language 
in a particular culture or political structures.  Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus (2008), for example, 
noted:  
The extreme importance of J.-F. Lyotard's recent book is due to its position as the first 
generalized critique of the signifier.  In its most general proposition, in fact, he shows that the 
signifier is overtaken toward the outside by figurative images, just as it is overtaken toward the 
inside by the pure figures that compose it – or, more decisively, by "the figural" that comes to 
short-circuit the signifier's coded gaps, inserting itself between them, and working under the 
conditions of identity of their elements. […] Lyotard shows that what is at work in dreams is not 
the signifier but a figural dimension underneath, which gives rise to configurations of images that 
make use of words, making them flow and cutting them according to flows and points that are 
not linguistic and do not depend on the signifier or its regulated elements (243-44).    
 
My own sense, from the perspective of a practising creative writer-researcher, is that Lyotard was focused 
on the difference between the discursive writing (dominated by language or the signifier) and creative 
(artistic) writing (guided by visual/figural images in the mind).  For Lyotard the figural (visual) breaks the 
rules of language and reveals purely visual (graphic) forms that always remain open to intense desires and 
feelings. Lyotard seems to me to suggest that language (what is said/heard) always fails to account for what 
is seen and felt (emotional intensity).  
ix I have used the term ‘sensing’, by which I mean ‘resonates for me’.  The performance researcher Susan 
Melrose, in 2003 in “Who Knows – and Who Cares (about performance Mastery)?” (sfmelrose.org.uk/e-pai-
2003-04/performancemastery) draws attention to “those moments when something you sense in your own 
reading of practice-writing […] resonates for you with something you retain from expert-mixed mode 
practices”.  In this particular document Melrose both ‘shows’ us and explains how creative research 
practices are characterised by research processes that she seems to identify as emerging from a particular 
creative disciplinary pursuit of knowledge that is based on a drive to continue to develop and learn.    
x In Discourse, Figure (2011) Lyotard reminded those who might object to the idea of a writer as an artist 
who is an illustrator of visual images (in the mind) by drawing attention to the relationship between writing 
and the figural (212-213).  He noted: “The birth and re-birth of painting from writing” (264).   
xi Italics used in original document.  
xii  By ‘fulfilling a desire’ (from the Latin desiderare “wish, long for, expect”) I mean an unfolding embodied 
‘affective-force’ or (non-transgressive) ‘libidinal energy’ that impacts the nervous system of an artist/writer 
and sharpens sensation.  It may be that desire is the glimmering silent figural-space that arrives before 
speech.  In 1971 in Discourse, Figure Lyotard proposed: “Desire does not speak; it does violence to the order 
of utterance.  The violence is primordial: the imaginary fulfilment of desire consists in transgression, which 
repeats […]” (2011: 233).  Also in 1971 in “Taking the Side of the Figural” (see The Lyotard Reader & Guide 
2006) while drawing attention to writing that is not “read” but rather “seen” (34) Lyotard pointed out that 
if we are ordered to ‘hear’ words then “we deliver ourselves from the thickness of flesh, that we shut our 
eyes, and that we are all ears” (2006: 35).  This suggests to me that Lyotard also understood that an artist 
who writes might valorise seeing rather than hearing.  In this essay he draws attention to what “marks the 
history […] of Western thought” (35) suggesting there has been a purposeful overlooking of the creation 
of “shimmeringness” and “appearance” of “painting born from [creative] Writing” (35).  In 1973 in 
“Painting as a Libidinal Set-up: (Genre: Improvised Speech)” (see Lyotard Reader & Guide) Lyotard noted: 
“Desire is a term borrowed from Freud.  Yet in Freud’s work itself there is profound hesitation over the 
position and function of the term; a hesitation which is not merely circumstantial but probably decisive” 
(2006: 302).  Freud was focused on a ‘talking cure’.  In other words, Freud valorised discourse over a figural-
space.  If desire, indeed, concerns a ‘decisive-hesitation’ it may be that the ‘talking cure’ is what caused 
Freud’s own ‘equivocation’.  In 2002 the social theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi argued: “[creative] 
work has to do with desire, it is not desire for something in particular: no utopia.  In more ways than one, 
it is desire without an object.  It is desire as a process, purely operative rather than object-orientated: the 
process of reason rejoining desire” (2002: 113).  It may be the case that ‘fulfilling a desire’ is a living 
embodied flow of energy that is channelling the creative process itself, not the outcome of the process (i.e. 
artefact).  Lyotard reminded us: “Here I will take desire in the second sense […] in the sense of a process, 
desire as productive force, as energy open to transformations […] in which it is put to work, in which it 
produces certain effects, in which it is transformed into something else” (Lyotard 2006: 303).    
xiii Spelling and punctuation is as in the original document.  
xiv  Here by ‘sensed’ I mean ‘resonates for me’ but also an immediate intuitive way of knowing that arrives 
immediately before some sort of categorical order.  In 1971 Lyotard explained that discourse is related to 
aural language that does not “partake of the sensory through its “matter”; rather it is through its figure that 
language will be able to measure up to the sensory” (50).  In 1981 Deleuze in Francis Bacon: The Logic Of 
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Sensation noted that the figure “is sensible form related to sensation; it acts immediately upon the nervous 
system, which is of the flesh” (2003:31).  In 1991 Deleuze and Guattari proposed: “Sensations, percepts, 
and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived.  They could be said to exist in 
the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a 
compound of percepts and affects.  The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in 
itself ” (1994: 164).  However, in order for a particular ‘image’ to be ‘sensed’ what is required is a living 
body.  It is the human body that makes art possible.   
xv On the back cover of Discourse, Figure (2011) Mieke Bal wrote:  
 
We have had to wait a long time for the English translation of this seminal book.  It was among 
the first to bring ‘word and the image studies’ to a level where binary opposition is no longer the 
sole mode of argumentation, and complexity of thought allows us to envision that both of these 
two complimentary modes are constantly in operation.  The key term ‘the figural’ brings thinking 
about visual manifestations of thought beyond the opposition between abstract and figurative 
that continues to predominate even today.  
 
My own sense is that this early work perhaps was an effort to draw attention to the manifestation of visual 
images that guide a creative (artistic) process that involves writing (i.e. inscription).  	  
xvi Lyotard in Discourse, Figure (2011) identifies writing as bringing together the very “stuff” of an image:  
 
This unity constitutes the very stuff of the inscription.  It is written in the same space as 
something, else, in this case an image.  Now the topical unity of writing and scene indicate that 
the text, having taken up a position on the same plane as the image, will submit to the strictures 
of that plane and betray the strictures of writing.  By this simple placing of inscription, we pass 
from a linguistic space, that of reading, where one hears, to visual space, that of painting, where one 
looks (263-64).   
xvii Born in Moravia in 1856, Sigmund Freud moved with his family to Vienna and lived there until 1938 
when he moved to London as a result of Hitler’s invasion of Austria.  He wrote on the subject of the 
unconscious in the early part of the 1900s.  In a book entitled The Unconscious Freud indicated that dreams, 
new thoughts, and ‘symptoms and compulsions in sick people’ are all embedded in the unconscious all of 
which are “latent memories” that are the trace of a [unconscious] psychic process (2005: 51). However, in 
“Screen Memories” (1899) Freud was focused on memories that emerge in the conscious during waking 
hours that reveal dramatic scenes from childhood in healthy adults.     
xviii For an overview of a Deleuzian rhizome see Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (2014: 3-25).   
xix The Oxford English Dictionary defines heuristic: “enabling a person to discover or learn something for 
themselves” (2010: 823).    
xx Spelling and punctuation is as in original document. 
xxi Spelling and punctuation is as in original document.  
xxii J. Kincheloe and P. McLaren in “Rethinking Critical Theory And Qualitative Research” that was 
published by Sage publications in 2005 in The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research suggested that as we 
move through the 21st C. the French term bricoleuse f. or bricoleur m. as it relates to qualitative research is 
someone who “highlights the relationship between a researcher’s ways of seeing and the social location of 
his or her personal history” (316).  
xxiii Spelling as in original document.  
xxiv Spelling as in original document.  
xxv In 1987 the British anthropologist Jack Goody in The Interface Between the Written and the Oral (1993) was 
interested in “the interface between oral and the written which are often confused” (xi).  He reminded us:  
  
The physical basis for writing is clearly the same as drawing, engraving and painting – the so-
called graphic arts.  It depends ultimately on man’s ability to manipulate tools by means of his 
unique hand with its opposable thumb, coordinated of course by eye, ear and brain.  There is little 
evidence of such activities in the early phases of man’s history, during the Early and Middle Old 
Stone Age.  But with the coming of the later Old Stone Age (the Upper Palaeolithic, c. 30,000 – 
10,000 BC) we find an outburst of graphic forms in the caves of south-western France, then later 
on in the rock shelters of Southern Africa and much later still, on the birch bark scrolls of the 
Ojibway of North America.  
 Writing, then, has its roots in the graphic arts, in significant design.  To use distinctions 
that sometimes overlap and are not always helpful, both the intention and the consequences of 
these designs can be described as either communicative or expressive.  Expression can be seen as […] 
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a kind of graphic monologue, the aim of which is the externalization of thoughts and of feelings 
or simply the creation of the design itself (4).  
 
Thus, the term graphic, I would argue, has the beauty of applying to writing and other visuals without 
needing to make a distinction.   
xxvi Noland wrote: “Writing about cyberspace, Keep makes a similar point, insisting that the […] fingers are 
gestures that define a new gestural body, one coterminous with a keyboard and screen” (2006: 220).  She 
also cites the work of Poster where he draws attention to the keyboard (222).  And she also wrote: “All 
writing, in short is disciplined […] writing always involves […] new implements, such as the electronic 
keyboard” (224).   
xxvii In 2006 Ngoc Phan Hong Nguyen wrote in a master of computer science thesis “Note Taking and 
Sharing with Digital Pen and Paper”: “The field of pen-based digital […] systems is moving fast forward 
[and] combines the advantages of both the paper world and the digital world” (6).  
xxviii See Noland page 217 and 227.  
xxix In Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (1986/2010) the ethnographer James Clifford 
wrote in response to a photograph on the cover of the book:  
 
The ethnographer is absorbed in writing – taking dictation?  fleshing out an interpretation?  
recording an important observation?  dashing off a poem?  Hunched over in the heat, he has 
draped a wet cloth over his glasses.  His expression is obscured.  An interlocutor looks over his 
shoulder – with boredom? […].  In this image the ethnographer hovers at the edge of the 
frame—faceless, almost extraterrestrial, a hand that writes.  It is not the usual portrait of 
anthropological fieldwork.  […].  But in another photo, carefully posed Malinowski recorded 
himself writing at a table […].  We begin, not with participant observation or with cultural texts 
(suitable for interpretation), but with writing, the making of texts.  No longer a marginal, or 
occulted, dimension, writing has emerged as central to what anthropologists do both in the field 
and thereafter. […]. [Ethnographers] see ethnographic writing as changing, inventive […] (1-3).      
xxx Jacques Derrida in Writing Difference in a chapter entitled: “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the 
Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” defined kath’ auto as: “the thing in itself expresses itself” (1978: 101).  
xxxi For example, Farag Moussa in “The Computer Age And The Inventor” (1998) defined “Computer 
Age” as: “an age which owes everything to inventors”. See online at: http://www.invention-
ifia.ch/computer_age_and_the_inventor.htm [retrieved December 7, 2014].  
xxxiiIn “Real-Time Systems” (2009) the computer researcher Insup Lee defined real-time in the following 
terms: “System time and external physical time are the same” (3)! See online at: 
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~lee/09cis480/lec-RTS-web.pdf [retrieved December 12, 2014]. 
xxxiii  Agencement is a French word that John Phillips described in “Agencement/Assemblage” (2006) as 
implying in the philosophical sense “specific connections with other concepts.  It is, in fact, the 
arrangement of these connections that give the concepts their sense […] in specific yet creative and often 
unpredictable ways” (108).  
xxxiv The English professor Gregory Ulmer in Applied Grammatology (1985) described Derrida as having 
partaken in “experimental (creative) writing” (x).  
xxxv Henri Bergson was interested in how time (duration) is experienced.  In The Creative Mind (1974) he 
explained that 
 
duration [is that] which science eliminates, and which is so difficult to conceive and express, is 
what one feels and lives.  Suppose we try to find out what it is?—How would it appear to a 
consciousness which desired only to see it without measuring it, which would then grasp it 
without measuring it, which would then grasp it without stopping it, which in short, would take 
itself as object, and which, a spectator and actor alike, at once spontaneous and reflective, would 
bring ever closer together–to the point where they would coincide—the attention which is fixed, 
and time which passes?  [….].   [Finally], I believed I had found pure, unadulterated inner 
continuity (duration) […] theories of space and time thus become counterparts of one another 
[…].  Real duration was systematically avoided.  Why?  Science has its own reasons […].  As I 
examined the various doctrines it struck me that language was largely responsible for this 
confusion:  duration is always expressed in terms of extension: the terms which designate time are 
borrowed from the language of space.  When we evoke time, it is space which answers our call 
(13-14).  
xxxvi As Susan Melrose has written: “I use the verb “sense” advisedly - [it being something that] resonates for 
you with something you retain from expert mix-mode practices.  I have referred to processes of sensing and 
resonating; at this point I want to add the notion of a moment of recognition, when something you sense 
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[…] seems to achieve for you a degree of empirical fit […] with your own experience of complex arts-expert practices” 
(2003).   
xxxvii Bricoleuse (feminine) is a French term that has no English equivalent.  The French anthropologist 
Claude Levi-Strauss in The Savage Mind (1966) defined a bricoleur (masculine) as a man who is  
 
adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike an engineer, he does not 
subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured 
for the purpose of the project.  His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are 
always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which 
is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current 
project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there 
have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous 
constructions or destructions.  The set of the ‘bricoleur’s’ means cannot therefore be defined in 
terms of the project (which would presuppose beside, that, as in the case of an engineer, there 
were, at least in theory, as many sets of tools and materials or ‘instrumental sets’, as there are 
different kinds of projects).  It is to be defined only by the potential use or, putting this another 
way and in the language of the ‘bricoleur’ himself, because the elements are collected or retained 
on the principle that ‘they may always come in handy’.  Such elements are specialized up to a 
point, sufficiently for the ‘bricoleur’ not to need the equipment and knowledge of all trades and 
professions, but not enough for each of them to have only one definite and determinate use.  
They each represent a set of actual and possible relations; they are ‘operators’ but they can be 
used for any operations of the same type (17 -18).  
xxxviii See Freud Complete Works 1890 – 1939 in “Screen Memories” at: 
http://staferla.free.fr/Freud/Freud%20complete%20Works.pdf [retrieved October 8, 2014].  
xxxixIt was Lyotard in 1971 in Discourse, Figure (2011), who identified the “figure”.  It was Deleuze and 
Guattari who in 1972 drew attention to the importance of Lyotard’s “figure” in Anti-Oedipus (2008: 243-
244).  And, it was Deleuze who borrowed Lyotard’s notion of the “figure” in Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation (2003).     
xl “Perhaps this too will be a pleasure to look back on one day”.  
xli Goddard took up the notion of “scar”, in the context of creative arts enquiry in “Anecdotes and 
Antidotes – Stories as Balms, Storytelling as Healing” (2003: 1-16).  Here he writes about his difficulty 
retrieving “a hazy memory” and how he “stroked” his “scar in an attempt to re-kindle lost memories and 
submerged feelings about [an] accident” (2-3).   
xlii The terms “chorographer”, “chorography”, and “mystory” are terms coined by Ulmer.  Since, in the 
arguments I am making in this thesis, these are of no direct importance, I do not unpack these terms 
further.   
xliii See Roman Jakobson, “Closing Statement: Linguistic and Poetics” (1960: 350–377). 
xliv Goddard noted an interest in “recording […] the pain and impact of a scar that bears witness to an 
adolescent surfing fiasco”, and in using of a “scar” to “recall the memories” that he describes as: “it was as 
if my body was once again opened up for scrutiny” (2003: 4-5).  This method of recalling and recording 
memories seems to me to overlap with Melrose’s “expert-recall” in the sense of the artist-researcher’s 
“own grasp of her [decision-making] ‘process’ […] [that is] a way of seeing and knowing that is vitally 
important to making new work” (2012: 308-309). 
xlv Lyotard here recalls Plato’s dialogues in the Meno: 81b-d; 85 d- 86 b and Phaedo: 72c-76 d – an 
epistemological theory – that suggests human knowledge is discovered by accessing memory.  
xlvi Recently, in “Derridian dispersion and Heideggerian articulation: general tendencies in  
the practices that govern intelligibility” (2001) Charles Spinosa explained: “The Derridian, however, 
believes that, even if there are moments where habitual practices enable determinations without decisions, 
his arguments show that we have no grounds for attributing logical priority to them” (203).  Perhaps this 
‘logicality’ is a sensory one?  In 1981 Deleuze suggested in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (2003) that the 
“logic of sensation” is very different to rational logic.  How I understand what Deleuze meant by sensation 
is that it precedes the self and is essentially the ever-changing material “stuff” of life.  
xlvii See Deleuze and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy?, in the chapter “What Is a Concept?” for a detailed 
discussion on concepts (1994: 15 -24).  They argued, for example: “There are no simple concepts” (3).   
xlviii In the “Translator’s Forward: Pleasures of Philosophy” in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014) Brian Masssumi wrote: “the authors steal from other disciplines with 
glee, but they are more than happy to return the favour” (xv).  See also M. Foucault: Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (1977: 208).   
xlix Michael Polanyi, in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1974) argued: “Throughout this 
book I have tried to make this situation apparent.  I have shown that into every act of knowing there 
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enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no 
mere imperfection but a vital component of his [or her] knowledge” (viii).   
l See Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002: 27).   
li See, for example: Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (2014: 16) and 
Deleuze’s Foucault (2010: 37).   
lii Spelling and punctuation is as in original document.  
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